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This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. TESTIMONY The Development of China’s Air Force Capabilities ROGER CLIFF CT-346 May 2010 Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on May 20, 2010 This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. is a registered trademark. Published 2010 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Roger Cliff1 The RAND Corporation The Development of China’s Air Force Capabilities2 Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission May 20, 2010 Mr. Chairman: Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing on this important topic. China’s air forces have made substantial strides over the past decade and are well on their way to becoming fully modern. Coupled with the geographic advantage China would enjoy in the most likely military conflict between China and the United States – a war over Taiwan – the capabilities of China’s air forces have the potential to present a significant obstacle to U.S. success in such a conflict. Understanding these capabilities, therefore, is critical to understanding the nature of the military challenge China is presenting to the United States. Before I launch into the substance of my testimony, let me explain what I will talk about and what I will not. As is true in many country’s militaries, China’s air forces are distributed across more than one service. The U.S. Army, for example, likes to say that it operates more aircraft than the U.S. Air Force (USAF), a reference to its helicopter force. Likewise, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) ground forces also operate a substantial helicopter force, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) operates both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. I will not discuss the PLA Army or PLAN helicopter forces, but I will discuss the PLAN’s fixed-wing aviation forces. China’s air force, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), operates not only fixed wing aircraft and helicopters; its combat forces also include long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), large-caliber antiaircraft artillery, and paratroops. When discussing China’s “air forces,” therefore, I will include not only the fixed-wing aviation forces of the PLAN and PLAAF, but also the PLAAF’s land-based air defense forces and airborne forces. As an aside, I should note that, although the term is commonly used, there is not actually an organization in China called the People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF). The PLAN has aviation forces, but they are not collected into a single, unified organization. Rather, each of 1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2 This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT346/. 1 China’s three fleets (the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet) has its own aviation organization underneath it. (Interestingly, this is similar to the U.S. Navy, which also does not collect its aviation forces into a single organization separate from the rest of the Navy, but rather divides its aviation forces into two entities: Naval Air Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet and Naval Air Forces U.S. Atlantic Fleet.) China’s air forces have improved significantly over the past 10 years. In 2000, of the estimated 3,200 fighter aircraft operated by the PLAAF and PLAN, for example, all but approximately 75 “fourth-generation” Su-27s (“Flankers”) imported from Russia and 20 domestically designed and built third-generation JH-7s, were based on the 1950s-era second-generation MiG-19 and MiG-21. China’s fighters, moreover, were dependent on ground-based radar or their largely outdated on- board sensors to locate and identify enemy aircraft, as China had only one operational airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. In addition, except for the Flankers, they were limited to within- visual-range engagements, as China’s domestically-produced aircraft were not equipped with beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles. China’s electronic warfare capabilities were minimal as well. By comparison, the U.S. air forces of 2000 were equipped entirely with fourth-generation fighters, all of which carried BVR missiles, and operated numerous airborne early warning and control (AWE&C) and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft. In an air-to-air engagement between Chinese and U.S. air forces in that year, the United States would likely have enjoyed an advantage at least as great as it did in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, when 33 Iraqi aircraft were shot down by U.S. air forces while only one U.S. aircraft was lost in air-to-air combat. Except for a few bombers equipped with antiship cruise missiles or torpedoes, China’s strike aircraft in 2000 carried only unguided gravity bombs and rockets, and certainly none of them had the low-observable capabilities of the U.S. F-117 and B-2. Thus, the ability of China’s air force to conduct effective attacks against surface targets, or even survive the attempt against a modern adversary, was highly questionable. The training of China’s air forces was considered poor. Pilots of all aircraft types were believed to average fewer than 100 hours of flight training a year, and exercises highly scripted, with pre- determined outcomes. Virtually all officers in China’s air forces were either graduates of PLA-run military academies, the quality of whose education was questionable, or had been directly promoted from the enlisted ranks without receiving a higher education. Finally, the PLAAF and PLAN were in the process of absorbing an entirely new set of doctrinal guidelines that had just been issued in 1999, in many cases replacing doctrine that had not changed for twenty years. 2 Today the picture is very different. China has reduced the overall size of its air forces, with the PLAAF alone cutting approximately 100,000 personnel – roughly a quarter of the force – and halving the size of its fighter force. A top-heavy organizational structure has also been streamlined, with the PLAAF eliminating one entire organizational level – the corps-level – and all of its associated general officer billets. The remaining forces are considerably more capable than those in 2000. The number of second-generation fighters in China’s inventory has been reduced by two-thirds, and the number of fourth-generation fighters has more than quadrupled. There have been improvements in other dimensions as well. Many of China’s fighters are now capable of carrying BVR missiles, China operates at least a dozen AEW&C aircraft, many strike aircraft are now equipped with precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and China’s EW capabilities have improved substantially too. Many Chinese fighter pilots are now believed to receive roughly the same number of training hours as their U.S. counterparts, and the quality and realism of training has also improved. Roughly half of all new officers in China’s air forces are now graduates of China’s increasingly rigorous civilian universities. Finally, China has had an additional ten years to absorb the modern doctrinal guidelines issued in 1999. Nonetheless, China’s air forces are still only partly modernized.