Document généré le 26 sept. 2021 22:34 Refuge Canada's Journal on Refugees revue canadienne sur les réfugiés Decade of Despair: The Contested Rebuilding of the Nahr al-Bared Refugee Camp, Lebanon, 2007–2017 Are John Knudsen Volume 34, numéro 2, 2018 Résumé de l'article À la mi-2007, le camp de réfugiés de Nahr al-Bared a été détruit par l’armée URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1055584ar libanaise alors qu’elle combattait Fatah al-Islam, un groupe de rebelles DOI : https://doi.org/10.7202/1055584ar islamistes. Ce confit, l’un des confits internes les plus importants après la guerre civile libanaise, a déplacé environ 30 000 réfugiés palestiniens. Dix ans Aller au sommaire du numéro plus tard, le camp reste encore à reconstruire entièrement ; en réalité, sa reconstruction est lente, confictuelle et insufsamment financée. Cette reconstruction est contestée et retardée par une opposition politique, par un Éditeur(s) manque de fonds, et par des problèmes complexes de propriété foncière et patrimoniale. Aujourd’hui, environ la moitié des familles déplacées ont pu Centre for Refugee Studies, York University retourner au camp, l’autre moitié restant déplacée à l’intérieur du pays, vivant de manière temporaire dans d’autres camps ou dans des appartements loués. ISSN Cet article analyse la lente reconstruction du camp de Nahr al-Bared, et tout particulièrement les enseignements qui peuvent être tirés quant au relogement 0229-5113 (imprimé) des réfugiés dans un espace militarisé d’exception. 1920-7336 (numérique) Découvrir la revue Citer cet article Knudsen, A. (2018). Decade of Despair: The Contested Rebuilding of the Nahr al-Bared Refugee Camp, Lebanon, 2007–2017. Refuge, 34(2), 135–149. https://doi.org/10.7202/1055584ar Copyright (c), 2018 Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d’auteur. L’utilisation des services d’Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d’utilisation que vous pouvez consulter en ligne. https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/ Cet article est diffusé et préservé par Érudit. Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l’Université de Montréal, l’Université Laval et l’Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. https://www.erudit.org/fr/ Volume 34 Refuge Number 2 Decade of Despair: The Contested Rebuilding of the Nahr al-Bared Refugee Camp, Lebanon, 2007–2017 Are John Knudsen Abstract Résumé In mid-2007 the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near Tripoli À la mi-2007, le camp de réfugiés de Nahr al-Bared a été was destroyed by the Lebanese Army battling an insurgent détruit par l’armée libanaise alors qu’elle combattait Fatah Islamist group, Fatah al-Islam. Displacing about 30,000 al-Islam, un groupe de rebelles islamistes. Ce conflit, l’un des Palestinian refugees, it was one of the largest internal bat- conflits internes les plus importants après la guerre civile tles in post–civil war Lebanon. A decade later, the camp has libanaise, a déplacé environ 30 000 réfugiés palestiniens. yet to be fully rebuilt; indeed, reconstruction has been slow, Dix ans plus tard, le camp reste encore à reconstruire entiè- conflictual, and underfunded. Rebuilding the camp has rement ; en réalité, sa reconstruction est lente, conflictuelle been contested and delayed by political opposition, fund- et insuffisamment financée. Cette reconstruction est contes- ing shortfalls, and complex ownership of land and property. tée et retardée par une opposition politique, par un manque About half of the displaced families have been able to return, de fonds, et par des problèmes complexes de propriété fon- the remainder are internally displaced, living temporarily cière et patrimoniale. Aujourd’hui, environ la moitié des in other camps or rented apartments. This article analyzes familles déplacées ont pu retourner au camp, l’autre moitié the slow-paced reconstruction of the Nahr al-Bared camp restant déplacée à l’intérieur du pays, vivant de manière and especially what can be learnt from rehousing refugees temporaire dans d’autres camps ou dans des appartements in a militarized space of exception. loués. Cet article analyse la lente reconstruction du camp de Nahr al-Bared, et tout particulièrement les enseignements © Are John Knudsen, 2018. This open-access work is licensed under a Creative Cette œuvre en libre accès fait l’objet d’une licence Creative Commons Attribu- Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Licence, which permits tion-NonCommercial 4.0 International License, laquelle autorise l’utilisation, la use, reproduction, and distribution in any medium for non-commercial purposes, reproduction et la distribution de l’œuvre sur tout support à des fins non commer- provided the original authorship is credited and the original publication in Refuge: ciales, pourvu que l’auteur ou les auteurs originaux soient mentionnés et que la Canada’s Journal on Refugees is cited. publication originale dans Refuge : revue canadienne sur les réfugiés soit citée. 