Identifying Potential Gaps in U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Capabilities ABBIE TINGSTAD, SCOTT SAVITZ, KRISTIN VAN ABEL, DULANI WOODS, KATHERINE ANANIA, MICHELLE DARRAH ZIEGLER, AARON C. DAVENPORT, KATHERINE COSTELLO HS AC HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS CENTER An FFRDC operated by the RAND Corporation under contract with DHS Published in 2018 Preface This report documents the outcome of a research project entitled “Department of Homeland Security [DHS] Evergreen Arctic Priorities,” which focused on identifying priority potential Arctic capability gaps with respect to U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) operations in the region in 2017, and whether and how these gaps might become exacerbated by the 2030s. As the Arctic environment evolves, it is becoming increasingly important to determine how to operate in the region, given changing conditions and the potential for increasing activity that will drive demand for more-frequent U.S. government presence across a broader spectrum of roles. There are several challenges associated with operating in the Arctic, including large distances and the harsh environment, as well as limited infrastructure and available assets for communicating, observing, understanding, and maneuvering. This research provides an additional perspective on how to characterize potential gaps in order to develop clearer avenues ahead for mitigating them that cover a range of possible current and future USCG activities in the Arctic. The primary purpose of this research is to support a USCG Capability Analysis Report focused on the Arctic. This report could be considered similar to a capability analysis and may be of broad interest to the USCG, DHS, and other decisionmakers involved with Arctic policy and planning. This research was sponsored by the USCG Office of Emerging Policy and conducted within the Strategy, Policy, and Operations Program of the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC). About the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Section 305 of Public Law 107-296, as codified at 6 U.S.C. § 185), authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, to establish one or more FFRDCs to provide independent analysis of homeland security issues. The RAND Corporation operates the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) as an FFRDC for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under contract HSHQDC-16-D-00007. The HSOAC FFRDC provides the government with independent and objective analyses and advice in core areas important to the Department in support of policy development, decisionmaking, alternative approaches, and new ideas on issues of significance. The HSOAC FFRDC also works with and supports other federal, state, local, tribal, and public- and private- sector organizations that make up the homeland security enterprise. The HSOAC FFRDC's research is undertaken by mutual consent with DHS and is organized as a set of discrete tasks. iii This report presents the results of research and analysis conducted under HSHQDC-16-D- 00007/HSCG23-17-J-M7P029. The results presented in this report do not necessarily reflect official DHS opinion or policy. For more information on HSOAC, see www.rand.org/hsoac. For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2310. iv Contents Preface ...................................................................................................................................... iii Figures ...................................................................................................................................... vi Tables ....................................................................................................................................... vii Summary ................................................................................................................................. viii Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... xv Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................... xvi 1. Addressing Arctic Planning Challenges .................................................................................. 1 U.S. Coast Guard Roles in the Arctic .................................................................................................. 4 Arctic Capability Gaps ........................................................................................................................ 6 Research Purpose, Objective, and Approach ........................................................................................ 9 2. An Expert Workshop to Identify Potential Arctic Capability Gaps ........................................ 12 Workshop II Approach ...................................................................................................................... 13 Results .............................................................................................................................................. 17 Summary of Key Findings ................................................................................................................ 23 3. Identifying Potential USCG Arctic Capability Gaps .............................................................. 24 How Potential Gaps Were Estimated ................................................................................................. 24 Summary of Potential Gaps ............................................................................................................... 25 Limitations in Voice and Data Communications ................................................................................ 27 Lack of Consistent Awareness About Threats and Hazards ................................................................ 29 Challenges in the Ability to Respond to Incidents .............................................................................. 31 Deficiency in the Articulation of Needs and Risks ............................................................................. 35 4. Identifying Vulnerabilities Associated with Gaps .................................................................. 37 5. Conclusions and Recommendations ...................................................................................... 42 Appendix A. Scenario Development Approach ......................................................................... 45 Appendix B. Mapping Enablers to USCG Activities ................................................................. 73 Appendix C. Full Description of Workshop I ............................................................................ 83 References ................................................................................................................................ 97 v Figures Figure S.1. Map of the U.S. Arctic ........................................................................................... viii Figure S.2. Process for Identifying Potential Gaps ..................................................................... xi Figure 1.1. Map of the U.S. Arctic .............................................................................................. 2 Figure 1.2. Summary of Research Approach ............................................................................. 10 Figure 2.1. Summary of Workshop II Flow ............................................................................... 14 Figure 3.1. Process for Identifying Potential Gaps .................................................................... 25 Figure A.1. “Deepwater Horizon North” Context ...................................................................... 56 Figure A.2. “Smugglers’ Paradise” Context .............................................................................. 57 Figure A.3. “Build It and They Will Come” Context ................................................................. 58 Figure A.4. “Bump” Context .................................................................................................... 60 Figure A.5. “Cold Terror” Context............................................................................................ 61 Figure A.6. “Cyber Lights Out” Context ................................................................................... 63 Figure A.7. “Icy Standoff” Context ........................................................................................... 64 Figure A.8. “Small Boats, Big Problems” Context .................................................................... 66 Figure A.9. “Storm Front” Context ........................................................................................... 67 Figure B.1. Mapping of Safety Activities to Key Enablers ........................................................ 75 Figure B.2. Mapping of the PWCS and Drug Interdiction Missions to Key Enablers................. 77 Figure B.3. Mapping of the Migrant Interdiction and Defense Readiness Missions to Key Enablers .................................................................................................................... 78 Figure B.4. Mapping of the Ice Operations and Aids to Navigation Missions to Enablers ......... 80 Figure B.5. Mapping of the Marine Environmental Protection and Living Marine Resources Missions to Enablers ........................................................................................................