1 GREECE AND THE OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN WAR OF 1877-1878 Nicholas C. J. Pappas Sam Houston State University A draft paper presented at the conference on the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877- 1878. Sponsored by Meiji University and Middle East Technical University Held in Ankara Turkey, 13-14 December 2005 Greek participation in the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 was characterized chiefly by vacillation. King George and his successive governments had not been eager to involve Greece in a war over predominantly Slavic issues. However, with the outbreak of the war, a significant portion of the Greek press and public began to insist that Greece take advantage of the war in order to gain irridenta. The prospect of Slavic gains, especially in Macedonia and Thrace, prompted the Greek government to cooperate with Greek nationalist organizations to begin sending irregular bands into Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia. In addition, an uprising on Crete broke out in expectation of Greek involvement in the war. Montenegro, Romania and Serbia rejoined the conflict by December 1878, shortly after the fall of Plevna. Greece, however, delayed in mobilizing its troops until January 1878 and did not start moving its forces across the border into Thessaly until 1 February 1878. By that time the war was over. The reasons for Greece’s delay and ultimate tardiness in entering the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 will be the theme of this study. One of the most unusual episodes of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 was the unsuccessful attempt by Greece to play a role in the conflict and thus gain favourable territorial concessions from the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers. Indeed, through much of the Eastern Crisis, Greece could not decide in its policies between remaining neutral or taking part in the war on the side of Russia.1 This indecisiveness and procrastination can be understood by looking at Greece’s relations with Russia, the peculiar nature of politics and the military in the Greek Kingdom, the complex position of the Greek communities in the Ottoman Empire, and Greece’s relations to Russia and the other powers. Let us first look at the condition of Greco-Russian relations during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, especially in comparison to Russian-Bulgarian relations. Greece and Russia had important cultural, religious, economic, political and military links going back to before the attainment of Greek independence. However, the years following the foundation of an independent Greek state witnessed a gradual weakening of Greco- Russian ties. In the nineteenth century, as Greek relations with western Europe broadened and as the real or perceived threat of Russian Pan-Slavism grew, the Greeks increasingly turned away from Russia in pursuit of their national goals. Greek aspirations often conflicted with Russian imperial policy in the Near East. Russia, in turn, sought other surrogates besides Greece among the other emergent Balkan states, such as Bulgaria and Serbia at different times. Nevertheless, ties between Russia and Greece remained intimate albeit complex and contradictory. Russia and Greece, for example, were coreligionist states, both adhering to the Eastern Orthodox communion. Yet Greek and Russian ecclesiastical interests often were at odds with one another in the Balkans and the 1 The most thorough study of Greece’s role in the Eastern Crisis is Evangelos Kofos’ Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878 (Thessalonike, 1975). A copy of this important work was graciously made for me by the staff of the Institute for Balkan Studies and was used extensively in the preparation of this paper 2 Near East. Greece and Russia also had dynastic links with the marriage of George I, King of Greece from 1863 and 1913, to Grand Duchess Olga, niece of Tsar Alexander II. The close relations of the two ruling houses did not prevent friction between the Russian Empire and the Greek Kingdom.2 Russian-Greek relations began to change in the period 1856-1878, especially with the growth of Russian-Bulgarian ties. Russian policy towards Bulgaria during this period was very different from that toward Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, or Greece, in that Russia was not dealing with an autonomous or independent state, but rather with a people who were still directly under Ottoman rule. One of the most striking changes in Russian foreign policy toward the Balkans in the era between the Crimean War and the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 was in its attitude toward the Bulgarians and their nascent national movement. This change was to affect relations with not only the Ottoman Empire, but with the other Balkan peoples, notably the Greeks and the Serbs. By the time of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, Russian foreign policy, as represented by Nikolai Ignatiev, had tilted in favour of the Bulgarian national movement