135 Volume 34 Refuge Number 2 qui peuvent être tirés quant au relogement des réfugiés dans In 1983 the Nahr al-Bared camp was destroyed by inter- un espace militarisé d’exception. factional battles, but there was no concerted post-war effort to rebuild the camp or other camps, and they were hap- Introduction hazardly rebuilt as money and resources allowed.10 In 1986 the Shatila refugee camp in south Beirut was ruined by the n 20 May 2007, after weeks of minor skirmishes, factional infighting that became known as the “War of the heavy fighting broke out between the Lebanese Camps.” The destitute residents were given individual grants Army and Fatah al-Islam, a militant Islamist group for reconstruction, but without any plan or coordinating Othat had infiltrated the Nahr al-Bared camp near Tripoli body to steer reconstruction.11 Unplanned and underfunded (figure 1). After fifteen weeks of intense bombardment and reconstruction has made refugee camps like Shatila remain gunfire, the camp was reduced to rubble and the death toll overcrowded slums,12 without proper sewage, water, and had reached 500, including around 226 militants and 179 electricity infrastructure.13 There is no historical precedent soldiers.1 At least 50 civilians were also killed in the bloody for the systematic rebuilding of refugee camps destroyed by standoff that forced the camp’s 30,000 residents to flee, most war in Lebanon. of them to the Beddawi refugee camp located ten kilometres Programs that seek to refurbish, upgrade, or improve to the south, doubling the camp’s population. This was one of dilapidated Palestinian refugee camps are typically met the biggest internal conflict events since end of the civil war with suspicion, as they are seen as a potential threat to the in 1990. Following in the wake of nationwide political crises— refugees’ “right of return [to Palestine]” as attested by case the 2005 assassination of former premier Rafik Hariri and the studies from the Jordan valley and Syria.14 This problem 2006 July War with Israel—the battle turned into a proxy war becomes even more acute when a refugee camp is not only between pro-Syrian and pro-Western government blocs.2 upgraded, but rebuilt after being purposively destroyed. Cautious of being drawn into an urban street fight in the An example is Linda Tabar’s study of the rebuilding of the alleyways of the camp, the army resorted to mortar fire and West Bank Jenin refugee camp ravaged by Israeli bulldozers aerial bombardment of the camp.3 The sustained bombing in 2002.15 The reconstruction of Jenin’s ruined centre and accounted for the enormous physical destruction of the Nahr rebuilding the 500 destroyed houses took three years and al-Bared camp.4 Almost 6,000 residential and commercial was contested among residents in the camp and vis-à-vis units were damaged or destroyed, as was the camp’s rudimen- UNRWA. The camp’s stakeholder committee wanted to rebuild tary infrastructure: electricity, water, and sewage.5 The army’s the camp “as it was” and it was adamant that the new access siege trapped civilians inside the camp, ignoring calls for a roads should replicate the narrow streets of the old centre truce by humanitarian groups. The last civilians were evacu- as a means of community protection. This demand brought ated from the camp in late August, more than two months after the committee into conflict with UNRWA planners, who the battle began. In September, after more than one hundred argued that narrow roads were neither feasible nor desir- days of sustained bombing, the last Fatah al-Islam fighters able. UNRWA’s vision for unhindered vehicular access was were defeated and the remaining 215 militiamen taken into shared by other residents viewing wide access roads as pref- custody.6 Palestinian officials from Hamas and the Palestine erable, despite legitimate security concerns. The disagree- Liberation Organization (PLO) differed in their response to the ment delayed planning and divided residents. In the end, the army’s siege of the camp but, fearing reprisals against the refu- committee was sidelined, and the proponents were branded gees, chose to protect the residents at the expense of the camp.7 “emotional,” “self-interested,” and therefore “political,” as Lacking protection from political patrons, the camp could be opposed to UNRWA’s masterplan cast as neutral and univer- destroyed without consequence. The Nahr al-Bared residents sal.16 UNRWA pushed through with the plan for seven-metre were a marginal and isolated minority that could be marked roads, almost twice the maximum demanded by the com- out as disposable; indeed, only in a refugee camp would a mittee and three times wider than the pedestrian footpaths.