ORIGINAL: ENGLISH NATO CONFIDENTIAL 15th March, 1957 . WORKING PAPER ^^ • Acynj-wpy^r COMMITTEE OF POLITICAL ADVISERS TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET POLICY Draft prepared "by the Expert Working Group PART ONE - SUMMARY General Since December there has "been no indication of a change in "basic Soviet intentions. These are: to strengthen the Soviet Union and reconstruct the solidarity of the Communist Bloc; to weaken the non-Communist world - particularly NATO; to cause the withdrawal of allied troops, from Europe and the abandonment of bases around the Soviet periphery; and to encourage neutralism and extend Soviet influence and Communism throughout the world. In pursuing these policies the Soviet leaders recognise the dangers of war in the thermonuclear age and, though maintaining and probably increasing their programme of re-equipment with complex modern weapons, are anxious to avoid a world conflict. 2. Soviet leadership remains stable and there is no sign of a serious split within the Presidium. Khrushchev continues to act as its principal spokesman although his prestige may have been 6omewhnt tarnished. Internal 3. At home, relaxation in some of the harsher and more arbitrary aspects of the régime has led in intellectual circles to more open expression of discontent. This does not amount to a threat to the system. In response, the régime has mounted a vigilance campaign without applying major repressive measures. De-Stalinisation has not been abandoned although efforts to limit its scope hove been made. k* For the economy, 1957 may be a year of readjustment: the planned increase in industrial output for 1957» though considerable DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED (7-1/5) > is the smallest since 19U6, and there are plans for reorganizing the control of the economy. Somewhat greater atten- tion is being paid to consumer interests. Relations among Communist countries 5. In thoir efforts to reconstruct the solidarity of the bloc, the most serious problem facing the Soviet leaders is the Gomulka experiment in Poland and its possible repercussions on the other satellite countries. NATO CONFIDENTIAL *c/l Ig-WP^j 6. Sino-Soviet ties are closer than ever, and China has recently been playing a larger rôle in intra-bloc affairs. 7. Although the Soviet leaders do not seem to want a com- plote break with Yugoslavia, relations have deteriorated sharply since last June as a result of the Soviet efforts to prevent the spread of Titoist influence within the bloc. Foreign policy 8. Although Soviet external policies have faced a period of unexpected tension, the Soviet Union is now seeking to reassert the policy of "peaceful co-existence". The USSR has embarked on a diplomatic offensive in order to regain the initiative and to restore her prestige, so badly tarnished in Hungary. Soviet proposals on disarmament and the Middle East are designed to show the USSR in a peaceful constructive light, while at the same time, through attacks on the Western powers and particularly the United States and the "Eisenhower doctrine", the USSR tries to shift the onus for world tensions to the West. 9. Europe remains the key factor in Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet attitude there is negative and gives no indication that they are considering any withdrawal from their positions in Eastern Europe or any weakening of the military control, which they at present exercise through the Warsaw Pact. They still block the reunification of Germany in freedom, and show no readiness to take into account the legitimate security interests of the West. 10. The Soviet leaders have taken advantage of the Suez crisis to encourage Middle Eastern States in the pursuit of policies which they hope will in the long run lead to the denial of the area s resources to Western nations. Particular attention has been paid to the oil-transit states of Egypt and Syria. Now that the immediate danger of a wider conflagration has passed, they are using their enhanced prestige and influence to encourage Egypt to be intransigent, to prevent a permanent settlement in the Middle Ea3t and especially to counteract any increase in United States influence in this area. 11. Soviet policies in Asia and Africa, although hampered by events in Hungary, have been maintained. Assessment 12. In sum, the Soviet leaders, while faced with serious problems of maintaining bloc solidarity and of keeping internal dissidence under control, still possess a strong, expanding economic base in the USSR and increasingly powerful aimed forces. They have succeeded in surmounting the immediate danger of defections from DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED the bloc. They are now trying to regain the initiative and pur- sue their long-term aims through the policy of peaceful co-existence, but their attitude towards the West remains fundamentally hostile and is accompanied by extreme touchiness in reacting to Western initiatives (e.g. the Eisenhower doctrine). This, with the growing campaign of vigilance within the bloc, suggests that the Soviet leaders are rather less confident than formerly and are now to some extent on the defensive. 