over that of the Romanians, Serbs and the Greeks. Russian authorities were much more apprised as to the growth of Bulgarian nationalism than the representatives of the other Great Powers in the Ottoman Empire, and as such had both the wherewithal and inclination to harness this national movement. The Bulgarians participated in earlier Russian-Ottoman Wars, and the resultant political, social, economic and cultural ties from participation and subsequent immigration to Russia, made them the same type of surrogates that the Russians had in the Serbs and Greeks earlier in the century. The Bulgarians, unlike the Greeks, Romanians and Serbs, did not have their own autonomous or independent state open to the influence of other powers, such as the British, the French and the Austrians. Russia's policy toward Bulgaria and the Bulgarians in the years 1856 to 1875 was guided by its earlier contacts with the Bulgarian National Movement, as well as by other factors. Among these factors was Russia's loss in the Crimean War and the need to undo the most onerous aspects of the treaty of Paris, notably the demilitarization of the Black Sea, the loss of Southern Bessarabia, and the loss of an exclusive Russian Protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and Serbia. This factor did not directly affect or was affected by Bulgarian affairs, only insofar that an increase of Russian influence over one of the major Christian groups in the Balkans, hitherto unrecognized and located along Russia's traditional invasion route to the straits, could enhance Russia's position vis-à-vis other European powers involved in the region, notably Austria, Britain and France. Russia would eventually successfully repudiate the provisions of the treaty of Paris by taking advantage of the changes in the European balance of power brought about by the Wars of German Unification. This policy to bring about revision of the setbacks of the Crimean War was brought about by prudent engagement in European affairs as advocated and followed by A. M. Gorchakov and the Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 The Asiatic department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, located in Moscow, was more involved in the development of relations with the Balkans than the chancellery and Foreign Minister Gorchakov. The most important individual involved in the development of Russian relations with the Bulgarians was N. P. Ignatiev, who served as minister, later ambassador to the Porte between 1864 and 1877. 4 Ignatiev already had a brilliant cursus 2 The process and other elements of Greek foreign policy are found in E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 a nos jours, 3 vols. (Paris, 1925); and Stylianos Laskaris, Diplomatikē historia tēs Hellados, 1821-1914 (Athens, 1947). 3 On Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy, see: S. Bushuev, A. M. Gorchakov (Moscow, 1942); J. Klaczko, The Two Chancellors: Prince Gortchakoff and Prince Bismarck (New York, 1876); C. Roux, Alexandre II, Napoleon II et Gorchakoff (Paris, 1913); and S. Semanov, A. M. Gorchakov, russkii diplomat XIX veka (Moscow, 1962). 4 On Ignatiev, see: F. Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia: Karamzin to Danilevskii, 1800-1870 (Washington, D.C., 1962); G. Hünigen, Nikolai Pavlovic Ignat’ev und die russische Balkanpolitik, 1875-1878 (Göttingen, 1968); N. P. Ignatiev, “Zapiski Grafa N. P. Ignatieva, 1864-1874,” Izvestiia Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, bks. 1-4 (1914-1915): 93-135; D. MacKenzie, “Ignatiev, Nikolai Pavlovic,” the Modern 3 publicus within the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry before assuming his post in Istanbul. At the age of 32, he had already led two successful embassies to the Central Asian khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, and to Peking, where he negotiated the Russian acquisition of the Pacific Maritime provinces. Ignatiev had also served as the director of the Asiatic Department (which covered policy for Asia, the Balkans, and the Near East) from 1861 to 1864 and developed a great deal of influence in the department, which he used to further his policies during his years at his post in Istanbul. As the Russian representative to the Ottoman Empire, Ignatiev used his mastery of diplomatic relations with an activist and aggressive personal style to become the foremost foreign diplomat in the Ottoman capital and the restorer of Russian prestige in the Near East. His position as ambassador to the Porte and his connections to the Asiatic department and court circles made him infinitely more influential than the Russian consuls in Belgrade, Bucharest, or Jassy, or the Russian minister in Athens. He even challenged Gorchakov in influence over policy in the Near East. 5 Like Gorchakov and the those in the Chancellery, Ignatiev saw revision of the Treaty of Paris as one of the main goals of Russian foreign policy in the Near East. He also envisioned Russian domination of the Straits and Istanbul as an important long-term goal, achievable either by diplomacy or conquest.