Party politics and intelligence : the Labour Party, British intelligence and oversight, 1979-1994 Lomas, DWB http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1874102 Title Party politics and intelligence : the Labour Party, British intelligence and oversight, 1979-1994 Authors Lomas, DWB Type Article URL This version is available at: http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/59265/ Published Date 2021 USIR is a digital collection of the research output of the University of Salford. Where copyright permits, full text material held in the repository is made freely available online and can be read, downloaded and copied for non-commercial private study or research purposes. Please check the manuscript for any further copyright restrictions. For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please contact the Repository Team at: [email protected]. Intelligence and National Security ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fint20 Party politics and intelligence: the Labour Party, British intelligence and oversight, 1979-1994 Daniel W. B. Lomas To cite this article: Daniel W. B. Lomas (2021) Party politics and intelligence: the Labour Party, British intelligence and oversight, 1979-1994, Intelligence and National Security, 36:3, 410-430, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2021.1874102 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1874102 © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published online: 13 Jan 2021. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 653 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fint20 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 2021, VOL. 36, NO. 3, 410–430 https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1874102 ARTICLE Party politics and intelligence: the Labour Party, British intelligence and oversight, 1979-1994 Daniel W. B. Lomas ABSTRACT For much of the 20th Century, intelligence and security was a taboo subject for Parliamentarians. While Labour backbenchers had suspicions of the secret state, there was a long-held bipartisan consensus that debates on intelligence were ‘dangerous and bad’. Yet by the 1970s, new disclosures on the activities of foreign intelligence and domestic surveillance eroded this consensus with the Labour Party willing to push for greater accountability and oversight of the UK’s intelligence agencies. This article looks at how, through the campaign to reform intelligence oversight, Labour pushed for changes reflected in later legislation. It also explores Labour’s attitudes to intelligence. The emergence of Soviet Bloc era files in 2018 suggesting that then Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn was targeted by Czechoslovak State Security (the Státní bezpečnost StB) as a backbench MP in the 1980s brought intelligence and security issues to the forefront of the UK national press and politics. The documents, found in the Czech Republic, showed that StB officersthought Corbyn ‘reserved and courteous’, occasionally ‘explosive’ on human rights, but often ‘calm and collected’. Corbyn was also ‘negative towards the USA’ and took a ‘positive’ view of the Eastern Bloc, they reported, with the StB keen to maintain contact, ascribing Corbyn the codename COB. A spokesperson for the Labour Party said Corbyn was unaware the individual was an StB officer, while Corbyn himself dismissed the claims as ‘ridiculous smears’. Conservative Party MPs and MEPs, unsurprisingly, described the Labour leader an ‘embittered fool’ arguing that the claims, if true, would ‘disqualify Corbyn from holding any elected office’, with the story taking on an increasingly party political dimension.1 In the previous century, parliament and Hon. Members had largely tried to stay away from intelligence matters, taking the view that these subjects should stay off the political agenda. Nonetheless, the activities of Britain’s intelligence and security agencies had become increasingly politicised from the 1960s onwards, fuelled by the gradual end of the ‘consensus’ politics,2 a wave of spy scandals, pressure for parliamentary oversight, and Labour’s own long-held suspicions of the ‘secret state’. By the 1980s, Labour’s willingness to raise intelligence even led to the first attempt by a British political party to set out a legal framework for Britain’s agencies – the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the end of the Official Secrets Act and Parliamentary accountability, with some of the recommendations echoing the later Security Service Act (1989) and Intelligence Services Act (1994), eventually bringing Britain’s agencies in from the cold. While overlooked by those discussing UK intelligence oversight, Labour’s policy proposals – the first to appear in a party manifesto, signalled the real emergence of intelligence and security as a party-political issue and the final end to the bipartisan reluctance to make such matters a routine part of political discourse. Using the papers of the Labour Party’s ‘Security Services Study Group’, this article looks at Labour’s efforts to reform Britain’s intelligence oversight, placing it in the wider CONTACT Daniel W. B. Lomas [email protected] © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 411 context of British party politics, the history of the Labour Party, and discussions on intelligence oversight more generally. As such, the article also explores how Labour’s thinking on intelligence and security, largely shaped by long-held fears that the UK’s agencies were unaccountable, gave much impetus to wider pressures for change, effectively pushing for reforms now taken for granted in the liberal democratic oversight of intelligence. Parliament, party politics and intelligence in Britan Intelligence and security was a taboo subject for Britain’s parliamentarians, even if many former intelligence officers sat in both the House of Lords and the Commons.3 For much of the Twentieth Century few Hon. Members were willing to break Foreign Secretary Sir Austin Chamberlain’s 1924 dictum, ‘It is of the essence of a Secret Service that it must be secret, and if you once begin disclosure it is perfectly obvious to me as to hon. Members opposite that there is no longer any Secret Service and that you must do without it’.4 The intelligence community was ‘the “invisible” man of govern­ ment’, writes Christopher Moran, ‘a state within a state about which questions were never asked’.5 In parliament there was a ‘bipartisan consensus to protect the intelligence community from any . discussion’, even if, following security scandals and intelligence leaks, the issue raised its head often via backbenchers and the ‘awkward squad’.6 One backbench Conservative MP even recalled it was ‘almost unpatriotic’ to raise questions on intelligence, adding it was simply ‘not done’.7 Even so, there were occasions when intelligence was cited to support government policy – sometimes with disastrous consequences,8 yet Prime Ministers were generally loath to discuss the matter, beyond carefully worded statements. In July 1963, following former SIS officer ‘Kim’ Philby’s defection to the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told MPs, ‘It is dangerous and bad for our general national interest to discuss these matters. It has been a very long tradition of the House to trust the relations between the two parties to discussions between the Leader of the Opposition of the day and the Prime Minister of the day. I ask the House now to revert to the older tradition which I think is in our real interests’ – a view echoed by Leader of the Opposition Harold Wilson (‘we feel that in the public interest this is a matter which should now be left where it is and not made the subject of further public discussion or public inquiry’).9 Wilson famously wrote in his book, The Governance of Britain, ‘The prime minister is occasionally questioned on matters arising out of his responsibility. His answers may be regarded as uniformly uninformative’.10 Wilson’s chapter certainly reflected the absence of public information on security and intelligence in the public domain, while also betraying that all was not well in his relationship with internal security. Privately, Wilson believed that while ‘Secret Service must be secret’, it needed to be ‘of service, i.e. it must be efficient’ and ‘responsive to democratic, i.e. Ministerial, control’.11 Questioned by Labour MPs on the publication of MI5 officer Peter Wright’s memoir, Spycatcher, Margaret Thatcher maintained the same principle, ‘I shall follow the precedent set by previous Prime Ministers and, I understand, upheld in “Erskine May”, of not commenting on security matters’.12 For successive governments it was as if, historian Sir Michael Howard explained, the ‘British security and intelligence services, MI5 and MI6, do not exist. Enemy agents are found under gooseberry bushes and intelligence is brought by the storks’.13 Yet while successive Prime Minister’s fought to uphold this