UK Limited Naval Aviation Capability in the 1982 Falklands

UK Limited Naval Aviation Capability in the 1982 Falklands

University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2014-07-09 Sea-Based Air Power and Maritime Expeditionary Operations: U.K. Limited Naval Aviation Capability in the 1982 Falklands War Reumkens, Brock J. Reumkens, B. J. (2014). Sea-Based Air Power and Maritime Expeditionary Operations: U.K. Limited Naval Aviation Capability in the 1982 Falklands War (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27718 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/1609 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Sea-Based Air Power and Maritime Expeditionary Operations: U.K. Limited Naval Aviation Capability in the 1982 Falklands War by Brock J. Reumkens A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTRE FOR MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA, CANADA JULY, 2014 © Brock Reumkens 2014 ii Abstract Following Argentina’s seizure of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia on 2 and 3 April 1982, the United Kingdom’s military response to reclaim these overseas territories was the launching of a large maritime expeditionary operation extending over 8,000 miles into the harsh South Atlantic. As part of this challenging military undertaking, an extensive naval Task Force was assembled and despatched to the theatre of operations. Since the greatest threat to the Task Force would come from the numerically superior Argentine aircraft based on the South American mainland, air power would play a critical role in the successful prosecution of Operation Corporate. However, geography precluded the continuous and effective involvement by land-based aircraft of the Royal Air Force in the South Atlantic. Therefore, the task of providing the U.K.’s maritime expeditionary operation with the requisite air power fell to a small number of carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft. In total, 28 Sea Harriers of the RN’s Fleet Air Arm and ten Harrier GR.3s of the RAF carried aboard two small, non-fleet aircraft carriers were called upon to support Operation Corporate. By 14 June 1982, Argentine forces on the Falklands surrendered to the U.K., thus bringing to a close a unique military campaign at the bottom of the world. This thesis argues that, despite its inability to achieve permanent air supremacy or superiority, RN and RAF sea-based air power during the 1982 Falklands War was nevertheless a crucial contributing factor in the victory over Argentina due to its effective support of the U.K.'s maritime expeditionary operation. iii Acknowledgements This thesis would have not been possible if it were not for the exceptional supervision provided by Dr. Holger H. Herwig of the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. His knowledge, patience, and guidance over the past two years have been absolutely incredible and I am indebted to him. It has truly been a privilege and a pleasure to study under Dr. Herwig both in the classroom and as his graduate student. I simply could not have asked for a better supervisor to support me through this demanding process. To my father, Berry Reumkens, I would not be here today if it were not for his encouragement and support. His proofreading and editing assistance throughout the writing of this thesis was enormously helpful. To my mother, Jane Reumkens, her kindness and care have shaped who I am today. I am truly thankful. To my brother, Cash Reumkens, I am grateful for his advice and suggestions. Finally, to my Opa, Jozef Reumkens, I owe special thanks. His memory and experiences growing up in the occupied Netherlands during the Second World War served as the inspiration for me to journey down the path I am on now. iv Table of Contents Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………ii Acknowledgements....……………………………………………………………………………iii Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………………iv List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………………..vi List of Figures and Illustrations…………………………………………………………………..ix CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….1 1.1 Thesis Topic and Context……………………………..………………………………1 1.2 Historiography…………………………………………..…………………………….3 1.3 Methodology…………………………………………..………………………………8 1.4 Analytical Framework……………………………..………………………………...13 CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND……….…………………………………………………..……18 2.1 Historical Context of the United Kingdom’s Limited Naval Aviation Capability………………………………………………….18 2.2 Tactical Sea-Based Air Power in British Joint and Amphibious Doctrine………..…24 2.3 U.K. Political, Strategic, and Operational Objectives.