Case 1:20-cv-02299-JEB *SEALED* Document 3 Filed 08/20/20 Page 1 of 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) 171 “DEHLAVIEH” ANTI-TANK GUIDED ) MISSILES; ) ) EIGHT TYPE “358” SURFACE-TO-AIR ) MISSILES; ) Case: 1:20−cv−02299 ) Assigned To : Boasberg, James E. Assign. Date : 8/20/2020 TEN RAYAN ROSHD AFZAR RU60G ) Description: Gen. Civil (E−DECK) THERMAL WEAPONS OPTICS; ) ) ONE USV KIT GM2 35-1; ) ) ONE USV KIT 36-1; ) ) Civil Action No. _______ ONE USV KIT 38-1; ) ) ONEBOX NO 573/714; ) ) 13,000 “PLAIN DETONATOR, NO. 8” ) BLASTING CAPS; ) ) 351 COMPONENTS FOR LAND-ATTACK ) CRUISE MISSILE; ) ) ONE SET OF COMPONENTS TO NOOR- ) C802 ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILE; and ) ) SIX BOXES OF MISCELLANEOUS ) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE ) COMPONENTS ) ) Defendants. ) ) Case 1:20-cv-02299-JEB *SEALED* Document 3 Filed 08/20/20 Page 2 of 20 UNITED STATES’ VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE IN REM COMES NOW, Plaintiff the United States of America (the “United States”), by and through the Acting United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, which alleges as follows and brings this verified complaint for forfeiture in a civil action in rem against the Defendant Properties (defined and displayed below), namely: i. 171 “Dehlavieh” anti-tank guided missiles (“Defendant Property 1”); ii. Eight type “358” surface-to-air missiles (“Defendant Property 2”); iii. Ten Rayan Roshd Afzar RU60G thermal weapons optics (“Defendant Property 3”); iv. One USV KIT GM2 35-1, which includes: two optics, one gear box controller, one USV control panel, one hydraulic control, one antenna adaptor AMP FK-2, one USV 10 panel, three 3 outlet connectors (bronze), and one mounting hardware kit (“Defendant Property 4”); v. One USV KIT 36-1, which includes: one USV control panel, one USV 10 panel, four optics, one gear box controller, one hydraulic control box, and one antenna adaptor AMP FK- 2 (“Defendant Property 5”); vi. One USV KIT 38-1, which includes: six optics, one gear box controller, one USV control panel, one USV I/O panel, one antenna adaptor FK-2, one hydraulic control box, and one mounting bracket kit (“Defendant Property 6”); vii. One “BOX NO 573/714,” which includes: five optics “AK-12” with bags, three USV controller boxes, and three camera controllers (“Defendant Property 7”); viii. 13,000 “Plain Detonator, No. 8” blasting caps (“Defendant Property 8”); ix. 351 components for land-attack cruise missile (“Defendant Property 9”); x. One set of components to Noor-C802 anti-ship cruise missile (“Defendant Property 10”); and - 2 - Case 1:20-cv-02299-JEB *SEALED* Document 3 Filed 08/20/20 Page 3 of 20 xi. Six boxes of miscellaneous unmanned aerial vehicle components (Defendant Property 11), (collectively, the “Defendant Properties”). NATURE OF ACTION AND THE DEFENDANT IN REM 1. This in rem forfeiture action arises out of an investigation by Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (“DCIS”). Specifically, the United States is investigating an Iranian maritime weapons smuggling network involved in the illicit trafficking of advanced conventional weapons systems and components, including systems that contain U.S.-origin components, by sanctioned Iranian entities that directly supports military action by the Houthis movement in Yemen and the Iranian regime’s campaign of terrorist activities in Yemen and throughout the region. 2. The Defendant Properties are subject to seizure and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i), as domestic and foreign assets of a designated foreign terrorist organization, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), which has engaged in planning and perpetrating federal crimes of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5), against the United States, citizens or residents of the United States, and as domestic and foreign assets affording any person a source of influence over any such entity or organization. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1355. 4. Pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 522(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(b), this court has jurisdiction for property subject to forfeiture on the high seas. 5. Venue is proper within this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2). - 3 - Case 1:20-cv-02299-JEB *SEALED* Document 3 Filed 08/20/20 Page 4 of 20 FACTS GIVING RISE TO FORFEITURE I. BACKGROUND A. Iranian Support of Military Action and Terrorist Activity in Yemen 6. According to reliable reporting, the Houthis, who have been fighting the United Nations-recognized government in Yemen, took control of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, in 2014. In response to Houthi advances, neighboring states launched a military campaign in 2015. Iran is widely known to provide support to the Houthis. Yemeni officials and their allies, most notably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have repeatedly alleged that Iran and its proxy Hezbollah1 have provided arms, training, and financial support to the Houthis. Iranian and Hezbollah officials have denied such claims. 