TESIS DOCTORAL 2016 MORALITY AND MINDREADING IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS SUSANA MONSÓ GIL LICENCIADA EN FILOSOFÍA PROGRAMA DE DOCTORADO EN FILOSOFÍA DIRECTOR: DR. JESÚS ZAMORA BONILLA (UNED) CODIRECTOR: DR. MARK ROWLANDS (UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI) TESIS DOCTORAL 2016 MORALITY AND MINDREADING IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS SUSANA MONSÓ GIL LICENCIADA EN FILOSOFÍA PROGRAMA DE DOCTORADO EN FILOSOFÍA DIRECTOR: DR. JESÚS ZAMORA BONILLA (UNED) CODIRECTOR: DR. MARK ROWLANDS (UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI) 2 Para Mavi y Cote. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis is the result of four years of hard work, during which I have received help from a great number of individuals. There are three people in particular, however, without whom this dissertation would not have existed as such, and I must begin by thanking them. My first big thank you goes to my advisor, Jesús Zamora, who gave me the opportunity to be a part of his team at UNED and the freedom to pursue this somewhat unorthodox research topic. I am very grateful for his support, his trust in me, and his perpetual good humour. My second big thank you goes to David Teira, Head of the Department of Logic, History, and Philosophy of Science at UNED, who gave me all the strategic and bureaucratic advice that I needed, pushed me to be more ambitious from the very first day, and took great care of me even though I was never his direct responsibility. My last big (immense, gigantic) thank you goes to my external co-advisor, Mark Rowlands, who took on the task of supervising my work out of pure altruism. It’s hard to imagine how I could have made it without his thoughtful guidance, his many words of encouragement, and his sincere belief in my project. I have shared my time at the Department of Logic, History, and Philosophy of Science at UNED with several brilliant graduate students, who have not only become good friends, but also taught me a great deal at our many seminars, reading groups, and informal discussions: Agata Bąk, Álex Díaz, José Ángel Gascón, Javier González de Prado, and Marco Antonio Joven. Most of them have additionally read parts of this dissertation and given me feedback that infallibly helped improve my work. Over the course of my PhD studies I have been fortunate to enjoy two stays abroad. I first spent three months at the University of Miami, as a result of a short-stay research grant from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. I would like to thank Mark Rowlands for his help with this, and his willingness to work side by side with me during my time there. Thanks, as well, to Eugene Rosov, Alice Lowe, Sagid Salles, Damien Dupasquier, Shan Haq, and the rest—my adoptive family—, all of whom made me feel at home. I’m also 4 grateful to the dogs—Chico, Licker, Hennessy, and Unique—who were so much fun to live with and taught me several important lessons on animal morality. During my final year, I also had the chance to spend three weeks in Vienna, as part of a lectureship contract at the Messerli Research Institute. This was an exhilarating and inspiring experience, not only because I learnt so much from teaching my students there, but also because I got the chance to meet and discuss my work with several scholars who have research interests close to mine. I would like to thank Judith Benz-Schwarzburg and Herwig Grimm for this opportunity, as well as Eva Schwarzinger for helping me out with all the necessary paperwork. During these last four years, I have also attended many conferences, workshops, and seminars where I have sometimes come across inspiration for my own work. These include the many invited talks organised by the Department of Logic, History, and Philosophy of Science at UNED, the ‘Pain in Animals’ conference held at the University of Glasgow in 2013, the 2014 ISAZ meeting at the University of Vienna, and a talk by Françoise Wemelsfelder at the Messerli Research Institute. I have also presented my own work at various venues, where I’ve always received interesting—sometimes crucial—feedback: the ‘What is cognition?’ workshop at the Ruhr-University of Bochum, the 2013 graduate conferences organised by the SEFA and the SIFA, the 3rd Graduate Seminar on Philosophical Research organised by UNED, the 4th Research Workshop on the Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Science held at the University of Granada, the ‘De-intellectualizing the mind’ workshop at UNED, the philosophy of mind workshop at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Miami, and the 17th edition of the Taller d’Investigació en Filosofia held at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. I’m especially grateful for having had the opportunity to present at this last meeting, since the criticism that I received from my commentator, Claudia Compte, as well as from some of the attendants, made me reconsider many aspects of my work and, in the end, served to greatly strengthen my dissertation. This thesis has further benefited from feedback from various anonymous reviewers for the journals Argumenta, Biology & Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, and Mind & 5 Language. Several of the arguments I present in this dissertation have also been shaped, in one way or another, by the many conversations that I’ve had with philosophers and other scholars during these last few years. Special mention is due to Collin Allen, Kristin Andrews, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg, Samuel Camenzind, José Ángel Gascón, Javier González de Prado, Herwig Grimm, Annika Huber, Richard Moore, and Laura Nuño de la Rosa, all of whom provided me with key tips. Thanks, as well, to Mauricio Suárez, for his part played in convincing me to pursue a PhD. And thanks to Cristian Saborido, for constantly reminding me that I was doing fine. These acknowledgements would not be complete without a mention to my family and friends. I’m lucky enough to have two parents who have unwaveringly supported my choice of career, and made countless sacrifices to ensure I could be whomever I wanted to be. For that, I am immensely grateful. To the rest of my family and friends—they know who they are—, thanks for providing a refuge away from my thesis, and for never doubting that I would make it. Special thanks to Julia Schell and Pablo ‘Susu’ Suárez, who have understood my academic struggles better than anyone else, and continued to inspire me with their multiple talents and energetic attitude towards life. My final—and most important—word of thanks goes to my two life companions, who have shared this journey with me and never failed to lift me up when I was falling. My dog, Tote, was the one who sparked my interest in the animal mind, and I’m grateful for all he has taught me ever since—not least that you don’t need much intelligence to love and care for others. But my deepest gratitude goes to my partner, Javi, who has been incredibly patient and supportive throughout the many emotional peaks and valleys that come with writing a thesis. Thanks for understanding and, above all, for making me laugh every day. 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Resumen ....................................................................................................................................... 9 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 10 1.1. The question and why it matters .................................................................................... 10 1.2. Theoretical framework .................................................................................................. 13 1.3. Structure of the dissertation .......................................................................................... 16 2. Moral Animals? ..................................................................................................................... 19 2.1. The evidence ..................................................................................................................... 20 2.1.1. Experimental evidence .............................................................................................. 21 2.1.1.1. The cooperation cluster ..................................................................................................... 21 2.1.1.2. The fairness cluster ............................................................................................................ 23 2.1.1.3. The altruism cluster ........................................................................................................... 26 2.1.2. Observational evidence ............................................................................................. 31 2.1.2.1. The cooperation cluster ..................................................................................................... 32 2.1.2.2. The fairness cluster ............................................................................................................ 34 2.1.2.3. The altruism cluster ........................................................................................................... 35 2.1.3. Anecdotal evidence ................................................................................................... 37 2.1.3.1. Grade 1 anecdotal evidence ............................................................................................... 38 2.1.3.2. Grade 2 anecdotal evidence ............................................................................................... 42 2.2. The theoretical case against animal morality .................................................................. 45 2.2.1. A common (and problematic) argument