Ethical intuitionism Previous (Ethical Culture) (/entry/Ethical_Culture) Next (Ethics) (/entry/Ethics) Ethical intuitionism refers to a core of related moral theories, influential in Britain already in the 1700s, but coming to especial prominence in the work of G.E. Moore (/entry/G.E._Moore), H.A. Pritchard and W. D. Ross (/entry/W._D._Ross) in the earlier part of the twentieth century. Somewhat confusingly, however, the label ‘ethical intuitionism’ has had at least two distinct contemporary uses. Firstly, ‘intuitionism’ between the 1860s and 1920s was another name for unranked pluralism (/entry/Pluralism), the doctrine that there is a plurality of moral principles none of which is more basic than any other. In this respect, intuitionism is a normative ethical theory (/entry/Normative_ethics) contrasted with versions of monism (/entry/Monism)—the view that there is only one basic moral principle—such as utilitarianism (/entry/Utilitarianism), and Kantianism (/entry/Kantianism). Intuitionism in this sense is nowadays distinguished as methodological intuitionism. Secondly, and primarily, intuitionism in ethics refers to a cluster of theories Contents about how moral agents come to know which things are good, or which actions are right and wrong. This view may be distinguished as 1 Historical overview 2 Two senses of intuitionism epistemological (/entry/Epistemology) intuitionism, a theory of the way in 3 Varieties of epistemological which ethical propositions come to be grasped or known. The relationship intuitionism between these doctrines is primarily historical: important intuitionist thinkers 4 Arguments for intuitionism such as H.A. Pritchard and W.D. Ross embraced both methodological and 5 Objections to intuitionism epistemological intuitionism. 6 Bibliography 7 External links Historical overview 7.1 General Philosophy Sources While elements of intuitionism are present in ancient ethical philosophy, it 8 Credits was in the seventeenth century, in the work of the Cambridge Platonists (/entry/Cambridge_Platonists), such as Ralph Cudworth (/entry/Ralph_Cudworth) (1617-1688) and Henry More (/entry/Henry_More) (1614-1687), and the Moral Sense Theorists such as the Earl of Shaftsbury (/entry/Earl_of_Shaftsbury) (1671- 1713) and Francis Hutcheson (/entry/Francis_Hutcheson) (1694-1746), that it was developed into a distinctive doctrine. Notable intuitionists, in the eighteenth century, are Joseph Butler (/entry/Joseph_Butler) (1692 –1752), Thomas Reid (/entry/Thomas_Reid) (1710-1796) and Richard Price (/entry/Richard_Price); in the nineteenth century, Henry Sidgwick (/entry/Henry_Sidgwick) (1838-1900), and in the twentieth, G.E. Moore (/entry/G.E._Moore) (1873-1958), H.A. Pritchard (1871-1947) culminating in W.D. Ross (/entry/W.D._Ross)’s (1877-1971) The Right and the Good. Intuitionism fell out of favor by the 1960s but has undergone some revival in the closing decades years of the twentieth century. Robert Audi, John McDowell, and Jonathan Dancy, are notable contemporary philosophers who defend versions of intuitionism. Two senses of intuitionism In the twentieth century, the term ‘intuitionism’ has had two main uses. Firstly, from the 1860s to 1920s it was a name for an ethical theory defined by a commitment to pluralism, or more particularly, unranked pluralism (/entry/Pluralism). Intuitionism in this sense is usually distinguished as methodological intuitionism. Pluralism is the doctrine that there is a plurality of moral principles, and unranked pluralism adds the additional claim that none of these moral principles are more basic than any other. Methodological intuitionism stands in contrast, then, with forms of monism—the view that there is only one basic moral principle—notably utilitarianism (/entry/Utilitarianism), and Kantianism (/entry/Kantianism), and varieties of ranked pluralism, which hold that some duties are more important than others. In illustration, a Kantian would argue that duties of promise keeping, and a duty to help other people, are grounded in a more basic principle, the categorical imperative. A ranked pluralist would argue that there are several different moral duties, which are not grounded in any fundamental principle, but may add that a duty not to harm others is more important than keeping one’s promises. By contrast, methodological intuitionists would argue that there are several distinct moral principles but that none of these is more important than any other. The second and primary usage of “intuitionism” is to refer to a doctrine in moral epistemology (/entry/Epistemology) concerning how agents come to know or justifiably believe moral judgments such as that ‘torture is wrong’ or that ‘virtue is good’. Intuitionism in this sense is a theory about how ethical beliefs acquire their justification. More