……………...….……….…...28 CHAPTER II: OPPOSING FORCES AND AIR SUPERIORITY……………...…………..…..30 3.1 The Aerial Combatants…………………………...……...…………………………..30 3.1.1: The United Kingdom……………………..……………………………….30 3.1.2: Argentina…………………………………..……………………………...34 3.2. The Question of Air Superiority……………………………...……………………..41 CHAPTER IV: ASSESSMENT……...……….……………………………….………………...48 4.1 Geography and Logistics………………….………….……………………………...48 4.1.1 “Southern” Hospitality: Forward Operating Base (FOB) Ascension Island ……………………….48 4.1.2 HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible: The Geographic Equalizers…………………………………………...……53 4.1.3 Replenishment at Sea (RAS) and Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR): The Pipelines of Victory …………………………………………………..59 4.1.4 American Support During Operation Corporate: The “Special Relationship” Utilized ………………………………………67 4.2 Doctrine, Training, and Interoperability ………………………...…………………..72 4.2.1 Sea Harrier and Harrier Doctrines: Warfare Outside NATO…………………………………………….……...72 4.2.2 FAA and RAF Pilot Training: The Linchpin of Combat Effectiveness…………………………….……...76 4.2.3 Jets, Ships, and Soldiers: Interoperability Within Operation Corporate…………………….………...80 4.3 Military Technology and Aerial Intelligence………………………………………...86 4.3.1 British Aerospace (BAe) Sea Harriers FRS.1: V/STOL’s Triumph in South Atlantic Skies……………….………………86 v 4.3.2 AIM-9L “Sidewinder” Air-to-Air Missile: Dogfighting Simplified…………………………………...………………..92 4.3.3 Enter Pinochet’s Chile: A Dictatorship with Benefits………………………………………….…...96 4.3.4 Satellite Intelligence: Britain’s “Paper Tiger” of the Falklands War…………………….………105 4.4 Adaptability and Serviceability……………………………………………………..108 4.4.1 Modified by Necessity: Adapting RAF Harrier GR.3s for South Atlantic Operations……….……108 4.4.2 Sea Harrier/Harrier Maintenance: Force Multiplied…………………………………………………………..115 CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………...125 5.1 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….125 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………131 vi List of Abbreviations 2PARA – 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment AAA – Anti-aircraft artillery AAM – Air-to-air missile AAR – Air-to-air refuelling AEW – Airborne early warning AIC – Action information centre AOA – Amphibious Objective Area ARA - Armada de la República Argentina ARM – Anti-radiation missile ASM – Anti-ship missile ATG – Amphibious Task Group ATP – Allied Tactical Publication AVCAT – Aviation carrier turbine fuel AWACS – Airborne warning and control system AWI – Air Warfare Instructor BAe – British Aerospace BDR – Battle Damage Repair BFSU – British Forces Support Unit C2 – Command and Control CAP – Combat air patrol CAS – Close air support CATOBAR – Catapult assisted take-off, barrier-assisted recovery CBG – Carrier Battle Group CCA – Carrier-controlled approach CINCFLEET – Commander-in-Chief Fleet COAN – Comando de Aviación Naval Argentina COMAW – Commodore Amphibious Warfare CTF – Commander, Task Force CVS – Anti-submarine warfare carrier DIESO – Diesel oil DTIC – Defense Technical Information Center FAA – Fleet Air Arm FAA – Fuerza Aérea Argentina FAC – Forward air controller FACh - Fuerza Aérea de Chile FAE – Fuerza Aérea Estratégica FAS – Fuerza Aérea Sur FFO – Furnace Fuel Oil FINRAE – Ferranti Inertial Rapid Alignment Equipment FOB – Forward operating base GNP – Gross National Product HMS – Her Majesty’s Ship HQ – Headquarters HUD – Head’s up display vii IAF – Israeli Air Force IAI – Israel Aerospace Industries IFF – Identification friend or foe INAS – Inertial navigation alignment system JSP – Joint Service Publication JTP – Joint Tactical Publication LADE – Lineas Aéreas del Estado LOC – Lines of communication LSL – Landing Ship Logistics MAC – Military Airlift Command MPA – Maritime patrol aircraft MEZ – Maritime Exclusion Zone MoD – Ministry of Defence NAS – Naval air squadron NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NAVHARS – Navigation heading and attitude reference system NM – Nautical mile NORTHAG – Northern Army Group OC – Officer Commanding ORBAT – Order of battle OS – Offensive support PHOTINT – Photographic Intelligence POL – Petroleum, oil, and lubrication PR – Photo reconnaissance RAE – Royal Aircraft Establishment RAF – Royal Air Force RAN – Royal Australian Navy RAS – Replenishment at sea RFA – Royal Fleet Auxiliary RN – Royal Navy RNAS – Royal Naval Air Station RUSI – Royal United Services Institute SAS – Special Air Service SBS – Special Boat Squadron SHAR – Sea Harrier SNEB – Societe Nouvelle des Etablissements Edgar Brandt STUFT – Ships taken

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