CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 Perilous Prospects: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Peace Process Anthony H. Cordesman Co-Director, Middle East Program Center for Strategic and International Studies December 19, 1995 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved Perilous Prospects: The Arab-Israeli Mil. Balance & the Peace Process 12/19/95 Page 2 To Judith, Dick, Arnaud, Bill, Ahmed, David and my other colleagues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved Perilous Prospects: The Arab-Israeli Mil. Balance & the Peace Process 12/19/95 Page 3 Table of Contents I. Introduction.......................................................................................................................9 The "Conventional Balance"..........................................................................................11 Counting Total Forces....................................................................................................13 II. Military Expenditures and Arms Sales..........................................................................18 Differences in Economic Size and Level of Military Effort ..........................................18 Problems in Dollar Comparisons of Military Expenditures and Arms Sales ................19 What Can Be Learned from Comparisons of Military Expenditures.............................22 Comparisons of Arms Sales and Imports.......................................................................32 The Impact of US Military Assistance...........................................................................38 III. Quantitative Comparisons: Comparing Military Forces By Country...........................45 Understanding the Details Behind Quantitative Comparisons of Total Forces.............50 Total Force Strength and Differences in National Force Structure............................50 The Importance of Reserve Forces and Strategic Warning........................................52 High Quality Weapons Versus Total Weapons .........................................................57 Main Battle Tanks......................................................................................................58 Other Armored Fighting Vehicles..............................................................................64 Anti-Tank Weapons ...................................................................................................70 Artillery Forces ..........................................................................................................71 Multiple Rocket Launchers........................................................................................73 Mortars.......................................................................................................................75 Combat Aircraft .........................................................................................................79 Attack and Armed Helicopters...................................................................................92 Major Surface-to-Air Missile Defenses .....................................................................97 Short Range Air Defenses........................................................................................101 The Size and Role of Naval Forces..........................................................................105 The Inevitable Limits of Quantitative Comparisons....................................................110 IV. The Impact of Qualitative Factors and the “Revolution in Military Affairs”............111 The Israeli Organizational and “Cultural” Edge ..........................................................111 The Arab Organizational and “Cultural” Problem.......................................................121 The Qualitative Weaknesses in Arab and Third World Military Forces .....................127 The Qualitative Advantages of Israeli Forces..............................................................134 The Limits of Israel’s Qualitative “Edge” ...................................................................144 V. Possible War Fighting Outcomes: A Dynamic Net Assessment.................................149 VI. Case One: The Peace Process Fails and A New "Intifada" Takes Place....................155 Palestinian Paramilitary Groups ..................................................................................156 The Role of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad ...................................................................158 Hamas.......................................................................................................................158 Islamic Jihad ............................................................................................................163 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved Perilous Prospects: The Arab-Israeli Mil. Balance & the Peace Process 12/19/95 Page 4 Other Patterns in Terrorist Activity .............................................................................166 The Palestinian Authority Response............................................................................172 Conflict in Gaza...........................................................................................................178 The Security Problem in Gaza .................................................................................178 Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza.........................................................................179 Future Military Clashes in Gaza ..............................................................................181 Conflict on the West Bank...........................................................................................185 Major Security Issues on the West Bank .................................................................186 The New Security Arrangements on the West Bank................................................194 The Palestinian and Israeli Security Problem ..............................................................198 Palestinian Authority Security Operations...............................................................198 Israeli Security Operations.......................................................................................200 “Peace With Abuses” and “Peace With Violence”..................................................208 If Peace Should Fail: The Balance of Forces on the West Bank .................................209 The Role of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iran, and Hizbollah in a Conflict in Gaza or the West Bank..............................................................................................................216 The Impact of the Peace Process on the Military Balance...........................................217 VII. Case Two: A Syrian Grab For The Golan ................................................................219 Comparing Total Syrian and Israeli Forces: Syrian Capabilities.................................219 Comparing Total Syrian and Israeli Forces: Israeli Capabilities .................................224 An Attack Through the Golan Heights Before A Peace Settlement with Syria...........228 An Attack Through the Golan Heights After A Peace Settlement with Syria.............237 Creating A Secure Peace on the Golan ........................................................................241 Israeli and Syrian Positions......................................................................................242 Force Limitation Measures and Confidence Building Measures .............................244 Observation Points, Sensors, and Transparency ......................................................245 The Role of a Peacekeeping or Observer Force and the Role of the US .................247 The Lebanese Dimension.............................................................................................252 The Lebanese Military Forces..................................................................................253 The Syrian Presence in Lebanon..............................................................................257 The Hizbollah and Proxy-Wars in Lebanon.............................................................259 The Israeli Security Zone and the South Lebanon Army.........................................263 Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and the Peace Process..........................................................264 VIII. Case Three: The Collapse of the Peace Process and Conflict Between Israel and Jordan ..............................................................................................................270 Jordanian Support of Palestinian Forces in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel......271 Jordanian "Rescue" of Palestinians in the West Bank: Jordanian Re-Occupation of the West Bank.........................................................................................................274 Arms Control and Security Implications .....................................................................277 IX. Case Four: A Jordanian-Syrian Alliance: The Eastern Front ....................................282 X. Case Five: Islamic Upheaval: Egyptian Crisis with Israel ..........................................288 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved Perilous Prospects: The Arab-Israeli Mil. Balance & the Peace Process 12/19/95 Page 5 Egyptian War Fighting Strengths.................................................................................289