Al-Qaeda’s Quest for Non-Conventional Weapons, 1996-2006 The history behind the hype by Anne Stenersen Master’s Thesis in Arabic Spring 2008 Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages University of Oslo Summary The aim of the thesis has been to describe the nature of al-Qaeda’s interest in non- conventional weapons, as reflected by the network’s own statements and activities in the period from 1996-2006. The analysis has been divided into two parts: First, I have critically examined primary and secondary source material in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the history of al-Qaeda’s pursuit for non-conventional weapons. Second, I have discussed why there is a lack of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) innovation within the al-Qaeda network. The conclusion to the first part is that the al-Qaeda network’s interest in using unconventional means appears much lower than commonly anticipated. Al-Qaeda’s efforts have been concentrated on crude and easily obtainable CBRN materials, not on developing actual warfare agents. Also, a preference for conventional weapons and tactics is evident on all levels within the network. There are no strong indications that al-Qaeda’s interest for non- conventional weapons has increased after 2001. With regards to the lack of CBRN innovation, I conclude that the al-Qaeda network clearly lacks some of the characteristics typical of past ‘CBRN terrorists’, such as a millenarian ideology or an ‘expressive attachment’ to this particular type of weapon. In addition, however, I argue that al-Qaeda’s networked structure itself prevents innovation, rather than promoting it. There are at least two possible explanations for this: first, the global nature of the network makes mobility an alternative to innovation; and second, al-Qaeda’s loose organizational structure increases the need for carrying out operations that can immediately be identified with the al-Qaeda ‘brand’. 2 Table of contents SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................................... 2 PREFACE.............................................................................................................................................................. 5 A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION................................................................................................................... 6 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 7 1.1 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................................................... 8 1.2 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS...................................................................................................................... 14 2 FRAMEWORK FOR MY APPROACH................................................................................................. 15 2.1 FOUNDATIONAL PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE STUDY OF MILITANT ISLAMISM .................................... 15 2.2 REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE...................................................................................................... 16 2.2.1 Literature describing al-Qaeda’s quest for CBRN weapons......................................................... 16 2.2.2 Literature on the phenomenon of CBRN terrorism ....................................................................... 19 2.2.3 Literature on the process of innovation in militant organizations ................................................ 24 2.3 HOW I WILL USE THIS FRAMEWORK AS SUPPORT FOR MY ANALYSIS ................................................... 28 3 METHODS AND SOURCES ................................................................................................................... 31 4 BACKGROUND ON CBRN TERRORISM AND AL-QAEDA ........................................................... 34 4.1 THE PHENOMENON OF ‘CBRN TERRORISM’........................................................................................ 34 4.1.1 The history of CBRN terrorism ..................................................................................................... 34 4.1.2 How significant is the phenomenon?............................................................................................. 35 4.2 AL-QAEDA AND THE GLOBAL JIHADI CURRENT................................................................................... 37 4.2.1 What is al-Qaeda?......................................................................................................................... 37 4.2.2 Al-Qaeda’s goal and strategy........................................................................................................ 39 4.2.3 Are all tactics acceptable? ............................................................................................................ 40 5 THE HISTORY OF AL-QAEDA’S QUEST FOR CBRN WEAPONS................................................ 42 5.1 AL-QAEDA CENTRAL .......................................................................................................................... 42 5.1.1 Written and oral statements .......................................................................................................... 42 5.1.2 Actual plans and activities ............................................................................................................ 50 5.1.3 The CBRN interest of Al-Qaeda central........................................................................................ 55 5.2 AL-QAEDA AFFILIATES ....................................................................................................................... 57 5.2.1 The case of Iraq............................................................................................................................. 58 5.2.2 The CBRN interest of al-Qaeda affiliates in Iraq.......................................................................... 62 5.3 AL-QAEDA LOCALS ............................................................................................................................ 63 5.3.1 Jose Padilla................................................................................................................................... 64 5.3.2 The Courneuve-Romainville group (“The Chechen Network”).................................................... 65 5.3.3 Kamal Bourgass and the “ricin plot” ........................................................................................... 69 5.3.4 Dhiren Barot ................................................................................................................................. 72 5.3.5 The CBRN interest of al-Qaeda locals .......................................................................................... 75 5.4 AL-QAEDA SYMPATHIZERS................................................................................................................. 76 5.4.1 Jihadism Online ............................................................................................................................ 76 5.4.2 Chemical and biological manuals................................................................................................. 81 5.4.3 Radiological and Nuclear manuals............................................................................................... 90 5.4.4 The nature of online CBRN discussions ........................................................................................ 93 5.4.5 The CBRN interest of the al-Qaeda sympathizers......................................................................... 96 5.5 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS...................................................................................................... 97 5.5.1 What kinds of CBRN weapons are al-Qaeda interested in?.......................................................... 97 5.5.2 How important are CBRN weapons in relation to other types of weapons and tactics?............... 98 5.5.3 How has al-Qaeda’s interest in CBRN weapons developed?........................................................ 99 6 EXPLAINING THE LACK OF CBRN INNOVATION...................................................................... 100 6.1 CBRN WEAPONS ARE NOT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN THE GOAL .......................................................... 100 6.2 LACK OF ‘EMOTIONAL ATTRACTION’ TO CBRN ............................................................................... 102 6.3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ......................................................................................................... 104 3 7 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................ 107 REFERENCES.................................................................................................................................................. 109 ARABIC SOURCES ............................................................................................................................................ 109 Books, articles and communiques.............................................................................................................. 109 Jihadi training manuals............................................................................................................................. 110 Jihadi websites..........................................................................................................................................