EASY CASES MAKING BAD LAW: THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY, DISCRIMINATION LAW, AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION Michael Connolly UCL PhD ‘I, Michael Connolly confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.’ i ABSTRACT The definitions of discrimination provided by equality legislation are a measure of how far a society is willing to challenge deep-seated assumptions, attitudes, and patterns of inequality. The judiciary has a major role in shaping these definitions. This is evident from the antecedent American cases and those of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which worked with more aspirational than detailed legislative provisions. One might conclude that the legislation coming before the English courts was thus ‘ready- made’, presenting the judiciary with few interpretive difficulties. But on many occasions this has proved not to be the case, with the senior English courts producing a number of highly contentious decisions. Commentators, heavily critical of many of these cases, tend to analyse them by reference to external understandings of concept, theory, or policy. This work offers a unique internal critique of the process producing the cases subject to such academic scrutiny. It makes a textual analysis of leading English judgments on the definitions of discrimination, and does so through the lens of statutory interpretation - the judge’s primary function. The scrutiny finds that these judgments are technically flawed in terms of the process of statutory interpretation and the definitions produced; it also finds them to be overcomplicated, excessively long, and often unduly restrictive. As such, the thesis is that these cases were better, and more easily, resolvable using conventional methods of interpretation, which would also shape the definitions better to reflect the policies underlying the legislation. Although highlighting inexpert reasoning, the textual scrutiny reveals other threads, particularly notable in the narrow interpretations. There is an adherence to the common law’s notion of binary litigation, envisaging just two individual litigants (e.g. a worker and employer) necessitating a harmed individual and fault-based liability; this is at odds with the societal and group-based purpose of the legislation. One can also detect a lingering historical negative or indifferent attitude to matters of equality, often realised nowadays with an assortment of personal predilections. Consequently, suggestions for reform are based around these findings. ii SUMMARY OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1. COMMON TOOLS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2. AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES AND AIMS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 3. HISTORY OF JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS DISCRIMINATION 4. THE BENIGN MOTIVE DEFENCE AND DIRECT DISCRIMINATION 5. THE BENIGN MOTIVE DEFENCE AND VICTIMISATION 6. PROBLEMS WITH INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION 7. DISABILITY-RELATED DISCRIMINATION CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY iii CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................1 1. The key concepts, drafting, and judges today .............................................................................. 1 2. Existing commentary ................................................................................................................... 3 3. The thesis ..................................................................................................................................... 5 4. Methodology and layout .............................................................................................................. 6 1 COMMON TOOLS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION .......................................................... 15 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 15 AN OUTLINE OF THE HABITUAL RULES ....................................................................................... 18 1. The Literal Rule ......................................................................................................................... 18 2. The Golden Rule ........................................................................................................................ 21 3. The Mischief Rule ...................................................................................................................... 21 4. The Purposive Approach ........................................................................................................... 22 5. Context ...................................................................................................................................... 24 6. Intrinsic Aids to Construction ................................................................................................... 24 7. Extrinsic Aids to Construction .................................................................................................. 26 THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURTS ............................................................................ 30 THE APPROACH OF THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE ......................................................................... 30 1. Context ...................................................................................................................................... 30 2. Enforcement in Member States .................................................................................................. 31 3. Circumventing Direct Effect ...................................................................................................... 33 4. Some General Principles of Interpretation ............................................................................... 34 5. The Rules of Interpretation ....................................................................................................... 38 6. Summary .................................................................................................................................... 40 7. EU Law in the English Courts ................................................................................................... 40 THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE STRASBOURG COURT ....... 41 The Convention in the English Courts ............................................................................................... 45 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 48 2 AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES AND AIMS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW .................... 51 THE MEANING OF DISCRIMINATION ............................................................................................. 51 THE AIMS OF THE LAW ..................................................................................................................... 53 1. Formal Equality ........................................................................................................................ 54 2. Substantive Equality .................................................................................................................. 59 3. Human Dignity and Equality ..................................................................................................... 62 4. Equality, Pluralism, and Compassion ....................................................................................... 66 5. Statutory Purpose ...................................................................................................................... 68 3 THE COMMON LAW AND EQUALITY .......................................................................................... 71 1. The Common Law and Morality ................................................................................................ 71 2. Racial Discrimination ............................................................................................................... 72 3. Gender Discrimination .............................................................................................................. 73 4. Sexual Orientation Discrimination ........................................................................................... 75 5. Religious Discrimination ........................................................................................................... 76 6. A Common Law Principle of Equality? ..................................................................................... 76 4 THE ‘BENIGN MOTIVE DEFENCE’ AND DIRECT DISCRIMINATION .................................. 81 1. Direct Discrimination and Motive ............................................................................................ 81 2. R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS ............................................................... 91 3. Direct Discrimination, the But For test, and the Benign Motive ‘Defence’ .............................. 97 4. Conclusion on JFS .................................................................................................................. 104 5. The Status of the But For Test ................................................................................................. 106 iv 5 THE ‘BENIGN MOTIVE DEFENCE’ AND VICTIMISATION ................................................... 109 1. The legislation .......................................................................................................................