Government of Canada Government Canada’s 2005 Defence Policy Statement. The Evolution of Canadian Defence Policy through the Pragmatic Control Theory of Civil-Military Relations by Brian Frei Colonel (ret’d) Brian Frei, until his recent retirement, was a subsequent implementation. By examining each of these policy Military Police Officer in the Royal Canadian Air Force, serving development processes through the lens of pragmatic control as the Force Protection Advisor to the Commander of Canadian theory, it will illustrate the negative impacts upon military Joint Operations Command in Ottawa. Colonel Frei is a recent effectiveness that resulted from unbalanced relations in 2005 and graduate of the National Security Programme at the Canadian 2008, and postulates that, barring significant changes in global Forces College in Toronto, Ontario. He is also a graduate of the or domestic context, the more balanced relationship that led to Royal Military College of Canada and he holds Masters Degrees the development of Strong, Secure, Engaged in 2017 signals a in Astrophysics and Defence Studies. He is currently President more effective implementation process for the coming years. of Presidia Security Consulting, a private company that is part of the ADGA Group. Studies of civil-military relations focus upon the application of civilian control over the military. At their root, civil-military Introduction relations theories seek to understand how state political sys- tems are best protected from the power of military forces, while ince 2005, Canadian Defence Policy has undergone simultaneously empowering military leaders to protect the state.4 three separate periods of renewal by successive Within modern democratic societies, the risk of a military coup, governments, resulting in three distinct defence the ultimate breakdown of civil-military relations, is minimal. policies: the 2005 Defence Policy Statement,1 the However, the study of civil-military relations often examines the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy, 2 and the 2017 balance of influence between military and civilian leaders on vari- SStrong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy.3 Given the ous issues, such as policies, procurement, and strategy, in what the changing political and global contexts throughout this period distinguished American political scientist Elliot Cohen, Dean of of time, shifts in the balance of influence in the civil-military the Paul A. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, refers relationship can be seen in the three defence policy renewal to as an unequal dialogue: “…unequal in that the final authority processes. This article will explore the role that civil-military of the civilian leader [is] unambiguous and unquestioned.”5 relations plays in shaping Canadian Defence Policy and its 16 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 19, No. 4, Autumn 2019 harmonious relations can contribute positively to military effectiveness.9 But what does military effectiveness mean? A variety of authorities have proposed definitions that relate to the ability of a military to achieve assigned objectives while others base their definitions on measures of professionalism and power. Nielsen’s recognition that military activi- ties span the spectrum of the tactical, operational, strategic and political levels leads her to the conclusion that military effectiveness should likewise be judged at each level.10 To that end, senior Slovenian military officer and distinguished scholar Branimir Furlan’s definition of an effective military as one that “…understands its role and mission and is capable of trans- forming political guidance into effective military action and responses” provides DND Photo/CFJIC CX2004-0074-007 DND Photo/CFJIC a foundation from which to study the implementation of defence policy.11 Prime Minister Paul Martin arriving at CFB Comox in 2004. While some authorities, such as Dr. Peter Feaver, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, choose to focus upon the interactions of individuals MILITARY PROFESSIONAL THOUGHT as principals and agents to under- stand the dynamics of civil-military relations,6 others examine this relation- ship through a variety of structural approaches. Objective civilian con- trol theory postulates that military and civilian leaders occupy discreet structural roles, with military lead- ers abstaining from any political involvement, and civilian leaders exercising a directive control over military policies, but not upon operations.7 In contrast, pragmatic civilian control theory argues that military leaders must be politically sensitive, but not ideological, as they AR2006-G016-0006 DND photo/CFJIC interact collaboratively with civilian leaders to achieve national goals, General Rick Hillier (L), in Kandahar, Afghanistan, 29 September 2006. which are political by definition. As a result, pragmatic control theory suggests that Taken together, these theories suggest civil-military relations exist as a delicate balance that context plays an important role in shap- of influence that may shift “…based on a threat, “As the political, ing the civil control construct at any particular crisis, or mission, instead of position, profession, security or social period of time. As the political, security or 8 or institution.” environments change, social environments change, so too does the delicate balance of civil-military relations. While each of these theories provides a so too does the Pragmatic control theory therefore provides framework to understand the role and balance delicate balance of a particularly useful lens through which to of civilian control over military forces, Colonel civil-military relations.” examine Canadian civil-military relations in Suzanne Nielsen, a Professor of Political Science light of the dual civilian-military leadership and Head of the Department of Social Services at structure of Canada’s Department of National West Point, examines the more practical impacts Defence. Thereafter, military effectiveness can of civil-military relations on military effectiveness. In particular, be examined through the policy implementation process in the Nielsen notes that “…conflict-laden relations between political context of the existing civil-military relations. and military leaders will harm a country’s national security,” while Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 19, No. 4, Autumn 2019 17 In order to evaluate the effectiveness of Canada’s successive When Paul Martin assumed the leadership of the Liberal Party defence policies through a pragmatic control lens, it is necessary of Canada, and the position of Prime Minister from Jean Chrétien to first understand the context in which each policy was developed. in December 2003, he sought to establish a policy position that With each of these three defence policies having been crafted would distinguish his leadership from Jean Chrétien’s. With the under different governments, and in differing global and domestic global war on terrorism and rising public support for defence, Paul settings, the contexts that defined the civil-military relationship Martin turned to his Minister of National Defence (MND), Bill during those periods clearly resulted in shifts in the balance of Graham, to “produce bold, innovative policies.”20 It seems that legitimate military influence.12 With the benefit of hindsight, it Paul Martin was looking to promote integrated foreign and defence is possible to examine the policy commitments in the 2005 and policies that would reassert Canada’s role on the global stage. In 2008 statements against the outcomes that were realized in the keeping with traditional Canadian civil-military relations, Minister intervening years. Thereafter, a comparison of the civil-military Graham first tasked senior bureaucrats within the Department of relations environment of 2005 and 2008 with that of 2017 pro- National Defence (DND) to craft the new defence policy. However, vides a perspective upon the challenges facing implementation after two drafts failed to meet the Prime Minister’s intent, an of Strong, Secure, Engaged. unprecedented decision in recent history was taken. Contrary The 2005 Defence Policy Statement lthough successive Canadian Agovernments have had a long history of exercising a “…strict form of con- trol over the Canadian military,”13 in the year leading up to the publication of the 2005 defence policy statement, Defence: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, General Rick Hillier, then-Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the Canadian Forces,14 was granted exceptional influence over Prime Minister Paul Martin’s defence policy.15 Several authors have examined the civil- military relationship that existed during this period in Canadian military history through Feaver’s principal – agent theory, par- ticularly given the unique relationship that existed between General Hillier and Prime Minister Martin.16 However, for the pur- pose of a comparative study of successive defence policies over a period of thirteen years, pragmatic control theory suggests HSO95-132-23 DND photo/CFJIC that context, and not relationships, plays Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (L), at the G-7 Summit in Halifax, NS. a central role in determining the degree of influence granted to military leaders. With global events shaping domestic policies, Canada had embraced the peace dividend ideal presented by the end of the Cold War, resulting in significant cuts to Canadian Forces budgets and personnel. Coupled with the Somalia Affair, pub- lic opinions about defence and