Notes Introduction 11. An example of this traditional exposé is F.S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant (London, 1966). 2. S.A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: the Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill, 1976); W.A. McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914–1924: The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe (Princeton, 1978); M. Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics: France and European Diplomacy 1916–1923 (New York, 1980). See also C.S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilisation in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton, 1975); J. Bariéty, Les relations franco-allemandes après la première guerre mondiale, 10 novembre 1918–10 janvier 1925, de l’exécution à la négociation (Paris, 1977); J.F.V. Keiger, Raymond Poincaré (Cambridge, 1997); and B. Kent, The Spoils of War: The Politics of Reparations 1918–1922 (Oxford, 1989). 13. For an excellent overview of this literature, see J. Jacobson, ‘Is there a new International History of the 1920s?’, American Historical Review, vol. 88, no. 3 (1983), pp. 617–45. 14. Little has been written from the British perspective on the Ruhr crisis. Very general coverage can be found in F.S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers, 1916–1939 (London, 1966) and in M. Howard, The Continental Commitment: the Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (London, 1972). See J.R. Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–1926 (Ithaca, 1989) for an assessment of strategic policy at this time. More detail can be found in the biographies of the key people involved. On Bonar Law, see R. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: the Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law (London, 1955); on Curzon, see D. Gilmour, Curzon (London, 1994); on Baldwin, see K. Middlemas and F. Barnes, Baldwin, a Biography, (London, 1969); on MacDonald, see D. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977); and on Crowe, see S. Crowe and E. Corp, Our Ablest Public Servant: Sir Eyre Crowe, 1864–1925 (Braunton, 1993). The following are also of interest, though coverage of the Ruhr is far from complete: G.H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919–1924 (London, 1995); E. Maisel, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1919–1926 (Brighton, 1994); A. Orde, British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World War (Cambridge, 1990); D.G. Williamson, ‘Great Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, 1923–24’, British Journal of International Studies, 3 (1977), pp. 70–91; and A.J. Sharp, ‘Lord Curzon and British Policy towards the Franco-Belgian Occupation of the Ruhr in 1923’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 8, no. 2 ( July 1997), pp. 83–96. 183 184 Notes 15. In the event, the refusal of the US Congress to ratify the Treaty of Versailles meant that the US had only an unofficial representative on the Reparation Commission. 16. For further information on events at Versailles, see A. Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919, (Basingstoke, 1991); and M.F. Boemeke, G.D. Feldman and E. Glaser (eds), The Treaty of Versailles: a Reassessment after 75 Years (Cambridge, 1998). 17. For example, Gerald Feldman argues that the allied peace terms made impossible demands on the Germans (The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924, Oxford, 1993). Niall Ferguson, on the other hand, claims that it was possible for Germany to have fulfilled the more limited allied demands embodied in the London Schedule of Payments of 1921 and that a tighter fiscal policy and monetary stance would in fact have proved a more effective weapon against reparation than the infla- tionary policies pursued. N. Ferguson, ‘Constraints and room for manoeuvre in the German inflation of the early 1920s’, Economic History Review, vol. 49, no. 4 (1996), pp. 642–3. 18. For more information on Germany and the Ruhr Crisis, see Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924; and H.J. Rupieper, The Cuno Government and Reparations 1922–23: Politics and Economics (The Hague, 1979). More general works on Germany and German policy at this time are J. Hiden, Germany and Europe 1919–39 (London, 1977); A.J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler (Macmillan, 1991); E. Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London, 1988); and M.M. Lee and W. Michalka, German Foreign Policy 1917–1933: Continuity or Break? (Berg, 1987). There is also a vast wealth of material on the role of Gustav Stresemann. See, for example, M.J. Enssle, ‘Stresemann’s Diplomacy Fifty Years after Locarno: Some Recent Perspectives.’ Historical Journal, vol. 20, no. 4 (1977), pp. 937–48; R. Grathwol, ‘Gustav Stresemann: Reflections on his foreign policy’, Journal of Modern History, vol. 45, no. 1 (1973), pp. 52–70; T. Grathwol, ‘Stresemann revisited’, European Studies Review, vol. 7, no. 3 (1977), pp. 341–52; K.P. Jones, ‘Stresemann, the Ruhr Crisis and Rhenish Separatism; a case study of Westpolitik’, European Studies Review, vol. 7, no. 3 (1977), pp. 311–40; and L.E. Jones, ‘Gustav Stresemann and the Crisis of German Liberalism’, European Studies Review, vol. 4, no. 2 (1974), pp. 141–63. 19. Gilmour, Curzon, p. 544. 10. Curzon Papers, MSS Eur. F.112/200b: Hardinge to Curzon, 1.11.22. 11. J.M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London, 1919). 12. CAB 24, 140 CP 4348: Foreign Office Memorandum on the Reparation Position, 5.12.22. 1 The Bonar Law Cabinet and the Origins of the Ruhr Crisis 11. This conference was held after the war scare over Chanak in September 1922. Its aim was to formulate a final peace settlement for Turkey after World War I to replace the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. Notes 185 12. Curzon Papers MSS Eur. F.112/319 Memo by Curzon (Lausanne), 30.11.22. 13. Ibid. 14. Blake, Unknown, p. 466. 15. Bonar Law’s stated aim was that: ‘The work of the Foreign Office will in future be done by the Foreign Office, subject to the control of the Cabinet, and, of course, under the personal supervision of the Prime Minister.’ (HLRO, Hist. Coll. 184, Bonar Law papers, Box 113, folder 10, doc. 1: Cambray to Waterhouse, 10.11.22 enclosing ‘Principles of Unionist Foreign policy.’) 16. D’Abernon Papers, Vol. 48927B: Hankey (London) to D’Abernon (Berlin), letter, 24.10.22. 17. Curzon left London on 17.11.22. 18. Curzon Papers, MSS Eur. F.112/200b: Hardinge to Curzon, 2.12.22. 19. The British were well aware of Poincaré’s predicament. On 1 November, Hardinge reported from the French embassy: ‘Signs have not been wanting for some time that the ‘union sacrée’ of parties, formed under the stress of war, was breaking up’ (FO 425 390: W9078/4/17: Hardinge, disp. 2551, 1.11.22.) Mr Campbell (also of the Paris Embassy) added: ‘For some months M. Poincaré has been thought to be drifting towards the Left in internal politics. At the same time his foreign policy has, on the whole, been of a completely “Nationalist” complexion … As regards the Right, M. Poincaré has mainly relied, in order to preserve their favour, on a blustering for- eign policy towards Germany and on intransigence in his dealings with ourselves.’ (Memo by Campbell (n.d.), encl. in FO 425 390: W9078/4/17: Hardinge, disp. 2551, 1.11.22.) 10. FO 371 7487, C16157/99/18: FO minute, 23.11.22. 11. Keiger, Poincaré, p. 295. 12. CAB 23 31: Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 1.11.22. 13. HLRO, Hist. Coll. 184, Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, Doc. 35: Curzon to Bonar Law, 28.11.22. 14. Minute by Curzon 28.11.22 on FO 371 7487, C16100/99/18: Grahame tel. 102, 26.11.22. 15. Throughout Curzon’s correspondence with Bonar Law at this time he dwelt on the importance of the Lausanne Conference, often mentioning the European situation only in passing. (See HLRO, Hist. Coll. 184, Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12: Correspondence between Curzon and Bonar Law.) 16. For example, on 4 December Curzon wrote: ‘I am afraid that if you break with Poincaré in London, it will mean the failure of my already slender chances here.’ (HLRO, Hist. Coll. 184, Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, Doc 39: Curzon to Bonar Law, 4.12.22.) 17. HLRO, Hist. Coll. 184, Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, Doc. 38: Bonar Law to Curzon, 5.12.22. 18. Minute by Lampson, 9.12.22 on: FO 371 7489, C17052/99/18: Ryan (Coblenz) to Lampson 7.12.22. 19. FO 371 7488, C16643/99/18: FO minute on ‘Reparation Position’, 5.12.22. 20. FO 371 7487, C16157/99/18: FO minute, 23.11.22. 21. FO 371 7487, C16116/99/18: Memo by Wigram, 23.11.22. 22. Ibid. 23. Minute by Lampson, 18.11.22 on: FO 371 7487, C15635/99/18: Central Department Minute, ‘Relations between the British Delegation to the Reparation Commission and the Treasury and the Foreign Office’, 14.11.22. 186 Notes 24. Curzon Papers: MSS Eur. F.112/200(b), Hardinge to Curzon, 6.11.22. 25. Curzon Papers: MSS Eur. F.112/200(b), Hardinge to Curzon, 2.12.22. The Bloc National was the rather uneasy coalition of parties upon which Poincaré relied for his Parliamentary support. 26. Curzon Papers, MSS Eur. F.112/240: Curzon to Grahame, 1.11.22. 27. FO 371 7488, C16247/99/18: Memorandum on Conversation between Bonar Law and the French ambassador in London, 28.11.22.