BROOKINGS 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036-2103 www.brookings.edu ANALYSIS PAPER Number 22, December 2010 UNFINISHED BUSINESS: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward Kenneth M. Pollack Raad Alkadiri J. Scott Carpenter Frederick W. Kagan Sean Kane With contributions from: Joost Hiltermann ANALYSIS PAPER Number 22, December 2010 UNFINISHED BUSINESS: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward Kenneth M. Pollack Raad Alkadiri J. Scott Carpenter Frederick W. Kagan Sean Kane With contributions from: Joost Hiltermann Table of Contents About this Report . iii Executive Summary . iv The Authors . x I . Goals and Influence . 1 II . Politics . 15 III . Security . 30 IV . Governance and Economics . 44 V . Regional Issues . 55 UNFINISHED BUSINESS: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward The Saban Center at BROOKINGS ii About this Report Unfinished Business: An American Strategy for Iraq themselves in violent agreement over what needed Moving Forward is the product of a remarkable to be done . The product of that harmonic conver- transformation . Not the transformation of Iraq, but gence is this report . the transformation of the views of analysts in the United States who work on Iraq . During the spring Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group of 2010, in the midst of Iraq’s post-election wran- attended most of our meetings, participated fully gling, the six members of this group met on several in the conversations, and contributed a number of occasions at small dinners and other meetings re- important ideas to the final product . lated to Iraq . Over the course of those gatherings we realized that although many of us had once dif- As for the rest of us, the views expressed in these fered vociferously in our views regarding American pages are ours alone and do not constitute the po- policy toward Iraq, our disagreements had abated sitions of the American Enterprise Institute, the rather dramatically . Indeed, there seemed to be a Brookings Institution, PFC Energy, the United surprising convergence in our thinking despite our States Institute of Peace, or the Washington Insti- widely differing political backgrounds . tute for Near East Policy . In response, during the late summer and early fall We were extremely fortunate to have the advice of a of 2010, Kenneth Pollack of the Saban Center for remarkable collection of people . Ambassador Ryan Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Crocker, Lt . General James Dubik (ret .), Ambas- convened the group formally as a working group sador Charles Reis, and Emma Sky were all excep- on Iraq . Unfortunately, Frederick Kagan of the tionally generous with their time, experience, and American Enterprise Institute was asked to come expertise . They provided comments on an early to Afghanistan by General Stanley McChrystal to draft of this report and their insights made this a far help the U .S . military with that mission . As a re- better product than it otherwise would have been . sult, Fred had to follow our activities remotely, via We are deeply grateful to them for their wisdom . In emails, written notes from the sessions, and the odd addition, Bob Cassily of the U .S . State Department face-to-face meeting whenever he was in town . The shared the fruits of his experience with the Provin- rest of us spent long hours together hashing out ev- cial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq with us, which ery significant issue related to Iraq and U .S . policy proved invaluable to key sections of this report . toward Iraq . In the end, there were still some differ- Any and all remaining mistakes or stupid ideas are ences among us, but the degree of consensus—and ours alone . consensus on a number of rather bold statements about what the United States will need to do to se- Kenneth M. Pollack cure its interests in Iraq in the future—was remark- Raad Alkadiri able . By the end of our conversations, members of J. Scott Carpenter our group who had once been ready to do great Frederick W. Kagan violence to one another over their differences found Sean Kane UNFINISHED BUSINESS: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward The Saban Center at BROOKINGS iii Executive Summary raq still hangs in the balance . The dramatic im- Washington has announced a strategy to exit, but provements in Iraqi security between 2007 and it has not yet formulated an exit strategy that 2009 have produced important, but incomplete will secure and sustain its interests in Iraq and Ichanges in Iraq’s politics . These changes make it the region. possible to imagine Iraq slowly muddling upward, building gradually toward a better future . Although U .S . influence in Iraq remains substan- tial, it is less than what it has been in the past . It However, Americans must be constantly on guard is diminishing as American troops leave Iraq, as against the considerable potential for Iraq to slip American resources are diverted elsewhere, and as into all-out civil war . There are dozens of scenari- the Iraqis themselves regain the ability to secure os—from military coups, to official misconduct, to their country and govern themselves . This makes it the assassination of one or two key leaders—that all the more imperative that the United States have could spark such violence . The conflict might look a clear strategic concept that establishes clear goals somewhat different than before, perhaps featuring and well-defined objectives that can be achieved Arab-Kurd conflict, greater intra-Shi’i fighting, or with this reduced panoply of tools . various parts of the Iraqi security forces warring for control of the state . An American strategy for exiting Iraq must in- clude a ruthless prioritization of U.S. goals and Iraq’s own internal dynamics and the history of objectives to ensure that the United States directs intercommunal civil wars indicate that if Iraq its residual influence toward securing first what does not find a way to muddle slowly upward is absolutely vital, and only then whatever else toward greater stability, it is far more likely that is possible. it will slide quickly backward into the chaos of all-out civil war than that it would simply mud- The United States will have several different goals dle downward toward an unpleasant, weak, but as it exits Iraq, but these goals, and the objectives minimally stable state that need not concern the they imply, are not all of equal importance, and United States . Washington must recognize the priorities among them . The following should be the priority for U .S . Washington has signaled its intention to withdraw interests in Iraq: U .S . military forces from the country, sooner rather than later . What is not clear, however, is what the 1 . Iraq cannot be allowed to descend back United States hopes to accomplish before its troops into civil war. Because of Iraq’s own resourc- depart and its other resources attenuate, or how it es and its position in the economically vital plans to reach its goals . and geo-strategically sensitive Persian Gulf UNFINISHED BUSINESS: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward The Saban Center at BROOKINGS iv region, it would be disastrous for American For these same reasons, the United States must vital national interests if Iraq were to slip into work in tandem with the United Nations As- an all-out civil war, which still remains very sistance Mission for Iraq, other international or- possible . ganizations, and its allies (in the region, in Eu- rope, and elsewhere) more than ever before. The 2 . Iraq cannot reemerge as an aggressive state. more that the United States can move in synch There is little danger of this in the near term, with the UN and American allies, the more pal- but as the United States works to build a atable American initiatives will be to Iraqis. strong, cohesive Iraq that would not relapse into internal conflict, it also must avoid The most important source of American influ- building one that is so powerful and self- ence moving forward is conditionality . Virtually confident that it will threaten its neighbors . all American assistance needs to be conditioned on Iraqis doing the things that the United States needs 3 . Iraq should ideally be a strong, prosperous them to do, which in every case is likely to be some- U.S. ally. Because it will be difficult enough thing that is in the long-term interests of the Iraqi to ensure that Iraq averts civil war and does people and the Iraqi nation, albeit not necessarily in not emerge as a new “Frankenstein’s mon- the short-term interests of various Iraqi politicians . ster” of the Gulf, this last objective should Conditioning assistance means linking specific as- be seen as an aspirational goal rather than an pects of American activities to specific, related as- irreducible necessity . pects of Iraqi behavior . It also means tying wider aspects of American cooperation with Iraq to the Since Iraq is now a fully sovereign nation enjoy- general course of the Iraqi political system . ing a resurgence of nationalism, it is essential that Iraqis see themselves as benefiting from continued Ultimately, the United States must condition the American involvement in Iraq . The more the Iraqis continuation of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship on believe that the relationship with the United States the willingness of the Iraqi political leadership is of value to them, the more desirous they will be to guide their country in the direction of greater of preserving ties to the United States, and the more stability, inclusivity, and effective governance. willing they will be to overlook American interfer- ence or see it as positive, and the more afraid they Politics will be of losing those ties .