PREVENTIVE DEFENSE PROJECT A RESEARCH COLLABORATION OF STANFORD & HARVARD UNIVERSITIES WILLIAM J. PERRY & ASHTON B. CARTER, CO-DIRECTORS September 10, 2006 Dear Colleague: This summer the Preventive Defense Project hosted another of its series of Washington WMD Workshops on the subject of “Plan B for Iran: What if Nuclear Diplomacy Fails?” This report analyzes three alternatives to the EU-led but inconclusive nuclear diplomacy of the past few years: direct U.S.-Iran talks, coercion including the possibility of military action, and strategic adjustment to an Iranian bomb if prevention proves impossible and Iran goes nuclear. While it is important to explore and analyze various versions of Plan B, it would be premature to abandon the diplomatic path. There is still time, since Iran is years away from making its first bomb (unlike the urgent case of North Korea). And there is still hope, since the U.S. has only now, albeit haltingly, gotten in the game. But the time available is only valuable if it is used effectively. It is not too soon to be considering the alternatives. I hope you will be interested in this analysis. Sincerely, Ashton B. Carter Co-Director, Harvard University Preventive Defense Project STANFORD UNIVERSITY HARVARD UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL SECURITY & COOPERATION OF GOVERNMENT ENCINA HALL BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE & STANFORD, CA 94305-6165 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS TELEPHONE: (650) 723-9910 79 JOHN F. KENNEDY STREET FACSIMILE: (650) 725-0920 CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138 TELEPHONE: (617) 495-1405 FACSIMILE: (617) 495-9250 IranWorkshopReport.doc Plan B for Iran: What If Nuclear Diplomacy Fails? Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry A Report Based on a Workshop Hosted by The Preventive Defense Project Harvard and Stanford Universities PREVENTIVE DEFENSE PROJECT Plan B for Iran: What if Nuclear Diplomacy Fails? SUMMARY The Preventive Defense Project conducted the latest in its series of Washington WMD Workshops entitled “Iran Plan B Design” on May 22, 2006. The purpose of the Workshop was to collect the best thinking on the design of a plan for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program should diplomacy fail and the Iranians continue on the path to nuclear capability. (At the time of the Workshop, diplomacy centered on the EU3-led process with the U.S. in the background; the U.S. has since agreed to join the talks directly, though Iran has rejected the condition that it cease uranium enrichment in advance of the talks.) While it is important for the United States and its international partners to design Plan B now, it is premature to abandon the current diplomatic course, Plan A. For one thing, Iran’s known nuclear program is several years away from being able to produce its first bomb’s worth of fissile material. Unlike the case of North Korea which has already obtained fissile material and is producing more, there is time to let diplomacy with Iran play out. Second, and again unlike North Korea, the Iranian government has exhibited at least a smidgen of sensitivity to international opinion and to the possibility of further isolation and punishment if it persists, and acceptance and trade if it stops – i.e., to diplomatic carrots and sticks. Third, while the cat-and-mouse diplomacy led by the EU3 has not led to conclusive results, it has caused Iran to slow the progress of its uranium enrichment program through intermittent suspensions. It is not yet time to switch to Plan B. But it is time to devise Plan B. And the time available for diplomacy is only valuable if it is used effectively. The Workshop addressed three distinct versions of Plan B, shown on the attached graphic. Plan B1 would add direct U.S.-Iran contact to the EU3-led diplomacy the U.S. has supported from the sidelines for several years. Plan B1 was suggested by a number of influential observers and leaders – Republican, Democratic, and foreign – in the weeks before the Workshop. Shortly after the Workshop, the Bush administration adopted a version of Plan B1. Plan B2 would use coercion to obtain the outcome that Plan A and Plan B1 seek – a non-nuclear Iran. Coercion is the political, economic, and military pressure that the U.S. and other nations can bring to bear on Iran in an attempt to discourage or physically delay it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Plan B3 prescribes what the United States should do if Iran succeeds in going nuclear and the U.S. needs to make strategic adjustments to protect itself and its friends from a nuclear Iran. Strategic adjustment requires the U.S. to develop a long-term strategy to respond to Iranian possession of nuclear weapons if diplomacy and coercion fail. 1 PREVENTIVE DEFENSE PROJECT Plan B for Iran: What if Nuclear Diplomacy Fails? The Workshop participants are listed in an appendix. They were a