the theme in new ways using different victory resulted as much from Allied ef- battles and their actors. fort as it did from Nazi mistakes. Still, Regarding the Russo-Japanese War, Horne ponders, counterfactually, what Horne explains that while neither the history would have recorded had hubris, Russian nor the Japanese army performed to include ignorance of history and an spectacularly, the Japanese navy surprised ideological and racial fanaticism, not oc- the Western world with its overwhelm- cluded Hitler’s vision when he decided ing victory against the Second Pacific upon the perilous thrust into Russia. Squadron at the Battle of Tsushima, The Axis powers did not have a mo- thereby establishing fertile soil for hubris nopoly on the proclivity to believe in one’s to take root. To wit, according to Horne, infallibility. Indeed, examining General the Japanese naval victory coupled with Douglas MacArthur’s leadership during their Pyrrhic victory in Manchuria not the Korean War and France’s inglorious only forced the Russians to the negotiat- surrender at Dien Bien Phu, Horne writes ing table at Portsmouth in autumn 1905, a fitting recapitulation and coda for the but it also sowed the seeds of the “myth theme of hubris and peripeteia. In the case of Japanese invincibility.” of MacArthur, Horne juxtaposes his demi- Belief in this myth stoked the fires of god status with the shame that followed militarism in Japan during the interwar his dismissal from command. Horne years. Those flames blinded Japan to argues that MacArthur’s belief that “gen- its strategic reality, thereby leading to erals are never given adequate directives,” its overreach in Mongolia, a crippling coupled with his performance leading to Hubris: The Tragedy of War defeat at Midway, and its eventual sur- the Chinese intervention in autumn 1950, in the Twentieth Century render in August 1945. For Horne, stoked his hubris and caused him to act pride caused Japanese leaders to misap- in ways that undermined his civilian lead- By Alistair Horne propriate historical analogy and attempt ers’ policy aims. In turn, a tragic reversal HarperCollins, 2015 to view their battles with the Soviets and of fortune followed as exemplified by the $28.99, 400 pp. Americans as nearly identical to their humiliating “bug out” by United Nations ISBN: 978-0062397805 struggle against Tsar Nicholas II’s Russia forces and President Harry Truman’s de- Reviewed by Ryan A. Sanford in 1905. According to Horne, an earlier cision to replace the general in April 1951. generation’s victory paved the way for its Overall, Horne’s thesis and argument successor’s defeat. Excessive pride made are compelling. There are, however, some ubris, or excessive pride, com- brittle the strategic decisionmaking pro- weaknesses worth noting. While many will prises one part of a tragic dyad. cess where, in fact, elasticity was needed appreciate Horne’s masterful grasp of his- H The other part of the dyad to account for and adapt to changes in tory and his ability to tie together events is peripeteia, or a sudden reversal of the strategic environment. that seemingly do not cohere, his habit of fortune. For historian Alistair Horne, Using the Nazis’ perilous foray into ascribing many of the decisions, actions, the hubris-peripeteia dyad comes to the Soviet heartland as a new subject, and outcomes in his examples to hubris the fore in the decisions and actions of Horne further develops the hubris- ignores the reality that war is inherently some of history’s best-known leaders peripeteia theme. Here, he argues that complex. In other words, the path from and commanders, whose arrogant German arrogance, exemplified by its hubris to disaster is not always straight. overreach led to rapid reversal, defeat, ideology and selective ignoring of his- Nor does every case hinge on individual and shame. In Hubris: The Tragedy of tory, set the foundation for eventual Nazi or institutional hubris. Given the same War in the Twentieth Century, Alistair defeat. Whether discounting the Russian conditions and actors, small perturbations Horne examines six 20th-century battles army’s resurgence in Mongolia or hold- in seemingly insignificant components of to show how an inability to assess the ing in high, but uncritical, regard the the larger battle could result in different strategic context properly, an overesti- Wehrmacht’s performance in Western outcomes. Such is the nature of nonlinear- mation of one’s ability, and, potentially Europe, Horne asserts that Adolf Hitler ity inherent in human endeavor. most significant, an ignorance of histo- never examined the strategic context, and Still, Horne’s argument that hubris ry’s lessons, preceded many inglorious how it had changed, before Operation was the sufficient condition for the re- failures on the battlefield. Much like a Barbarossa. Hitler’s geopolitik and belief versals of fortune in his examples might Baroque composer, Horne establishes in the superiority of ethnic Germans have been more