7. In January 2020, the United Nations (“U.N.”) Security Council published its Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (hereafter “Panel of Experts Report”) regarding their findings on the ongoing conflict between the Houthis and U.N.-recognized Yemeni government. With regard to potential violations of the targeted U.N. arms embargo, the Panel of Experts Report noted the continued reception by Houthi forces of military support in the form of assault rifles, rocket- propelled grenade launchers, anti-tank guided missiles, and more sophisticated cruise missile systems. 8. According to the Panel of Experts Report, some of those weapons have technical characteristics similar to arms manufactured in Iran. 1 On October 8, 1997, the United States Secretary of State designated Hizballah, including several aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On May 16, 2017, the Secretary of State amended the designation of Hizballah to include the following aliases: Lebanese Hizballah, also known as Lebanese Hezbollah, also known as LH, among other aliases. To date, Hizballah remains a designated FTO. - 4 - Case 1:20-cv-02299-JEB *SEALED* Document 3 Filed 08/20/20 Page 5 of 20 9. The Panel of Experts Report further noted that for both commercial parts and weapons, the main smuggling route seems to run overland from Oman and the southern coast of Yemen, through territory controlled by the U.N.-recognized Yemeni government, but the recent interdiction of a vessel carrying anti-tank guided missiles and other missile parts in the Arabian Sea indicates that, as in previous years, sea transport continues to play a role in potential violations of the targeted arms embargo. B. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 10. The U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of the Treasury have found that the Iranian government uses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”) as its primary means to direct and implement its global terrorist campaign, to include the illicit trafficking of advanced conventional weapons to proxies in various countries, including Yemen. 11. On April 15, 2019 the United States Secretary of State designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. To date, the IRGC remains a designated FTO.2 2 The Secretary of State has also listed the following aliases for the IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps; Islamic Revolution Guards Corps; Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Corps; IRG; The Iranian Revolutionary Guards; Islamic Revolutionary Guards; Iran’s Revolutionary Guards; Revolutionary Guards; Revolutionary Guard; Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; AGIR; Pasdaran; Pasdaran-e Inqilab; Pasdarn-e Enghelab-e Islami; Sepah; Sepah Pasdaran; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Sepah-e Pasdaran Enghelab Islami; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force; IRGC-Quds Force; IRGC-QF; Qods Force; Sepah-e Qods; Jerusalem Force; Al Qods; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force; Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami (Pasdaran); Sepah-e Qods (Jerusalem Force); Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the IRGC; Quds Force; IRGC Ground Forces; Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Ground Force; Basij; Baseej; Basij-e Melli; Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Resistance Force; Basij Resistance Forces; Mobilization of the Oppressed; Mobilization of the Oppressed Unit; Mobilization of the Oppressed Organization; Organization of the Mobilisation of the Oppressed; Sazman Basij Melli; Sazman-e Moghavemat-e Basij; Sazeman-e Basij-e Mostazafan; Vahed-e Basij-e Mostazafeen; Vahed-e Basij Mostaza’feen; National Mobilization Organization; National Resistance Mobilization; Resistance Mobilization Force; Nirooye Moghavemate Basij; Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij; IRGC - 5 - Case 1:20-cv-02299-JEB *SEALED* Document 3 Filed 08/20/20 Page 6 of 20 12. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the IRGC and its major holdings have a dominant presence in Iran’s commercial and financial sectors, controlling multi-billion dollar businesses and maintaining extensive economic interests in the oil industry. The profits from these activities support the IRGC’s full range of nefarious activities, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, support for terrorism, and a variety of human rights abuses, at home and abroad. See https://home.treasury.gov/news/ press-releases/sm703. II. UNITED STATES MARITIME INTERDICTION OF STATELESS VESSELS CONTAINING IRANIAN ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTINED FOR YEMEN 13. This civil forfeiture action arises from two separate U.S. Navy Central Command (“NAVCENT”) interdictions of stateless vessels (i.e., vessels not displaying a national flag), the Al Qanas 1 and Al Raheeb, occurring on November 25, 2019, and February 9, 2020, respectively.