Making Sense of Biological Naturalism Jennefer Hodges Submitted to the University of Hertfordshire in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of PhD March 2013 Contents Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... 4 Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 1 – Introduction .............................................................................................................. 6 1. A unique position within philosophy of mind? ..................................................................... 6 2. Searle’s Biological Naturalism – key features ....................................................................... 7 3. Chapter summaries ............................................................................................................. 11 Chapter 2 – Motivating the thesis .............................................................................................. 14 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 14 2. Theory-wide criticism ......................................................................................................... 16 3. Specific criticism ................................................................................................................. 27 4. Concerns about categorisation ........................................................................................... 33 5. The main barriers to making sense of Searle’s Biological Naturalism ................................ 40 6. Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 45 Chapter 3 – Making sense of first-person ontology ................................................................... 47 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 47 2. How Searle explains first-person ontology and its role in Biological Naturalism ............... 48 3. Ontological subjectivity as the basis of first-person ontology............................................ 52 4. Exploring first-person ontology .......................................................................................... 55 5. Assessing first-person ontology .......................................................................................... 64 Chapter 4 – Making sense of levels of description and causal reduction .................................. 71 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 71 2. A seemingly conflicting wish list ......................................................................................... 73 3. Levels of description ........................................................................................................... 74 4. The importance of how to individuate properties ............................................................. 77 5. Mental Causation ................................................................................................................ 81 6. Searle’s claim that experiences are caused by and realised in the brain ........................... 88 7. Causal reduction ................................................................................................................. 95 8. Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 98 Chapter 5 – Is Searle a property dualist? .................................................................................. 101 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 101 2. Property dualism .............................................................................................................. 102 3. Motivating the interpretation of Searle as a property dualist ......................................... 111 4. Searle’s notion of reduction and ontological irreducibility .............................................. 114 5. Contrasting Searle’s notion of ontological irreducibility with the irreducibility claim of the property dualist ........................................................................................................................ 120 6. Irreducible but not too irreducible ................................................................................... 124 7. Has Searle dealt with the seemingly intractable problem of fitting together subjective experiences and objective brain states? .................................................................................. 133 8. Conclusion......................................................................................................................... 142 2 Chapter 6 – Is Searle an identity theorist? ............................................................................... 144 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 144 2. Identity theory .................................................................................................................. 145 3. Motivating the idea of Searle as an identity theorist ....................................................... 148 4. Separating identity and reduction – real identity ............................................................. 152 5. Reclaiming identity theory as non-reductive and non-privileging ................................... 154 6. Why Searle’s Biological Naturalism should not be seen as a form of traditional privileging identity theory .......................................................................................................................... 161 7. Why Searle’s Biological Naturalism should be seen as a form of real identity theory ..... 163 8. Conclusion......................................................................................................................... 172 Chapter 7 – Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 173 1. Summary of chapters ........................................................................................................ 173 2. Revisiting the barriers to making sense of Searle’s Biological Naturalism ....................... 176 3. Making sense of Biological Naturalism ............................................................................. 180 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 181 3 Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Arts & Humanities Research Council for their studentship, without which I would not have been able to complete this dissertation. Thanks also to the University of Hertfordshire and the Phenomenal Qualities Project for accepting me as a PhD student and letting me explore an often dismissed theory. I’d like to thank my supervisor, Sam Coleman, for his willingness to provide feedback on my work; his detailed-focussed comments have been particularly useful in the final stages of this PhD. Special thanks go to Angie and Kathleen for their invaluable philosophical support and inspiration over the past decade. I cannot put into words the contribution made by my husband. I am indebted to both his patience with the greyness of philosophy, compared to the black and white certainty of his more natural domain of science and maths, and his expert skills as a sounding board. My little son Rowan has, unknowingly, been exposed to more philosophical thought than any other baby I know and although he is oblivious to it, I thank him for the large motivational role he has played. 4 Abstract Searle’s theory of Biological Naturalism has been largely ignored in the philosophical literature and Searle’s commentators are confused by his seemingly contradictory views. In this dissertation I attempt to make sense of Biological Naturalism. In chapter 2 I will ascertain which concerns prevent Searle’s readers from understanding his position. The remaining chapters aim to dissolve the tensions and dispel any confusion. Chapter 3 considers Searle’s notion of first-person ontology, finding that it expresses a belief that experiences are essentially subjective and qualitative. In chapter 4 I consider the notions of levels of description, causal reduction and what Searle means by causation and realisation. Chapter 5 turns to the question of how to categorise Searle’s position. Many of his critics charge him with being a property dualist. By highlighting the difference between the meaning of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism. Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of identity theory. I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity. I then argue that Searle should be