Mairi John Blackings Why Peace Fails: The Case of South Sudan’s Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan Mairi John Blackings | Why Peace Fails: The Case of South Sudan’s Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan Why Peace Fails in South Sudan? ii Mairi John Blackings | Why Peace Fails: The Case of South Sudan’s Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan Mairi John Blackings The Case of South Sudan’s Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan iii Mairi John Blackings | Why Peace Fails: The Case of South Sudan’s Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan About the author Mairi J. Blackings is a Professor of Literary Linguistics, University of Juba, South Sudan. His research interest is in cultural studies and language and power. He is the author of six books, which includes The Big Men of Africa: The Anomie of African Leadership in Wole Soyinka’s Plays. 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The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.” iv Mairi John Blackings | Why Peace Fails: The Case of South Sudan’s Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ............................................................................................ 6 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 6 Analyzing the Context ........................................................................................ 8 Inadequate capacity for conflict management .......................................................................... 8 Military integration gone wrong ................................................................................................ 9 Absorption’s unintended consequences.................................................................................... 9 Absorption of the SSDF ............................................................................................................ 10 Reversing imbalance by creating imbalance ............................................................................ 10 Divided loyalties and the Malong crisis.................................................................................... 11 Blurry institutional boundaries ................................................................................................ 11 Analysing the Actors ........................................................................................ 12 An inner circle of sectarian elites ............................................................................................. 12 Proliferation of opposition actors ............................................................................................ 12 Ethnic militias ........................................................................................................................... 13 Regional neighbours ................................................................................................................. 14 Analysis of Interaction Between Context and Actors ...................................... 15 Flawed approach to peacemaking ........................................................................................... 15 Challenges of credibility and impartiality ................................................................................ 16 Exclusion as incentive for spread of war .................................................................................. 17 Failing the security arrangements puzzle ................................................................................ 17 Questionable TGoNU legitimacy .............................................................................................. 18 Weak institutions and a culture of impunity ........................................................................... 18 Diffusion of conflict to the local level ...................................................................................... 19 The economy of war ................................................................................................................ 21 Arms purchases fuelling war .................................................................................................... 21 Quest for control of the oil ...................................................................................................... 22 Guns and livelihoods ................................................................................................................ 22 Conclusions and Appraisal ............................................................................... 23 References ...................................................................................................... 25 5 Mairi John Blackings | Why Peace Fails: The Case of South Sudan’s Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INTRODUCTION The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) signed in 2015 between in South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed between the the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan Government of South Sudan and the armed Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army in opposition group referred to as the Sudan Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) was meant to restore Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army – in peace and stability to South Sudan, but it failed Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) in August 2015. The to do so. The key parties to the agreement agreement was meant to restore peace, security signed because of the tremendous international and stability in South Sudan following a political pressure they were under rather than out of disagreement within the ruling Sudan Peoples’ conviction of the provisions of ARCSS. They Liberation Movement (SPLM), which erupted signed amidst public protest and reservations. As into violence in December 2013. This was barely a result, none of the signatories felt ownership three years after the secession of South Sudan of the agreement. Since none of them felt from the Sudan in July 2011. The political committed to the agreement, its disagreement quickly degenerated into open implementation was taken as no one’s warfare, which tragically came to be personified responsibility. Each party was expecting outside in the persons of Salva Kiir Mayardit, the forces to put pressure on the other, especially President of South Sudan and his then deputy, Dr with regard to the provisions the other party had Riek Machar. The pair hails from the two reservations about or which they felt would dominant ethnic groups in South Sudan, the threaten their existent privileges. Dinka and the Nuer, respectively. The genesis of the conflict was political, but the execution of The international community, through their the war, especially the targeted killings, the backing of and support for IGAD, was the recruitment and deployment of the army quickly midwife to the agreement. These international introduced ethnic elements to the conflict. The actors were however conspicuously absent main parties to the conflict – both the when needed most, especially when the government and the SPLM-in Opposition – have agreement started unravelling very fast in July been accused of war crimes and crimes against 2016. Events were allowed to unfold and take humanity in their execution of this deadly and their course, without any meaningful costly war. international intervention. The lack of robust and effective strategies for managing any The agreement, for all intents and purposes, has disputes arising from the agreement can be collapsed, notwithstanding contrary claims from identified as one of the contributing factors the government and the SPLM-IO faction in leading to the collapse of ARCSS. government. Most of the provisions of the agreement, apart from the formation of the The inability of the IGAD and Troika to ensure Transitional Government of National Unity that the parties delivered on what they had (TGoNU), are either lagging behind or have not committed to with their signatures has been one been implemented at all. of the weaknesses of this peace agreement. The sheer knowledge that one can get away with There are questions to be asked not only about flouting the will of the international community the legitimacy of the SPLM-IO faction in the with impunity may breed and already has bred government under Taban Gai and whether they all sorts of problems: wilful obstructions, can still speak in the name of SPLM-IO; or harassment and intimidation of individuals or whether they should now be considered as part parties who are trying or willing to implement of the SPLM-in Government (SPLM-IG) rather stipulated provisions. than SPLM-IO in any future negotiations; and therefore, whether they are able to deliver on 6 Mairi John Blackings | Why Peace Fails: The Case of South Sudan’s Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan the peace agreement, whose implementation is Sudan, August 26th, 2015, not without adding an miles behind schedule, at all. addendum outlining 16 points of reservations, which have yet to be addressed. The parties, Navigating one’s