SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 APRIL, 1951 2155 services in South East Asia that no matter PART IV. how long the struggle against the Japanese THE RE-OCCUPATION OF JAPANESE might have taken, victory would be with us OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ON SUR- in the end. In Sou/th East Asia we had good reason to remember that unequal con- RENDER. test during the dark days of 1941 and 1942, OPERATIONS "TBDERACE" AND "ZIPPER". when the enemy, powerful and well pre- pared, swept through Malaya, occupied Singa- 351. South East Asia Command's assault pore and later Burma. But their ultimate and on Malaya, planned for 9th September, 1945, decisive defeat—when the tide turned against was forestalled by Japanese surrender, thus them, must surely have caused them to re- bringing about a last minute change in plan member the sting of our air forces which, in involving more than 500 aircraft of the due course, swept clear the skies over Burma, Strategic, Tactical and General Reconnaissance and disorganised the land communications of units of the R.A.F. which had been assembled the Japanese army as the ground troops rolled in India, Burma, Ceylon and the Cocos Islands the enemy back through Burma during the for the attack. advance from Imphal to Rangoon. 352. While Operation " Zipper" went for- 346. The Instrument of Surrender was drawn ward on 9th September as arranged, it did so up in English—the only authentic version. on a much modified scale, having quickly In case of doubt as to the intention of our transferred a proportion of its original strength meaning in that Instrument of Surrender, the to 'Operation "Tiderace" and leaving itself decision of the Supreme Allied Commander more in the nature of a display to show the was unequivocal and final. 353. The sudden capitulation of Japan on 347. Under the terms of surrender, all August 14th had brought with it the gigantic Japanese Army, Navy and Air Forces in South task of effecting rapid occupation of the prin- East Asia passed to the control of the Supreme cipal key points throughout the 'Japanese Allied .Commander. occupied territories in South East Asia and 348. I was much impressed by one notice- further afield. able characteristic on the part of OUT enemies 354. South East Asia, in this respect, bore which was in striking contrast to their pre- no comparison to the situation in Europe vious behaviour in this Theatre—some of it where, on the eve of Germany's capitulation, an exhibition of unmitigated barbarism. After the armed might of the Allied forces could the surrender there was a widespread attitude roll along the roads of the Reich to Berlin, of subservient willingness by the Japanese to and the Air Forces sweep over Germany at obey our orders. In Singapore, as in other will from their bases behind the victorious parts of the Command, I observed that the troops. In South East Asia, the Japanese Japanese, officers and men alike, conducted occupied territories were vast. They covered themselves with strict discipline in our presence. Siam, French Indo-China, the Tenasserim They were super-punctilious too, when paying Coast of Southern Burma, Malaya, Singapore respects to members of our forces. While this Island, Sumatra, Java and Borneo. Even far was no doubt correct, it did appear somewhat off Hong Kong became a commitment. unreal. 349. If, at Singapore, the Japanese myth of 355., Headquarters, Air Command, South invincibility still lurked in the midst of the East Asia, based at Kandy, Ceylon, was 1,500 more fanatical Japanese elements, the Supreme miles distant across the Bay of Bengal from Allied Commander must have corrected s'harply its principal air bases in Burma. Yet, such any such belief which was held, in so far was the flexibility of air power, and despite as it concerned the campaign in South East the many and intricate formalities with which Asia. Admiral Mountbatten made it clear the Command was confronted hi implementing and emphatic to Itagaki during the surrender the surrender terms on the eve of the planned ceremony that it was not a negotiated sur- invasion of Malaya, that air formations occu- render, but complete capitulation by the pied bases at Penang on September 5th, Singa- Japanese, after total military defeat. He pore on the 6th, Bangkok on the 5th and informed Itagaki that not only did he possess Saigon and Hong Kong on September 12th. •superior naval, military and air forces at Singa- 356. More vital still was the fact that the pore, .but, in addition, he had a large fleet air forces of my Command had also launched anchored off Port Swettenham and Port upon one of the greatest" 'missions of mercy Dickson where, three days previously, on of the war—the relief and liberation of September 9-th, considerable forces had started thousands of Allied prisoners-of-war from the disembarking at daylight. On the 10th, the misery and privations of their prison camps, .•strength of. that force was 100,000 men ashore. and assisting in their transportation westwards. Indeed, at .the very time of the Japanese signing the Instrument of Surrender at Singa- The Advent of " Tiderace " for Occupation of pore, R.A.F. units were firmly established at Singapore. strategic points throughout the vast territories 357. Capitulation by Japan naturally of this Theatre which, a few weeks beforehand, rendered planning and preparations for the lad been held by the Japanese. assault on Malaya somewhat abortive. But 350. It was also emphasised at the Singapore this was only on a limited scale. -ceremony that the invasion of Malaya would 358. At the end of July, the mounting curve have taken place on September 9th whether of Allied air assaults on Japan was such that the Japanese had resisted or not, and it was it did seem reasonable to presume that an stressed for the particular benefit of General early collapse was a distinct possibility. Accord- Itagaki, 'therefore, that the Japanese were sur- ingly, emergency planning was put in pre- rendering to a superior AMed force in Malaya. paration for the rapid occupation of Singapore.