On the Plausibility of a Strong Transcendental Response to Scepticism Rosemary Jane Smith PhD University of York Philosophy May, 2015 Tom Stoneham Abstract I argue that the strong transcendental strategy can offer us a serious and robust response the sceptic who doubts that we can have knowledge of the extra-mental. This sceptic is motivated by sceptical hypotheses to worry that I could have all the thoughts and experiences I do in fact have if the world were radically different to how I take it to be. Transcendental arguments start from a premise about our thoughts or experience and move on to show that something must be the case because it is a necessary condition of our having such thoughts or experience. As such, transcendental arguments are particularly well- positioned to answer this sceptic, as the premises of a transcendental argument are drawn from the mental propositions the sceptic accepts. Some philosophers have argued that the same concerns that drive the sceptic to doubt the extra-mental should also give her cause to doubt the mental. To prevent the sceptic retreating to this thought, I show that these arguments are only effective against propositions that were unlikely to form the basis of a transcendental argument. Strong transcendental arguments (STAs) are differentiated from weak transcendental arguments as being those that move from mental premises to conclusions about the extra- mental world. I defend STAs against Stroud‘s objection that this is not possible, on the basis that the objection rests on an illicit assumption of dualism about mind and world. I argue for the plausibility of supervenience physicalism as a metaphysical picture upon which such inferences would be possible. I show how a dispositionally essentialist understanding of the laws of nature would plausibly support a metaphysically necessary psychophysical law, from which we could draw the bridging premise of an STA. This changes the dialectic, forcing the sceptic to defend specific metaphysical positions, such as resemblance nominalism, and to engage substantially with philosophy. The plausibility of strong transcendental arguments tells us something of what must be true of the world for the sceptic‘s arguments to even get started. 2 Tom Stoneham ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................. 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................. 7 AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ......................................................................................................................... 8 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 9 1.1 SCEPTICISM DEFINED .................................................................................................................... 9 1.2 SCEPTICISM, APPEARANCE, AND REALITY IN LITERATURE ..................................................................... 13 1.3 A POTTED HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SCEPTICISM ........................................................................... 16 1.3.4 SIXTH CENTURY BC—JAINIST EPISTEMOLOGY ......................................................................................... 19 1.3.2 FIFTH CENTURY BC—SOCRATIC SCEPTICISM ........................................................................................... 19 1.3.3 FOURTH OR SIXTH CENTURY BC—LAOZI ................................................................................................ 20 1.3.4 FOURTH CENTURY BC TO THIRD CENTURY AD—PYRRHONIAN SCPETICISM .................................................. 21 1.3.5 THIRD TO FIRST CENTURY BC—ACADEMIC SCEPTICS ................................................................................ 22 1.3.6 FOURTH CENTURY AD—AUGUSTINE ..................................................................................................... 23 1.3.7 MEDIEVAL SCEPTICISM ........................................................................................................................ 23 1.4 SCEPTICISM AS AN ENDURING CONCERN .......................................................................................... 25 1.5 TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AS A RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM ............................................................ 26 CHAPTER 2: TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................ 30 2.1 THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION ................................................................................................ 30 2.2 KANT’S COPERNICAN TURN .......................................................................................................... 32 2.3 THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM ...................................................................................................... 35 2.3.1 TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND MATERIAL IDEALISMS ............................................................................ 35 2.3.2 THE PROOF ........................................................................................................................................ 36 2.3.3 THE KANTIAN AND CARTESIAN ‘I AM’ ............................................................................................. 38 2.3.4 TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM, BERKELEYAN IDEALISM, AND SCEPTICISM ....................................................... 41 2.4 AUSTIN ................................................................................................................................... 45 3 Tom Stoneham 2.5 STRAWSON: INDIVIDUALS ............................................................................................................ 48 2.6 STRAWSON’S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION AND THE BOUNDS OF SENSE ............................................... 50 2.7 STROUD AND TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS .................................................................................. 52 2.7.1 TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AS ANTI-SCEPTICAL ................................................................................. 53 2.7.2 GOALS FOR TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................ 55 2.7.3 STRAWSON: NATURALISM AND SCEPTICISM ............................................................................................ 56 2.7.4 STROUD AND WEAK TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS................................................................................ 57 2.7.5 STROUD’S TAXONOMY OF TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS ........................................................................ 59 2.8 WHY A STRONG TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS MY SCEPTIC ................................. 60 2.8.1 AGAINST WEAK TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS ..................................................................................... 61 2.8.2 STRAWSONIAN WEAK TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS ............................................................................. 62 2.9 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 63 CHAPTER 3: WHAT’S SO SPECIAL ABOUT THE MENTAL? ........................................................................ 64 3.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 64 3.2 DOUBTING ONE’S OWN MIND ...................................................................................................... 65 3.3 EMOTION ................................................................................................................................. 66 3.3.1 ANTICIPATED AND REMEMBERED EMOTION ............................................................................................ 67 3.3.2 LINGUISTIC VAGUENESS ....................................................................................................................... 68 3.3.3 DISTINGUISHING MOODS AND EMOTIONS .............................................................................................. 69 3.3.4 PRESENTLY FELT EMOTIONS.................................................................................................................. 70 3.4 VISUAL EXPERIENCE .................................................................................................................... 73 3.4.1 ‘I THINK I CAN PROTRUDE MY TONGUE WITHOUT ITS COMING OUT’ ............................................................. 73 3.4.2 ‘I SEE A SEAL AS MY SISTER’ ................................................................................................................... 74 3.4.3 ‘I THINK I SEE A RED CARPET THAT’S NOT RED’ .......................................................................................... 75 3.4.4 INTROSPECTION, INTROSPECTIVE JUDGEMENTS, AND NEUROSURGEONS FROM ALPHA CENTAURI ..................... 78 3.4.5 BLINDSIGHT ....................................................................................................................................... 80 3.5 PERIPHERAL AND FOVEAL VISION ................................................................................................... 80 3.6 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THOUGHT .............................................................................................. 83 3.7 THE GENERAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................