University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1998 Hume's skepticism. Dennis F. Thompson University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Thompson, Dennis F., "Hume's skepticism." (1998). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2316. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2316 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HUME'S SKEPTICISM A Dissertation Presented by DENNIS F. THOMPSON Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 1998 Philosophy Copyright by Dennis F. Thompson 1998 All Rights Reserved HUME'S SKEPTICISM A Dissertation Presented by DENNIS F. THOMPSON Approved as to style and content by: V-fl/vC- C . Vere C. Chappell, Chair This work is dedicated in loving memory to William Arthur Thompson (1947 - 1994) " "Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning . [A Treatise of Human Nature, I. IV. VI I] ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In acknowledging those who have made it possible for me to complete this dissertation I must express my deepest gratitude to my sister, Mary. Without her support and encouragement I would not have been able to pursue my undergraduate education and thus would not even have begun the process of writing this work. I must also express my gratitude to my first and most inspiring philosophy professor, F. Russell Sullivan, whose excellent instruction provided the foundation for my futher work in philosophy. Of course, I thank the members of my dissertation committee, Bruce Aune, Bob Sleigh, Howard Ziff, and in particular my Ve r > © Chappell, who has not only been a patient, encouraging, and helpful advisor but has provided me with a model of careful scholarship. Finally, I thank my wife and best friend, Karin, for her love, support, and inspiration throughout my graduate student career. VI ABSTRACT HUME'S SKEPTICISM MAY 1998 DENNIS F. THOMPSON, A. A. , NORTH SHORE COMMUNITY COLLEGE B.A. , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS BOSTON Ph . D . , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor Vere C. Chappell David Hume has traditionally been regarded as a skeptic, perhaps the most formidable in the history of Western philosophy. Since the publication of Norman Kemp Smith's Philosophy of David Hume in 1941, however, there has been an increasing tendency to downplay the skeptical dimension of Hume's philosophy, in some cases to the point of denying that Hume is a serious skeptic, or even a skeptic at all. Much of the motivation for a nonskeptical reading of Hume comes from recognition of his endorsement of empirical science and his own project of founding a "science of man. Recent scholarship has, in my opinion correctly, recognized Hume as a constructive rather than a purely destructive thinker. Yet this recognition has, in my opinion incorrectly, gone hand in hand with a tendency to overlook or deny the skeptical side of Hume's thought. skepticism. In this work, I address the issue of Hume's Hume's skepticism is more I believe that though the issue of complicated than is suggested by some of those who interpret him as a skeptic, nevertheless the traditional view is more true to Hume's texts than is a nonskeptical interpretation. I argue, on the basis of a reading of the Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic with regard to much of our alleged knowledge. In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic I mean that (i) Hume's skeptical pronouncements are in general sincere, not ironic, (ii) Hume's skepticism extends to a large part of our alleged knowledge, and (iii) Hume's skepticism is a result of his substantive philosophical views. In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic I mean that though Hume doesn ' t prescribe eschewal of beliefs that are not rationally justified, he thinks that much of our alleged knowledge essentially involves beliefs that cannot be rationally justified and that hence much of our alleged knowledge is not knowledge at all. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vi ABSTRACT vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS „ x Chapter INTRODUCTION 1 I. HUME'S SKEPTICISM AT THE CLOSE OF BOOK I OF THE TREATISE 9 II. HUME'S ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION AND CAUSAL INFERENCE 35 III. HUME'S INDUCTIVE SKEPTICISM RECONSIDERED: THE STOVE INTERPRETATION 78 IV. HUME'S INDUCTIVE SKEPTICISM DENIED: THE BEAUCHAMP AND ROSENBERG INTERPRETATION AND THE GARRETT INTERPRETATION 125 V. HUME'S SKEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO REASON AND THE SENSES 172 VI. HUME AS METASKEPTIC: THE BAIER INTERPRETATION 219 VII. SCIENCE, NATURALISM, AND HUME'S SKEPTICISM 254 BIBLIOGRAPHY 290 IX LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Throughout the following chapters all references to A Treatise of Human Nature and the Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature are to the second Selby-Bigge edition and all references to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding are to the third Selby-Bigge edition of the the Enquiries . I will use the following abbreviations in citing Hume's works: T: A Treatise of Human Nature [References to the Treatise will be by Book, Part, Section, and page number except where that information would be redundant. For example, a reference to the first section of the third part of the first book of the Treatise would have the form (T, I. III. I, n) ] A: Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature [References to the Abstract will be by page number only.] E: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding [References to the Enquiry will be by section, part, and page number except where that information would be redundant. For example, a reference to part two of section seven would have the form (E, VII. II, n) ] Treatise Abstract, All references to works other than the , page and the Enquiry will be in author-date form with . numbers only. Exceptions to full author-date citation where required to avoid redunancy will be announced in the text. Cited works will be listed under "Works Consulted" following chapter VII Nl . INTRODUCTION 1 David Hume has traditionally been regarded as a skeptic, perhaps the most formidable in the history of Western philosophy. This traditional view of Hume has not been limited to his contemporaries, to those who ignore Hume's aspirations concerning a "science of man," or to those who are generally unsympathetic to empiricism or unappreciative of Hume's genius. For example, in A History of Western Philosophy , Bertrand Russell writes of Hume that It is evident that he started out with a belief that scientific method yields the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; he ended, however, with the conviction that belief is never rational, since we know nothing. After setting forth the arguments for skepticism. .he goes on, not to refute the arguments, but to fall back on natural credulity (Russell [1945] , 671) Russell, however, also says this of Hume: To refute him has been, ever since he wrote, a favourite pastime among metaphysicians. For my part, I find none of their refutations convincing; nevertheless I cannot but hope that something less sceptical than Hume's system may be discoverable (Russell [1945] , 659) In spite of the widespread acceptance of the traditional view of Hume's philosophy as skeptical, since the publication of Norman Kemp Smith's Philosophy of David Hume in 1941, in which he presents searching criticism of what is generally referred to as the "Reid-Beattie" interpretation 1 of Hume, there has been a tendency to downplay the skeptical dimension of Hume's philosophy, in some cases to the point of denying that Hume is a serious skeptic, or even a skeptic 1 at all . I agree with Kemp-Smith's criticism of the Reid- Beattie interpretation insofar as that interpretation presents Hume as a solely destructive thinker intent only on taking empiricism to its logical conclusion. I do not, however, agree with any interpretation of Hume according to which he is not a serious skeptic. In this work, I will address the issue of Hume's skepticism. I believe that though the issue of Hume's skepticism is more complicated than is suggested by some of those who interpret him as a skeptic, nevertheless the traditional view is more true to Hume's texts than is a nonskeptical interpretation. I will argue that in fact Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic with regard to a large part of our alleged knowledge, that is, that for Hume much of our supposed knowledge is not knowledge at all because the relevant beliefs cannot be rationally justified. In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic I mean that (i) Hume's skeptical pronouncements are in general sincere, not ironic, (ii) Hume's skepticism extends to a large part of our alleged knowledge, (and hence is broader than, for example, what one might refer to as Kant's Hume's skepticism is "skepticism" about noumena) , and (iii) a result of his substantive philosophical views concerning 2 topics such as causation, causal inference, and the extent of our conceptual capacity, that is, the extent of our meaningful thought. In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic I mean that though Hume doesn't prescribe eschewal of beliefs that are not rationally justified, he thinks that much of our alleged knowledge essentially involves beliefs that cannot be rationally justified and that hence much of our alleged knowledge is not knowledge at all.