13. There is unlikely to "be any radical modification in the present fundamentally hostile Soviet attitude unless there are internal changes within the bloc. Such changes may be assisted by the continuing pressure exerted by the very existence of a strong arid united Western Alliance. There are also certain other fields of action where the policies of Western nations can have an effect. In particular, the Western nations, without relaxing their opposition to Communism, should make the most of any possibilities for assisting evolutionary trends in the bloc. PART TWO LEADERSHIP 1U. The Hungarian crisis gave rise to many rumours about differences within the Soviet leadership over Eastern European problems. No important changes have, however, taken place since December which would appear to affect adversely the relative stabilit; and unity of the political leadership. The meeting of the Supreme Soviet and the Plenum of the Central Committee in February would havo been a convenient opportunity for making such charges, had any been intended. Khrushchev continues to act as principal spokesman for the Party Presidium and although his prestige may have "been slightly tarnished, he has suffered no discernable diminution in authority. Molotov's appointment in late November 1956 as Minister of State Control, and his assumption of the position of overseer of cultural matters probably reflected a desire to put an experienced Bolshevik of conservative views in these posts and did not in itself imply an increase in his overall influence. The reorganization of economic control following the Plenum of the Central Committee, ?0th-2hth December, did not involve any of the older party leaders personally, but concerned primarily high-ranking specialists in the economic field. There are a few signs that Malenkov's position is gradually improving although it may be noted that, whether by design or otherwise, the shift of six Deputy Premiers to the reorganized State Economic Commission leaves Malenkov as the only Deputy Premier who in not also a First Deputy. 15- Shepilov's replacement by Gromyko released him for other duties with the party. It does not necessarily imply a shift in the relative positions of Khrushchev, Molotov and other leaders. Marshal Zhukov received extensive publicity in connection, inter alia, with his 60th birthday on Ist December and his trip to India in February 1957; but it is doubtful if this attention, which reflected Zhukov1 s enhanced personal stature, indicated any change in the role of the armed forces in policy formulation. As previously estimated, the views of the Soviet military, while given DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED increasing weight in Soviet political councils (certainly more than in Stalin's time), do not appear to be determining. In sum, therefore, there seems to be little real change in the make-up of the top Soviet leadership since December, although the interplay cf forces within the collective leadership m .ay be somewhat more balanced. SOVIET INTERNZtL POLICY 16. The foundation of the Soviet leaders' policy is their desire to expand Soviet economic, industrial and military power until it equals and finally surpasses that of the United States and hcr allies, to strengthen the Soviet Union as a base for the inter- national Communist movement, and to further that movement. These policies have remained unchanged although several new factors have recently appeared on tho scene. 17. A new element of major potential importance emerged within tho,Soviet Union as .a result of the process of de-Stalinisation and of û period of rule in which the more "brutal methods of intimidation ï.ave been eschewed. The Soviet leaders have had to take account of long-standing dissatisfaction with Soviet living standards, and with a new mood of dissent amongst students, intellectuals and some of the minority nationalities. This mood has not developed into a concerted movement capable of formulating a series of demands: i; should rather be seen as evidence that a number of persons, notably the young and the thoughtful, hold heteredox opinions which tend to reject the practices current in the party and State system. Ai the same time the Soviet leaders have also to bear in mind the aspirations of the managerial and technological class. This cannot be described as a threat to the régime, although the Soviet authorities can hardly ignore the signs. In response, selective disciplinary measures have been adopted which should lead to a firmer control over the cultural sector, and ensure that the activities of the intelligentsia correspond more closely to the party conception of its proper function.