89 Indefinite Noun Phrases and Referential Opacity James T. Heringer Ohio State University In this paper it is argued that the distinction between specific and non-specific indefinite noun phrases first noted by Smith (1964) and discussed by Baker (1966) and Karttunen (1968), among others, actually amounts to a distinction between those noun phrases which carry with them a presupposition of the 'existence', in a sense to be clarified later, of a referent and those noun phrases which do not. The evidence for this comes from the manner in which specific and non-specific noun phrases behave in referentially opaque contexts. There are three major types of superficial indefinite noun phrases which it seems necessary to distinguish. First, there is the generic indefinite, illustrated in sentences (1) and (2). (1) A quagmire is tough to get out of. (2) A goose flies south for the winter. These are general statements about a class of individuals and are usually, but not always, paraphrasable by sentences having definite or plural noun phrases in place of the indefinitel, as shown by sentences (3)-(6). (3) Quagmires are tough to get out of. (4) Geese fly south for the winter. (5) *The quagmire is tough to get out of. (6) The goose flies south for the winter. Contrasting with this is the type of indefinite noun phrase illustrated in sentences (7)-(9). The indefinite noun phrases (7) A four-toed troglodyte just entered the room. (8) A square circle disturbed my dreams last night. (9) A friend of mine eats tapioca pudding with his bare hands. beginning these sentences clearly refer to specific individuals. However, they are able to do this without being a correct or true 90 description of their referents. In line with the semantic distinction drawn by Donellan (1966) between referential and attributive definite descriptions, it may be said that this type of noun phrase, called specific in discussions of syntax, is referential, i.e., used by the speaker to "enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about" rather than to "state something about whoever or whatever is Ca] so-and-so,"2 which is the case with the attributive usage.3 Thus, sentences (7) and (8) are meaningful independent of the existence in the real world of any entity which has four toes per foot and lives in a cave or which is simultaneously round and square, and sentence (9) is meaningful independent of whether the relationship between the speaker of this sentence and the individual referred to would really be called friend- ship. Sentences like (7)-(9) are usually paraphrasable by sentences to which there-insertion has applied and by sentences containing certain in the indefinite noun phrase, as in the next sentences. (10) A certain friend of mine eats tapioca pudding with his bare hands. (11) There's a friend of mine who eats tapioca pudding with his bare hands. The third type of indefinite noun phrase, the non-specific or attributive variety, cannot be paraphrased with the corres- ponding sentence containing certain, nor does it necessarily have a referent. This type of noun phrase denoted a single individual chosen arbitrarily from the class of individuals described by the noun phrase, as in sentences (12)-(16). (12) John wanted to catch a fish. (13) Henry tried to locate a winged horse. (14) Max is a doctor. (15) I didn't find an osteopath. (16) Did you hit a pig in the snout? These sentences are paraphrasable by pseudo-cleft sentences, independent of whether the class of individuals described is human or not, a fact recently noted by Kuno (to appear), N.B. the last three sentences of the next group. (17) What John wanted to catch was a fish. (18) What Henry tried to locate was a winged horse. (19) What Max is is a doctor. (20) What I didn't find was an osteopath. (21) Was what you hit in the snout a pig? While the object noun phrase in (16) is ambiguously specific or not (as in the case in (12), (13) and (15), at least for some 91 speakers of English), the corresponding noun phrase in (21) is unambiguously non-specific, although still possibly human. The preceding is by way of introduction and is meant to be indicative of what has been said previously about the specific/ non-specific distinction in indefinite noun phrases. Next we examine the interaction of this distinction with the phenomenon of referential opacity. Philosophers have long noted the curious semantic behavior of noun phrases in the complements of certain verbs, such as want, think, claim when the subject of these verbs is not to,be identified with the speaker of the sentence containing them.' It has been pointed out that in a sentence like (22) there is an ambiguity as to whether the responsibility for the description (22) John wants to marry a witch. la witch' is to be assigned to John or to the speaker