armenia azerbaijan urope e Disinformation belarus czech republic resilience estonia esilience esilience georgia astern astern r e hungary D in central latvia lithuania moldova anD eastern poland romania entral an entral c slovakia Disinformation Disinformation in europe ukraine Kyiv, 2018 Coordinator: Scientific editors: olga chYzhoVa anDrei YeliseYeu, Volha DamaraD Design and layout: VladyslaV KulYK Proofreading: Brien Barrnet, anthonY caseY, timothY Wells, richarD roman Disinformation resilience in central anD eastern europe This research is aimed at assessing national An integral part of the research vulnerabilities and preparedness to counteract is the Disinformation Resilience Index, foreign-led disinformation in 14 countries which is quantitative assessment of exposure of Eastern and Central Europe. The Visegrad states to Kremlin-led disinformation and the level (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), Eastern of national resilience to disinformation campaigns. Partnership countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Romania are covered. KYiV, 2018 All rights reserved. Any reproduction or copying of this work is allowed only with the permission of the publisher and right holders. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of the any organization participating in preparing the publication. content Foreword . 5 DRI Methodology . 13 Disinformation Resilience Index (DRI) . 23 Armenia . 27 Azerbaijan . 51 Belarus . 69 Czech Republic . 101 Estonia . 117 Georgia . 135 Hungary . 157 Latvia . 171 Lithuania . 189 Moldova . 209 Poland . 237 Romania . 265 Slovakia . 281 Ukraine . 301 Conclusions . 329 On research team . 335 Volha DamaraD, anDrei YeliseYeu Eurasian States in Transition research center foreWorD Recently, the notion of resilience has been extensively researched and discussed in relation to information warfare,[ 1 ] a comprehensive concept incorporating far-reaching varieties of actions, from planned and coordinated information operations in times of war and peace by a wide range of state or state-affiliated and non-state actors to sporadic actions centred on information influence, attempting to affect societal and political processes. The most recent examples of the use of such warfare include the Lisa case in Germany (2016),[ 2 ] US presidential elections (2016),[ 3 ] activity of Kremlin media and bots during the UK referendum (2016)[ 4 ], and the French presidential elections (2017).[ 5 ] The NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016 highlighted the issue of ‘resilience as a core element of collective defence’[ 6 ], which has become a progressing mode of security and strategic communication studies. The European Commission in its Communication ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action’ (2017) defines resilience in a broader sense as ‘the adaptability of states, societies, communities and individuals to political, economic, environmental, demographic or societal pressures, in order to sustain progress towards national development goals’.[ 7 ] For this research, the definition of ‘disinformation’ proposed by Bennett and Livingston is applied, understood as ‘intentional falsehoods spread as news stories or simulated documentary formats to advance political goals.’[ 8 ] Accordingly, ‘disinformation resilience’ is the adaptability of states, societies, and individuals to political, economic, and societal [ 1 ] For this paper, the term ‘information warfare’ should be understood as ‘coordinated and deniable activities that are initiated by a state actor and which are aimed at influencing the decisions, perceptions, and behaviour of political leaders, the population, or particular target groups (such as experts and media) with the objective of achieving the state actor’s security policy objectives, mainly through the dissemination of misleading or incorrect information, often complemented with other actions tailored for the purpose that is being pursued.’ – Adopted from Čižik, Tomáš, ed. 2017. Information Warfare: New Security Challenge for Europe. Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs. http://www.cenaa.org/data/databaza/Information%20Warfare%20+%20cover.pdf, cited in Pernik, Piret. 2018. “Hacking for Influence: Foreign Influence Activities and Cyber-Attacks.” International Centre for Defence and Security. https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/IMG/2018/Publications/ICDS_Analysis_Hacking_for_Influence_Piret_Pernik_February_2018.pdf. [ 2 ] Janda, Jakub. 2016. “The Lisa Case. STRATCOM Lessons for European States.” Berlin: Federal Academy for Security Policy. [ 3 ] “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections.” 