specifically, it says that we can know that certain things are good or actions are right by intuition. Coming to know something by intuition is to apprehend it directly, and not on the basis of some reasoning process. Since intuitionism assumes that we are capable of moral knowledge, it is to be contrasted with forms of moral scepticism, such as emotivism, which deny this. It is also to be contrasted with coherentism, which denies that moral knowledge is intuitive, rather than inferred from other things already known. In illustration, an intuitionist might hold that the judgment that one ought to keep one’s promises is something that is intuitively known to be true; in contrast, an emotivist (/entry/Emotivism) would regard this judgment as an expression of feeling, and hence not something that could be true or false; lastly, coherentists (/entry/Epistemology) would argue that this principle is known by inference from other principles which are themselves not intuitively known. What is the relationship between methodological and epistemological intuitionism? In their historical development, the two doctrines are closely tied up with one another. Notable intuitionists such as H.A. Pritchard and W.D. Ross held both of these doctrines, endorsing unranked pluralism, and the claim that a plurality of basic principles are known through intuition. However, it is possible to deny methodological intuitionism, while sanctioning epistemological intuitionism. Henry Sidgwick (/entry/Henry_Sidgwick) is instructive in this regard. He argued that that there is one basic moral principle—the principle of utility (/entry/Utilitarianism)—but that this principle is grasped through intuition. So Sidgwick is an epistemological intuitionist but not a methodological intuitionist. Varieties of epistemological intuitionism Within this general characterization of intuitionism as a theory of how moral beliefs are acquired and justified, a variety of different forms of intuitionism may be distinguished. Firstly, varieties of intuitionism may be distinguished from one another in terms of differences in the content of what is intuited. The content of an intuition is roughly “what it is about.” In the case of moral intuition, moral intuitions could be about (amongst other things) values such as goodness and badness, or rightness and obligation. G.E. Moore (/entry/G.E._Moore), for example, holds that goodness and badness are intuited. By contrast, Joseph Butler (/entry/Joseph_Butler) and H.A Pritchard hold that intuitions are about rightness and wrongness. Secondly, various forms of intuitionism may be distinguished from one another in terms of the generality of what is intuited. This is a question as to whether intuitive moral knowledge is essentially of general principles or of particular actions and things. For instance, one might intuit the general principle that breaking promises is wrong, or that some particular action would be morally wrong. In this respect, Sidgwick (/entry/Henry_Sidgwick) and W.D. Ross (/entry/W.D._Ross) argue that general principles are intuited; in Sidgwick’s case only one principle, the Principle of Utility; in Ross’s several basic and irreducible moral principles that cannot be ranked in terms of priority. Finally, Prichard, Butler (/entry/Samuel_Butler) and Dancy hold that the rightness of particular actions is intuited, such as, for example, that this action is morally wrong. Thirdly, various forms of intuitionism may be distinguished from one another in terms of the source of what is intuited. Intuitionists are here divided into two camps: rational intuitionists and perceptual intuitionists. Rational intuitionists hold that some moral judgments are known by means of reason, and are therefore a priori (/entry/A_priori). They are likely to draw an analogy with the way in which mathematical principles are known by intuition. For example, in the following quotation, W.D Ross emphasizes that basic moral principles are self-evident, in a very similar way to which mathematical axioms are self-evident. That an act qua fulfilling a promise, or qua effecting a just distribution of good… is prima facie right, is self- evident; not in the sense that it is evident from the beginning of our lives, or as soon as we attend to the proposition for the first time, but in the sense that when we have reached sufficient mental maturity and have given sufficient attention to the proposition it is evident without any need of proof, or evidence beyond itself. It is evident just as a mathematical axiom, or the validity of a form of inference, is evident… (W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, 1930, 29-30) In contrast with rational intuitionism, perceptual intuitionism holds that moral intuitions are akin to sense perceptions so