of the sentence. Further, it is not always possible to substitute equivalent terms for la witch' in (22), preserving meaning. Finally, the assertion of (22) does not entail that witches exist. This situation is contrasted with that in sentences like (23). (23) John married a witch. (24) All witches are hunchbacked. (25) John married a hunchback. (26) John wants to marry a hunchback. Here it is supposed that (1) the speaker must take responsibility for the description 'a witch; (2) given the concurrent assertion of (24), (25) follows (while (26) under the same circumstances • would not follow from (22)); (3) it follows from the assertion of (23) that witches exist. All contexts in which equivalent terms lack substitutivity and there is no existential generalization possible are called opaque contexts. The type of opaque context which was just illustrated and which is at issue in this paper is the type involving ambiguity concerning who is referring. This type is called a referentially opaque context. The reading of ambiguous sentences like (22) in which the speaker is responsible for the description is called the transparent reading; that in which the subject is responsible is called the opaque reading. It is only in the opaque reading that substitutivity and existential generalization are ruled out. As an illustration of the preceding, consider the sample argument given in (27). The statement of the conclusion, (2709 (27) (a) Oedipus wanted to marry Jocasta. (b) Jocasta was Oedipus' mother. (c) A0edipus wanted to marry his mother. is given by a sentence ambiguous in the manner just described. The important thing to notice here is that the argument is valid 92 only if thd sentence of the conclusion is given the transparent reading, that is, if 'his mother' is the speaker's description of Jocasta. If referential opacity is examined in the light of the specific/non-specific distinction, or rather the referential/ attributive distinction, since we are treading on philosophical ground, it becomes evident that referential opacity is not as monolithic a concept as it has been made to appear in most philosophical literature concerning itself with opacity, the content of which the sketchy description given above is meant to reflect. First, consider attributive indefinites in referentially opaque contexts. As Patton (1968) has noticed, attributive noun phrases in referentially opaque contexts can only be construed opaquely, and thus must be considered the responsi- bility of the subject of the sentence. Actually, this needs further qualification, as the following examples show. First, consider the argument given in (28). As opposed to the situa- (28) (a) John claims to be a bachelor. (b) All bachelors are profligates. (c) «John claims to be a profligate. tion with the argument in (27), there is no sense in which (28) is valid, given that 'a bachelor' and 'a profligate' are attributive and that 'bachelor' has its 'normal' meaning here. However (29) does constitute a valid argument. (29) (a) John claims to be a bachelor. (b) All bachelors are unmarried. (c) .John claims to be (an) unmarried (person). Moreover, it is not only the assertions associated with the noun phrase in the object complement which may be substituted, but also the presuppositions associated with the noun phrase in question,2 as shown by the valid inferences in (30) and (31). (30) John claims to be an assassin. «John claims to be a killer. (31) John wants (expects) to be a dictator. .John wants (expects) to be a ruler. The generalization to be drawn from this seems to be that an attributive noun phrase in an opaque context cannot be supplied by the speaker of the sentence if the description it gives is not at least presupposed in the subjects' belief world by the description the subject originally gave, or, more precisely, if the speaker does not assume that such a connection exists in the belief world of the subject. Thus if the speaker substitutes 'a profligate' for la bachelor' in a context like (28c), he is 93 presupposing that the term 'bachelor' carrys with it a pre- supposition of profligacy for the subject of the sentence and, perhaps, for everyone. The oddness of (28c) is evidence that such a presupposition would generally be considered false and apparently demonstrates a second-level presupposition failure,, i.e., failure of a presupposition that a presupposition holds.' Turning to the interpretation of referential indefinites in opaque contexts, it is apparent that the situation with respect to substitivity is entirely different than what was found to be the case with attributive indefinites, for the substitute may denote a class of individuals entirely disjoint from that denoted by the substituendum while making reference to the same individual as the substituendum.