DOSSIER Vocabulary of European Philosophies, Part 2 Following the publication of ʻSubjectʼ in RP 138, we as ʻobjectʼ. Yet as Dominique Pradelle shows, the dis- present here a trio of related entries from Barbara tinction involves ʻan etymological reawakeningʼ upon Cassin (ed.), Vocabulaire Européen des Philosophies: which Kantʼs critical revolution depended. Like that Dictionnaire des Intraduisibles (Editions du Seuil/ revolution itself, however, the precise contours of the Dictionnaires Le Robert, 2004): ʻGegenstand/Objektʼ, distinction remain in dispute. Pradelle argues that ʻter- ʻObjectʼ and ʻResʼ. Within the Vocabularyʼs reconstruc- minologically the distinction between appearance and tion of the complex, multilingual translational history thing-in-itself corresponds to the distinction between underlying the diversity of modern philosophical uses Gegenstand and Objekt in the original textʼ, thereby of ʻsubjectʼ – at once philologically meticulous and directly aligning Objekt with Ding, on the basis of philosophically polemical – the opposition of subject Kantʼs use of the expression ʻobject in itselfʼ. Others to object appears as part of only one of three main have placed more emphasis on the threefold nature of groups of meanings associated with the term ʻsubjectʼ. the chain, Gegenstand– Objekt –Ding, and hence upon Furthermore, in its most basic sense of subjectness the intermediate status of Objekt in Kantʼs discourse. ( subjectité in French, Subjektheit in German) – derived Nonetheless, this intermediate status is given its from Aristotleʼs hupokeimenon via the Latin subjec- due in Pradelleʼs brilliant exposition of the ʻdegrees of tum – the meanings of ʻsubjectʼ are shown to overlap phenomenal objectivityʼ in Kant. This also functions as with those of ʻthingʼ and ʻpragmaʼ (res and causa). We a conceptual transition to the Husserlian lexicon, in the are thus alerted to a fundamental difference between second half of the entry, within which these degrees are the philosophical histories of ʻobjectʼ and ʻthingʼ that transformed into a ʻmultiplicity of types of objectʼ, the is often suppressed in English, in which the terms are ontological status of which is bracketed. In Husserl, it frequently used synonymously, even in philosophical is Gegenständlichkeit that poses the main translational discussions of texts that are structured around this very difficulty. (One question raised by this account for the difference. Grouping together the Vocabularyʼs entries ʻSubjectʼ entry concerns the contribution of Husserlian for ʻGegenstand/Objektʼ, ʻObjectʼ and ʻResʼ allows phenomenology to the concept of the subject. Husserl something of the contradictory richness of this dual is strikingly absence there, along with Hegel.) history to appear. And once again, as was the case in The entries by Olivier Boulnois on ʻObjectʼ and ʻSubjectʼ, Kant is a pivotal figure. Jean-François Courtine on ʻResʼ underline the strength Kantʼs profound, epochal transformation of the of the Vocabularyʼs treatment of medieval philosophy, concept of objectivity was dependent upon a con- in identifying both new conceptual productions and ceptual distinction internal to the general notion of transformations of Greek concepts, respectively. In an object that is marked in German by the differ- the latter case, Courtineʼs entry is especially effec- ence between the terms Gegenstand and Objekt, in tive in showing the mediating role of Arabic phil- their mutual distinction from Ding – the term used osophy in this process, and the enduring philosophical in the Wolffian school of rationalism to determine significance of the developments, particularly in the metaphysical thinghood. (Disappointingly, there is no seventeenth century (ʻthe golden age of Scotismʼ). separate entry in the Vocabulary for Ding. The mark Each indicates something of the extent to which, given of the ambiguous residue of metaphysical realism in its profound historical deficit, Anglo-American philo- Kantʼs critical idealism, it later became an important sophical culture would benefit from the presence of the word for both Heidegger and Lacan.) Vocabulaire as a whole in English. In English, the distinction between Gegenstand and The translations that follow are once again by David Objekt is annihilated in Norman Kemp Smithʼs famous Macey, edited by Barbara Cassin and Peter Osborne. translation of Critique of Pure Reason (1929, reissued 2003), in which the terms are translated indifferently PO 20 Gegenstand/Objekt GERMAN ► OBJECT, and CHOSE, EPOKHÊ, ESSENCE, GEFÜHL, INTENTION, PERCEPTION, REALITY, REPRESENTATION, RES, SACHERHALT, SENS, SUJET, THING, TRUTH, WERT It is really in the so-called transcendental philosophies, which regard objective meaning or objects as the product of acts on the