convincing had he used the hubris and peripeteia theme of his blinded him to reality, which led to the methodology of process tracing. Even fugue using the Russo-Japanese War the Nazi reversal of fortune. That said, in failing to follow such a methodology, as the exposition, and then presents Horne acknowledges that the Allied Horne could have provided the reader JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Book Reviews 115 with the tools to conduct such an inquiry. who perished in the wheat-bearing land of With only a limited bibliography and a Gela; paucity of notes, however, such an in- of his noble prowess the grove of Marathon quiry would prove daunting. can speak, Despite these minor issues, Horne’s work is instructive, especially because and the long-haired Persian knows it well. of the author’s consistent reminder of the fate awaiting those who ignore the It serves as one more reminder of past. In fact, such a theme could have why the past appears to be of little use to easily taken pride of place in this work. Americans who look forward to a brave Horne’s explanation of how the Battle of new world. Tsushima, the 1940 Blitzkrieg, and the Professor Paul Rahe has directly chal- Battle of Verdun persisted as analogies lenged those assumptions that history for the Japanese at Midway, for Hitler is bunk. His Grand Strategy of Classical during Barbarossa, and for the French in Sparta is a brilliant study of Spartan strat- Indochina, respectively, shows the power egy during the Persian Wars (500 to 479 analogies wield within the mind of the BCE) that deserves to be read by those decisionmaker. In fact, Horne’s examples few still interested in the conduct of grand provide additional evidence of the power strategy and the choices, good and bad, of historical analogy, much as Yuen Foong made by leaders under the pressures of Khong described in Analogies at War. war. He has laid out the obvious as well For Horne, the arrogant not only tend to as the underlying factors that eventually ignore history, but they also are heavily The Grand Strategy of Classical led to victory on the part of the Spartans inclined to extend beyond their abilities. Sparta: The Persian Challenge and their Greek allies against the great Indeed, Horne’s six examples demonstrate By Paul A. Rahe empire of Persia. The victory of the Greek the validity of Clausewitz’s concept of a Yale University Press, 2015 states was by no means inevitable. Their culminating point and the importance $34.95, 424 pp. opponents not only had an immense of reading the strategic context correctly ISBN: 978-0300116427 superiority in numbers, but from the be- to assess when such overreach will prove ginning also possessed an advantage in the detrimental. Given the complexity of the Reviewed by Williamson Murray general disunity of the Greek city-states. strategic environment in the Pacific and Thus, it took extraordinary political and ongoing operations in the Middle East, strategic skill for a few Greek leaders to such reminders are helpful. t the end of the 20th century hold their fragile alliance together. Finally, some may find Horne’s lack of and the beginning of the 21st For Sparta, its leaders, and their any prescriptive counters to the influence century, Americans and their A strategy, the problem was both internal of hubris to be a detriment. Yet this, too, military leaders have had all too little and external. On one side, they con- is a strength. With a prescription, one sense of the importance of history and fronted a deeply hostile population of can easily fall prey to “checking the box,” too little grasp of literature on thinking helots, whom they ruled with a ruthless- all while treading the path of hubris. about strategy and the role of military ness that still echoes through the ages. Instead, Horne cautions that hubris is power in the world. In fact, in the Those helots were essential to Sparta’s insidious. While one is most vulnerable to massive assault by the literati of the military power because they provided its effects during triumphant moments, intellectual world, America’s elites have the sustenance on which the economy the pathogen lingers. Thus, an awareness come to regard the dead men of ancient and warrior polis depended, since the of its presence is, for Horne, the best Greece as thoroughly suspect and not Spartans forbade any kind of industry or medicine of all. The knowledge of hu- worthy of serious study. In that regard, trade to its warrior citizens, whose sole bris’s infectiousness and the willingness to the stele (tombstone) that marked the business was preparation for war. Not admit one’s fallibility may prove the clos- grave of the great Greek dramatist surprisingly, the Spartans confronted the est thing to an inoculation against hubris Aeschylus identifies him as a veteran of potential of massive revolt among the and its most dangerous manifestation, the pitched battle between the Persians helots, revolts that their neighbors were peripeteia.