select group of leading, experienced American thinkers and strategists on national security, Middle Eastern affairs, and nuclear weapons. All of the participants have been working actively on either Plan A, Plan B (in various versions), or both. The Workshop was off-the-record, and this report accordingly attributes no statement to a particular participant. Given the sensitivity of the subject – explicit exploration of alternatives to current U.S. policy – the Preventive Defense Project did not urge current U.S. government policymakers to join directly in the Design Workshop discussions. Briefings of this report are being held for key members of the administration and Congress – who will need a Plan B if and when that moment comes. The Iran Plan B Design Workshop is the fifth in a series of WMD-related activities of the Preventive Defense Project. Other Workshops and related publications and Congressional testimony in this series have concerned − Improving U.S. WMD Intelligence − Updating the NPT Regime − Plan B for North Korea, and − the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal. The Workshops are supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Richard Lounsbery Foundation and the Herbert S. Winokur Fund, to which the Preventive Defense Project is grateful for their support. PLAN B1: DIRECT U.S.-IRAN CONTACT The idea of direct U.S.-Iran talks (bilateral or multilateral) over the nuclear issue and other matters of concern to both sides was broached by a growing number of influential U.S. and non-U.S. figures in the spring of 2006: Senators Richard Lugar, Chuck Hagel, Christopher Dodd, and John McCain, as well as Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, Samuel Berger, former Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, and reportedly German Chancellor Angela Merkel.1: In 1 Senator Lugar: “I think that [holding direct talks with Iran] would be useful...The Iranians are a part of the energy picture…We need to talk about that…Furthermore we have an agenda with Iran to talk about as far as their interference in Iraq.” - Comments on ABC News This Week, 16 April 2006. Senator Hagel: “Allies of the U.S. will support tough action against Iran only if they are confident America is serious about achieving a negotiated, diplomatic solution. The continued unwillingness of the U.S. to engage Iran will make other states hesitate to support, and possibly oppose, these tougher measures… The U.S. should engage Iran directly with an agenda open to all areas of agreement and disagreement. It is only through this difficult diplomatic process that a pathway towards resolution and accommodation can be built, putting the U.S. and Iran, the Middle East and our allies in a position to defuse a potential Middle East conflagration and world calamity… The U.S., in partnership with our allies, should work towards a package of issues for discussion with Iran. This is not negotiation. That comes later. Ultimately, any resolution will most likely require security assurances for Iran.” - Chuck Hagel, “America must use a wide lens for its strategy on Iran,” 2 PREVENTIVE DEFENSE PROJECT Plan B for Iran: What if Nuclear Diplomacy Fails? Financial Times, 8 May 2004, 11. Senator Dodd: "I happen to believe you need direct talks. It doesn't mean you agree with [the Iranians].... But there's an option." - Comments on Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace, 17 April 2006. Senator McCain: “There has to be some kind of glimmer of hope or optimism before we sit down and give them that kind of legitimacy / it's an option that you probably have to consider.” - Comments on CBS Face the Nation, 7 May 2006. Henry Kissinger: “On a matter so directly involving its security, the United States should not negotiate through proxies, however closely allied. If America is prepared to negotiate with North Korea over proliferation in the six-party forum, and with Iran in Baghdad over Iraqi security, it must be possible to devise a multilateral venue for nuclear talks with Tehran that would permit the United States to participate—especially in light of what is at stake.” - Henry Kissinger, “A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy,” Washington Post, 16 May 2006, A17. Madeleine Albright et al: “We believe that the Bush administration should pursue a policy it has shunned for many years: attempt to negotiate directly with Iranian leaders about their nuclear program… Government leaders in Europe, Russia and Asia also believe that direct talks between Washington and Tehran could prove more fruitful now that the European and Russian-Iranian engagements on Iran's nuclear program have made some progress in communicating mutual positions and concerns. Accordingly, we call on the U.S. administration, hopefully with the support of the trans-Atlantic community, to take the bold step of opening a direct dialogue with the Iranian government on the issue of Iran's nuclear program.