part of the subject, that the translation difficulties pertaining to the register of objectivity arise. They relate for the most part to distinctions between levels of objectivation, or in other words to stages in the production of objective meaning. This leads to a real lexical proliferation that is difficult to translate into English, or into anything other than the original language. Two noteworthy distinctions do however emerge. By splitting the object into a ʻphenomenonʼ [Erscheinung] and a ʻthing-in-itselfʼ [Ding an sich] Kant divides the lexicon of objectivity into two, whilst Husserlʼs rejection of the notion of a thing-in-itself does away with that duality. Levels of objectivation are, for Kant, also related to the doctrine of the faculties and synthetic categories (the table of categories) and, therefore, to the structure of the subject, whilst Husserlʼs rejection of the Copernican revolution and the doctrine of faculties relates them only to the stratification of objective meaning unveiled by essential intuition [Wesenchau]. I. Kant: Objekt and Gegenstand, between A. The split between the phenomenon and phenomenon [Erscheinung] and thing-in- the thing-in-itself itself [Ding an sich] In the Latin of the Dissertatio of 1770, we find two Where the theme of objectivity is concerned, the series of antinomic ontological equations: objectivum transition to critical idealism was an etymological = reale = subjectum irrelativum, subjectivum = ideale reawakening. Gegenstand and Objekt were introduced = sensibile = subjectivum relativum. Objectivum is the to translate the Latin objectum, which comes from opposite of the subjectivum, of that which resides in or objicio (ʻthrow in the way ofʼ, ʻexposeʼ). The German is related to the subject and is therefore identified with gegen adds the idea of ʻdirecting towardsʼ to that of the intelligible (which, unlike the sensible, does not manifestation. It also introduces the idea of resistance: vary from one individual to another) and with realitas the primary meaning of entgegenstehen (the noun is (as opposed to idealitas, which is a characteristic of Gegenstand) is oppositum esse, and the Old High subjective representations or ideas, but not of existing German gaganstentida has the meaning of obstacula; objects). Kant therefore contrasts lex subjectiva, lex and Stand (= stans) means ʻthat which standsʼ and then quaedam menti insita or even conditiones subjecto ʻthat which subsists, that which lastsʼ. The philosoph- propriae (ʻsubjective lawʼ, ʻsituated in the mindʼ, ʻcon- ical term Gegenstand is thus heir to three registers: ditions specific to the subjectʼ: space and time, § 29), das Gegenüberstehende (ʻthat which stands in front with conditio objectiva, such as forma objective sive of meʼ, ʻthat which is op-posed to meʼ); the terminus substantiarum coordinatio (the objective condition, ad quem of a faculty (Gegenstand der Empfidung der objective form as coordination of substances). He Wahrehmung; ʻobject of sensation, of perceptionʼ); and also refuses to accord time and space the status of substance or substantiality. In the pre-critical period, ʻobjectivum aliquid et reale [something objective, or Kant, following the tradition of classical thought, in other words the real]ʼ (§ 14–15], and makes them a makes the register of op-position (phenomenality) ʻ coordination idealis et subjecti [an ideal, or, in other overlap with that of substance (reality in itself). The words, subjective coordination]ʼ. Hence the twofold turn to transcendental idealism represents an attempt meaning of objectum, which corresponds to the two to find the two earlier meanings beneath that of an etymological registers: on the one hand res, ʻexistens ʻobject subsisting in itselfʼ and to think them as a in seʼ, ʻobjectum intellectusʼ (thing-in-itself, the intel- systematic unit: the object is the ʻop-positeʼ [vis-à- ligible cause of sensible affections); on the other, vis] constituted by acts of objectivation on the part of phaenomenon, ʻobjectum sensuumʼ: the faculties (sensibility, imagination, understanding) and their functions, but the thing-in-itself is still its Phaenomena ceu causata testantur de praesentia unknowable epistemological foundation. objecti, quod contra Idealismum. Radical Philosophy 139 (September/October 2006) 21 [ʻPhenomena … being caused, witness the presence Objectivity thus appropriates the etymological of the object, contrary to idealism.ʼ] meaning of ʻmanifested toʼ, as ʻappearing toʼ sensi- § 4. bility through feelings: Objectum = Gegen-stand = Quaecunque ad sensus nostros referuntur ut objecta, phaenomenon = ob-jectum = Dawider = op-posed sunt Phaenomena. [vis-à-vis] to the intuitus derivatus. [ʻEverything that is related to our senses as object is • see box 1 a phenomenon.ʼ]