Research on Pre-Electoral Intervention by Foreign Countries in a Digital World

Research on Pre-Electoral Intervention by Foreign Countries in a Digital World

Research on Pre-Electoral Intervention by Foreign Countries in a Digital World The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Gilani, Syed. 2018. Research on Pre-Electoral Intervention by Foreign Countries in a Digital World. Master's thesis, Harvard Extension School. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42004033 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Research on Pre-Electoral Intervention by Foreign Countries in a Digital World Syed Gilani A Thesis in the Field of International Relations for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies Harvard University November 2018 © 2018 Syed Gilani Abstract The election is now over, The result is now known. The will of the people Has clearly been shown. Let’s all get together; Let bitterness pass. I’ll hug your Elephant; And you kiss my Ass. —Hillary Clinton, 2018 The 2016 U.S. presidential election is long over, but the will of the people is still being contested in the media and by many in the general public. Bitterness has severely divided the nation along ideological fault lines, and hugs and kisses are far from reality. Alleged Russian intervention in the U.S. national elections, in favor of Republican nominee Donald J. Trump, has been named as one of the major problems of this recent post-election discord across America. Foreign governments have intervened in the pre-election processes of other countries for a long time, often by overtly or covertly using economic and military muscle. For the first time, however, a major world power has used cyberspace and digital media to try to alter the outcome of elections held by another major world power. Digital media, especially social media, is a relatively new phenomenon. It is not easy to clearly associate the actions of rogue individuals and organizations who may have engaged in cyber espionage, coercion, and/or unlawful intervention with the specific policies and actions of their respective governments. For some time now, countries have been exploring the potential of cyberspace to extend their political, economic, and strategic influence beyond permissible and customary international law and treaties. In the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, U.S. intelligence chiefs, social media experts, political pundits, and representatives in the U.S. Congress became confident that the Russian government was directly involved in various attempts to influence the election outcome. I examine the principles of nonintervention and sovereignty under current international legal frameworks and compares current practices of nonintervention between countries with customary international law and treaties. The research specifically focuses on the role of digital media, in particular social media, as a tool for effective pre-election intervention in a country by a foreign government. It evaluates different digital intervention tactics frequently used by a foreign government while at the same time skirting around the nonintervention charter of the United Nations and customary international laws. I also provide a fuller understanding of the challenges of attribution, that is, associating the actions of citizens with a country. I recommend steps for managing possible threats to the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention as they exist under current international legal frameworks. Dedication To my wife, Aasma, for being the voice of reason and energy in my life. My journey at Harvard was made possible by your continuous support. To my children—Zayna, Myda, Ali Asad and of course Rehma—for their flexibility and willingness to cooperate with my study schedules during this Master’s degree process. And to my son residing in heaven, Samad Ali—although I didn’t get to spend much time with you, I will always miss you. I am forever grateful for each one of you. v Acknowledgements I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis advisor, Dr. Doug Bond, for his constant encouragement, guidance, and support. I would also like to thank my thesis director, Professor Gabriella Blum for her patience, engagement, and comments throughout this thesis process. Profound gratitude to my dear wife, Aasma, and to my parents, Anujan and Abujan, for their support throughout my degree program. I am forever thankful for your love and support. vi Table of Contents Dedication............................................................................................................................v Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ vi List of Figures.................................................................................................................... ix I. Introduction..............................................................................................................1 II. Research, Methodology, and Limitations ................................................................7 Methodology..........................................................................................................11 Limitations .............................................................................................................11 III. Definition of Terms................................................................................................13 IV. A Normative Approach to Nonintervention ..........................................................16 Coercion Under Customary International Law......................................................22 Espionage and International Law...........................................................................24 State Responsibility for Violations by Non-State Actors ......................................26 V. Current Practice and the Normative Approach......................................................29 Foreign Intervention by Major Powers..................................................................30 Risks of Cyberspace...............................................................................................34 VI. Methods of Digital Intervention.............................................................................37 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks ...................................................................39 DDoS Attacks During Elections ....................................................................40 vii Server Hacks ..........................................................................................................41 Hacking During U.S. Elections..................................................................42 Hacking During European Elections .........................................................43 Fake News..............................................................................................................44 Fake News and U.S. Presidential Elections...............................................46 Fake News and European National Elections............................................49 VII. Analysis..................................................................................................................52 VIII. Conclusion .............................................................................................................59 References..........................................................................................................................62 viii List of Figures Figure 1. Overt and Covert Activities Considered to be Interventions.............................4 Figure 2. Percent of US Adults Who Use at Least One Social Media Site.......................8 Figure 3. Differences in Social Media Use .......................................................................9 Figure 4. Intervention by the US and USSR/Russia in Foreign Countries .....................33 Figure 5. Increasing Size and Sophistication of DDoS Attacks......................................39 Figure 6. Twitter Feed from Possible Cyber Attacker ....................................................41 Figure 7. Examples of Fake News Chatter......................................................................45 Figure 8. Examples of Fake News on Social Media .......................................................47 Figure 9. Fake News........................................................................................................48 ix Chapter I Introduction In recent years, powerful countries have begun to interfere in the electoral processes of other countries, either covertly or overtly, using economic and military espionage and coercion. Since the advent of cyberspace and digital media, cross- border dialogue between people has taken new shapes as a result of a new generation of platforms like Facebook, YouTube, Google, and Twitter—each managing and promoting information in different ways. Global norms of nonintervention have been long settled in Customary International Law (CIL) through various international and regional agreements1 and international treaties. Yet these platforms have expanded public engagement at all levels and increased the likelihood of some level of influence on the outcome of foreign electoral processes through misinformation and/or coercive campaigns. The U.S. has a long history of pre-electoral intervention

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