Arms Control Association Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty A ResouRce Guide foR the 2010 Review confeRence March 2010 Cole Harvey with the ACA Research Staff Arms Control Association Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty A ResouRce Guide foR the 2010 Review confeRence March 2010 Cole Harvey with the ACA Research Staff About the Author Cole Harvey served as a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Arms Control Association from February through November 2009. He is a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh and currently works as a Research Associate for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, D.C. Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Arms Control Association, and in particular Daryl Kimball, for the opportunity to research and write on the variety of nuclear policy issues contained in this report. The process has been enormously instructive. I would also like to thank Tom Collina, Peter Crail, and Dan Horner for reading drafts of the report as it neared completion. Their close reading saved me from the embarrassment of a few subtle, but important errors. Thanks also to Brian Creamer for layout and design, and to Brian Allen for copyediting above and beyond the call of duty. I would also like to acknowledge the authors of the 2005 version of this research guide, Clare Applegarth and Rhianna Tyson, for their important work and inspiration for this, the 2010 edition. Lastly, I am indebted to the Scoville Fellowship for the privilege of entering the arms control field at such an exciting time. Note on Sources The majority of research for this project was conducted using official documents of NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences, the Conference on Disarmament, and the United Nations General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. These documents are available at www.reachingcriticalwill.org as well as via the UN disarmament homepage, http://www.un.org/disarmament. Proposals and state positions listed in the report are based on the most recently available documents. Web addresses listed in the end notes are not maintained by ACA, and may change. Cover Photo UN Secretary General Kofi Annan addresses the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference May 2, 2005 in New York, UN PHOTO/Mark Garten. TAble of CoNTeNTS 1 introduction Key ISSueS 5 verification 9 nuclear fuel cycle 12 export controls and interdiction 15 • sidebar: the indian nuclear deal 16 disarmament 22 fissile Material 24 nuclear testing 26 negative security Assurances 28 nuclear-weapon-free Zones 31 withdrawal 34 strategic Policy 37 institutional issues 39 universality 41 nuclear security 43 notes 50 Appendix 1. Glossary of terms 53 Appendix 2. text of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons 57 Appendix 3. un security council Resolution 1887 61 Appendix 4. the 13 Practical steps, a summary 62 Appendix 5. Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (adopted by the 1995 Review and extension conference) 65 Appendix 6. nPt states-parties, comp. safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols 68 Appendix 7. timeline of the nPt The 2010 NPT Review Conference: introduction An Opportunity to Strengthen the Regime orty years ago, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) set into place one of the most important international security bargains of all time: states without nuclear weapons Fpledged not to acquire them, while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up. At the same time, the NPT allowed for the peaceful use of nuclear technology by non- nuclear-weapon states under strict and verifiable control. The NPT is a good deal that must be honored and strengthened. Since its inception, the NPT has helped to limit fostering greater stability and predictability. the number of nuclear-weapon states to the five The bargain between the nuclear weapons haves with nuclear weapons at the time of its entry into and have-nots was further solidified at the 1995 force (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, NPT Review and Extension Conference, which and the United States) and the four other known led to a decision to extend the treaty indefinitely. nuclear-weapon states (India, Israel, North Korea, and That decision was based on a set of interlocking Pakistan), which are not party to the treaty. Dozens commitments on nonproliferation, the peaceful uses of other states might have the bomb today if not for of nuclear energy, and disarmament that included the NPT and associated measures. Over the years, the the conclusion of negotiations on the CTBT by 1996, NPT security framework, combined with effective the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material diplomacy, has led states such as Argentina, Brazil, cutoff treaty (FMCT), the universalization of the NPT, Sweden, and Libya to abandon their nuclear weapons and the application of comprehensive safeguards ambitions. Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and as a condition for the supply of nuclear fuel and Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons and joined the technology. NPT in the 1990s. In the context of the pivotal 1995 NPT conference, The NPT also makes it far more difficult for non- the nuclear-weapon states issued nonbinding nuclear-weapon states to acquire the material and negative security assurances—pledges not to use technology needed to build such weapons and, if they nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon NPT do, to do so without detection. Intrusive international members—thereby reducing incentives for others to inspections and safeguards against diversion of seek nuclear arms for defense. nuclear technology and material for weapons Leaders from across the globe have worked to purposes are now standard practice. create regional nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) The NPT process and sustained nongovernmental that further reinforce the norm against nuclear pressure have encouraged the United States and weapons possession and use. These include the Russia to take action on several nuclear arms control Treaty of Tlatelolco, which covers Latin America; and arms reduction initiatives, from strategic nuclear the Treaty of Rarotonga governing the South Pacific; Association weapons reductions to a halt on nuclear weapons the Pelindaba Treaty, which establishes an African testing and the negotiation of the Comprehensive NWFZ; the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which created Control Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These arms control an NWFZ in Central Asia; and the Bangkok Treaty agreements have reduced U.S.-Russian nuclear arms on a Southeast Asian NWFZ. The 1995 and 2000 Arms competition and increased transparency, thereby NPT conferences further reinforced the NWFZ 1 concept and, at the urging of a key coalition of non- offensive missile options open, Washington nuclear-weapon states, called for progress toward the unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty, realization of a Middle East NWFZ. effectively sinking prospects for START II, and The 2000 NPT Review Conference again reiterated instead pursued a one-page agreement with Russia to and refined the political commitments of the reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear NPT states-parties to strengthen the treaty in all warheads to no more than 2,200 each by 2012, aspects. Most notably, the 2000 conference led to but without any additional verification provisions. the expression of “an unequivocal undertaking by In 2003 the Bush administration sought and was the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total later refused congressional support for funding for elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to modifications to a U.S. nuclear warhead that would nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are have improved its earth-penetrating capabilities. committed under Article VI” and to the agreement on At the same time, new proliferation challenges a set of 13 “practical steps” on nuclear disarmament, emerged that have shaken the foundation of the including: NPT regime in other ways. In October 2002, U.S. and North Korean negotiators met for the first time since • Achievement of the early entry into force the Bush administration took office. At the meeting, of the CTBT; the U.S. side accused North Korea of seeking uranium- enrichment technology in violation of the 1994 • further irreversible and verifiable Agreed Framework, which froze Pyongyang’s nuclear reductions in nuclear arsenals, including program and put its major nuclear complex under entry into force of START II and preservation international inspection. Washington, along with its of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Japanese and South Korean allies, soon suspended heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea that were • concrete measures to reduce the part of the Agreed Framework. In January 2003, North operational status of deployed nuclear Korea declared it would withdraw from the NPT, weapons; ejected IAEA inspectors, and resumed work related to the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. • the start of FMCT negotiations and the Weeks later, it became known that Iran had establishment of a subsidiary body to discuss been secretly pursuing nuclear activities for years, nuclear disarmament at the Conference on including work on a large uranium-enrichment Disarmament; and complex at Natanz, in violation of its IAEA safeguards obligations. Less than a year later, in early 2004, U.S. • a commitment to the “diminishing role officials revealed that the head of Pakistan’s nuclear for nuclear weapons in security