Human Rights Brief Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 4 2001 Chechnya: Between War and Peace Shara Abraham American University Washington College of Law Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Abraham, Shara. "Chechnya: Between War and Peace." Human Rights Brief 8, no. 2 (2001): 9-11, 37. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Abraham: Chechnya: Between War and Peace Chechnya: Between War and Peace by Shara Abraham* n March 3, 2000, Russia declared the official end of the precedent for other republics to secede. Two years of bitter fight- second war in Chechnya, the first of which occurred ing ensued. By August 1996, Aslan Maskhadov, the leader of the Ofrom 1994–1996. Yet one year later, the Russian military Chechen rebel forces, and Russian General Alexander Lebed continues to carry out its campaign against Chechen indepen- negotiated an agreement providing for a withdrawal of Russian dence with brutality. The war in Chechnya has cost thousands of troops. The agreement notably postponed a decision on Chech- lives, displaced thousands more, and has severely damaged the nya’s constitutional status until 2001. The following winter, republic’s infrastructure. As was the case during the first war, dur- Maskhadov won the presidential elections and became presi- ing the second Chechen conflict the Russian military has per- dent of Chechnya’s separatist government. Six months into his petrated horrors upon the civilian population in Chechnya—from presidency, Maskhadov and then Russian president Boris Yeltsin torture and beatings in notorious “filtration camps” to indis- signed a formal peace treaty ceasing the Russian offensive in criminate shelling and bombings, forced repatriation, and arbi- Chechnya, officially ending the first war. While the peace treaty trary detention and arrest. left open the question of Chechnya’s independence, Russia Russia is a member of the Council of Europe, a State Party to agreed to abide by norms of international law and not exercise the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental force to settle disputes. In the ensuing years, Chechnya has Freedoms (European Convention), a State Party to the Geneva existed under a de facto independence. Conventions, and a signatory to the By August 1999, the Chechen con- Convention on the Prevention and flict was re-ignited. The renewed Punishment of the Crime of Geno- fighting was in part a response to cide. Accordingly, Russia is obligated Reluctance to deal harshly with Russia Chechen aggression in neighboring to respect human rights and human- compromises the international Dagestan and in part to a series of itarian law guaranteed by these instru- commitment to protecting human rights bombings in Moscow and other Russ- ments. Russia’s military offensive in ian cities, which the Russian govern- Chechnya has resulted in blatant vio- and denigrates the credibility of ment blamed on Chechen separatists. lations of these international legal international bodies. On September 15, 1999, CNN’s obligations. Moscow Bureau reported that dozens Thus far, the Russian legal system of suspects and stockpiles of explo- has proven to be ineffective in bring- sives had been seized in connection ing about accountability for Russia’s human rights and human- with the bombings. Having won the presidency largely because itarian law violations in Chechnya. Equally disturbing is the inter- of his opposition to Chechen independence, Russian President national community’s failure to demand accountability from Vladimir Putin has consistently sought to validate Russia’s pres- Russia. Fear of angering and antagonizing Russia has all but par- ence in Chechnya by labeling it an “anti-terrorist operation [that] alyzed the international community, as evidenced in part by its must be followed through to the end.” failure to demand Russian compliance with a UN Commission on Human Rights resolution condemning the atrocities in Chech- Violations of Humanitarian Law nya. Consequently, Russia has been able to violate international The war in Chechnya is characterized by egregious violations human rights and humanitarian law with impunity. Yet there are of international humanitarian law. The Russian military has per- other mechanisms available for pursuing justice in Chechnya. For petrated violent crimes upon the civilian population in Chech- instance, the UN Security Council might establish an international nya, including mass killings, deliberate and indiscriminate shelling criminal tribunal for Chechnya akin to the international crimi- and bombing of civilian areas, arbitrary arrest and detention, tor- nal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Additionally, ture and beatings, systematic rape, and forced repatriation from the UN could establish an international commission of inquiry neighboring Ingushetia into the Chechen war zone. Exacerbat- or prosecute Russia before the International Court of Justice. Out- ing the already dangerous situation, Chechen fighters have used side the UN system, the European community might bring an civilians as human shields. Chechen forces also have summarily inter-state complaint against Russia before the European Court executed Russian soldiers in contravention of humanitarian law. of Human Rights. According to numerous non-governmental organizations, how- ever, Russian forces have committed the majority of abuses. Historical Background Russian military tactics adhere to a pattern of directly target- The self-proclaimed Chechen Republic lies in the northern ing civilians. These tactics breach the requirement enumerated Caucasus region—bordered by Russia to the north and Georgia in Article 48 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Con- and Azerbaijan to the south—and is home to nearly one million ventions. Article 48 provides that “[i]n order to ensure respect Chechens. During the Stalinist era (1924–1953), Chechens, along for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, with other minority groups, were deported to Central Asia and the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between Siberia. In the late 1950s, Soviet authorities permitted Chechens the civilian population and combatants and between civilian to return to their homeland. Having been deprived of their land objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their and economic resources, for decades the Chechens sought inde- operations only against military objectives.” As part of its campaign pendence from the Soviet Union and, after it dissolved, from the in Chechnya, however, the Russian military has carried out three Russian Federation. large-scale civilian massacres. Through detailed interviews with In December 1994, Russian troops invaded the separatist over 500 witnesses, Human Rights Watch documented these Chechen Republic. Three factors supported the invasion: Chech- massacres. In the village of Alkhan-Yurt, Russian troops killed 17 nya’s vast oil resources and the presence of oil pipelines on its ter- civilians during a looting spree and burned homes and raped sev- ritory, Chechnya’s strategic location in the Caucasus mountains, eral women. In the Staropromyslovski district of Grozny, Russian and the fear that permitting Chechnya’s secession would set a continued on next page 9 Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2001 1 Human Rights Brief, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 4 ing beatings and torture. Russian practices in these “filtration camps” violate various provisions of the Geneva Conventions, including Article 3(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits violence to life and person, cruel treatment and torture, and “outrages upon personal dignity.” These acts by Russian forces in Chechnya constitute grave human rights abuses and violate Russia’s humanitarian law oblig- ations under the Geneva Conventions, which protect civilians and other non-combatants during armed conflict. Pursuant to the Con- ventions, Russia is obligated to focus attacks on combatants and undertake safeguards to protect civilians. Moreover, Russia did Photo courtesy of Human Rights Watch not invoke Article 15 of the European Convention, which provides for a right of derogation of international humanitarian law and permits partial limitation of civilian rights during war or a state of emergency. By failing to secure the right of derogation, Rus- sia has breached numerous provisions of the European Con- vention, including Article 3, prohibiting torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and Article 5, which protects the right to life and security of person. Russian military forces in Chechnya. The Elusiveness of Accountability within the Russian Legal System Chechnya, continued from previous page Russia has thus far failed to establish a meaningful account- ability process. In addition to regular law enforcement agencies, soldiers have murdered more than 50 civilians since taking con- Russia established three bodies to deal with human rights abuses trol of the district. In the Aldi district of Grozny, Russian