Morals by Convention The rationality of moral behaviour Vangelis Chiotis Ph. D. Thesis University of York School of Politics, Economics and Philosophy September 2012 Abstract The account of rational morality presented in Morals by Agreement is based, to a large extent, on the concept of constrained maximisation. Rational agents are assumed to have reasons to constrain their maximisation provided they interact with other similarly disposed agents. On this account, rational agents will internalise a disposition to behave as constrained maximisers. The assertion of constrained maximisation is problematic and unrealistic mainly because it does not explain how the process of internalisation occurs. I propose an amended version of constrained maximisation that is based on a conventional understanding of social behaviour and the social contract. Repeated interactions between rational agents lead to the creation of social conventions, which in turn serve as supportive mechanisms for behaviours that reinforce their stability. In addition, established social conventions facilitate and ensure information sharing, thus making it possible for conventional agents to know others' dispositions. The development and establishment of social conventions are best described and explained through an evolutionary account of social structures. The evolutionary account offers a more powerful and more realistic method of discussing cultural evolution, since it considers large populations over long periods of time and the interdependence between social structures and individual behaviour. In this context, information availability ensures that the most efficient conventions take over and maximising strategies become dominant. While for Gauthier moral behaviour depends on constrained maximisation, in the conventional account of morality it comes about as a result of repeated interactions between rational agents within the bounds of social conventions. 2 Table of Contents Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................5 1. Introduction..................................................................................................................6 1.1 The social contract tradition....................................................................................7 1.2 Game theory as a tool for the moral philosopher....................................................9 1.3 Naturalising the social contract ............................................................................12 1.4 Thesis overview....................................................................................................14 2. The Gauthier Project and its critics.........................................................................17 2.1 A morally free zone ..............................................................................................19 2.2 Minimax Relative Concession..............................................................................22 2.3 The Lockean Proviso............................................................................................26 2.4 Constrained Maximisation....................................................................................28 2.5 The Archimedean Point.........................................................................................32 2.6 Overview of the “Gauthier Project”......................................................................34 2.6.1 Weak Morality..........................................................................................35 2.6.2 Moral Principles.......................................................................................39 2.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................43 3. Evolutionary Theory in Moral Contractarianism..................................................45 3.1 Methodological Aspects .......................................................................................46 3.2 Spontaneous order.................................................................................................50 3.3 The Stag Hunt ......................................................................................................52 3.3.1 Location ...................................................................................................55 3.3.2 Communication........................................................................................57 3.3.3 Association...............................................................................................58 3.3.4 Coevolution..............................................................................................60 3.4 Game Theory and the Social Contract..................................................................62 3.5 Criticism................................................................................................................67 3.6 Conclusion............................................................................................................73 4. Rationality and Evolutionary Theory......................................................................75 4.1 Why evolutionary theory......................................................................................76 4.1.1 Evolution..................................................................................................76 4.1.2 Evolutionary game theory .......................................................................78 4.1.3 Conclusion................................................................................................79 4.2 Rationality.............................................................................................................80 4.3 Functionalism and conventional behaviour..........................................................86 4.3.1 Functional analysis ..................................................................................86 4.3.2 Rational conventions................................................................................87 4.3.3 Conclusion................................................................................................90 4.4 Evolutionary game theory and constrained maximisation....................................91 4.4.1 Evolutionary game theory........................................................................92 4.4.2 Rationality in evolutionary context .........................................................94 4.4.3 Conclusion................................................................................................98 4.5 Constrained maximisation as conventional rationality.........................................99 4.6 Conclusion..........................................................................................................102 5. Evolution and the Social Contract.........................................................................104 5.1 Dynamic Contractarianism.................................................................................107 5.1.1 The social contract dynamics.................................................................107 5.1.2 Conventional change..............................................................................109 5.1.3 Rationality in the social contract ...........................................................111 5.1.4 Bargaining...............................................................................................112 3 5.1.5 Dynamic contractarianism: Conclusion..................................................114 5.2 Evolutionary Contractarianism...........................................................................115 5.3 Equilibria Selection and Justice..........................................................................121 5.4 Conclusion..........................................................................................................125 6. Conventional rationality and collective benefit....................................................127 The problem of free-riding..............................................................................128 6.1 Free-riding and collective action failure.............................................................129 6.1.1 Free-riding .............................................................................................130 6.1.2 Collective action failure ........................................................................131 6.1.3 The rationale of free-riding.....................................................................133 6.1.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................135 6.2 The prisoner’s dilemma and the tragedy of the commons..................................136 6.2.1 Collective action games .........................................................................137 6.2.2 Solutions for collective action failure ....................................................139 6.2.3 Conclusion..............................................................................................141 6.3 Free-riding within rational conventions..............................................................141 6.4 A response to the Foole.......................................................................................146 6.5 Conclusion .........................................................................................................148 7. Social conventions and Justice................................................................................151