2017. National Intelligence Council. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. [ 4 ] “Putin’s Brexit? The Influence of Kremlin Media & Bots during the 2016 UK EU Referendum.” 2018. 89up. https://www.slideshare.net/89up/putins-brexit-the-influence-of-kremlin-media-bots-during-the-2016-uk-eu-referendum. [ 5 ] “Patterns of Disinformation in the 2017 French Presidential Elections.” 2017. Bakamo. http://bit.ly/2IRSHFU. [ 6 ] Shea, Jamie. “Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defense,” 2016. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/EN/index.htm [ 7 ] Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action’. 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/join_2017_21_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v7_p1_916039.pdf. [ 8 ] Bennett, W Lance, and Steven Livingston. 2018. “The Disinformation Order: Disruptive Communication and the Decline of Democratic Institutions.” European Journal of Communication, 2018. 6 intentional pressure and falsehood spread in various formats of media, including TV, radio, print and online media, (and) social media, to influence political and economic decisions, including thought- targeting particular vulnerable groups’. The aim of this research is to assess the level of resilience to foreign, foremost Kremlin-led, disinformation in 14 countries of Eastern and Central Europe, including the Visegrad states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), Eastern Partnership countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), Baltic states, and Romania. Based on an analysis of data collected by the EU’s East StratCom Task Force in its Disinformation Reviews, four basic categories of disinformation were singled out, namely: a ) unsourced or falsified claims; b ) non-credible claims with sources; c ) claims based on earlier unsourced or non-credible claims; and, d ) conspiracy theories.[ 9 ] Consequently, scholars argue that Kremlin disinformation is effective thanks to a variety of methods, which all can be classified within three categories, namely, exploiting differences in media systems (strategic asymmetry), targeting of disenfranchised or vulnerable audiences (tactical flexibility), and having the ability to mask the sources of disinformation (plausible deniability).[ 10 ] It follows that a national digital containment strategy is able to undermine Kremlin efforts to weaponise information if it is effective in three key components, namely closing the strategic asymmetry gap, obstructing tactical flexibility, and denying deniability. The country chapters’ and DRI indicators’ design partly reflects these considerations. The exploratory research design[ 11 ] is based on desk research, in-depth expert interviews, and online expert surveys. Such triangulation serves as confirmation to overcome any potential problems with validity and bias and completeness in clarifying and justifying the obtained [ 9 ] Bjola, Corneliu, and James Pamment. 2016. “Digital Containment: Revisiting Containment Strategy in the Digital Age.” Global Affairs 2 (2): 131–42. [ 10 ] Ibid. [ 11 ] Kothari, C.R. 2004. Research Methodology. Methods and Techniques. New Delhi: New Age International (P) Limited, Publishers. foreword 7 data.[ 12 ] The country desk research is aimed at giving a systemic analysis of a country’s media landscape, legal and institutional framework, as well as a statistical overview and data on the existing fact-checking, digital-debunking initiatives, and media literacy programmes and projects. In-depth interviews are aimed at providing insight to information ‘to understand the sense that actors give their actions’,[ 13 ] and for a ‘naturalist vision’[ 14 ] of a particular issue. Country experts conducted at least 10 in-depth interviews with representatives of the media community (media experts, editors of national media outlets, renowned journalists), specialised NGOs (fact-checking initiatives, national associations of journalists, NGOs working in the field of media literacy, etc.) and officials of relevant state bodies. The names and affiliation of the quoted individuals are mentioned in the chapters if they granted their informed consent to country experts to be mentioned. Online expert surveys were conducted with the aim to construct a quantitative Disinformation Resilience Index (DRI) across the CEE countries. All country chapters follow the same structure and include the following sections: Introduction, Vulnerable Groups, Media Landscape, Legal Regulations, Institutional Setup, Digital Debunking Teams, and Media Literacy Projects. Conclusions and Country Recommendations are proposed per country. Furthermore, chapters are enriched with