The Reward of Virtue: An Essay on the Relationship Between Character and Well-Being A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY Ian M Stoner IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Valerie Tiberius and Michelle Mason, Advisors July, 2011 c Ian M Stoner 2011 Acknowledgments Thanks to professors Fred Schueler, Doug Lewis, Sandra Peterson, Michelle Ma- son, and Valerie Tiberius for leading first-rate seminars that planted the seeds that eventually became this dissertation. Thanks to the members of several writ- ing groups along the way, including at least Marilea Bramer, Mike Rohde, Matt Frank, Jason Swartwood, and Steve Nelson. Thanks to Devora Shapiro for dis- cussions during the formative stages of these ideas. Thanks to Crystal Bergstrom for years of patience followed by a frantic marathon of copy-editing. Finally, thanks to Valerie Tiberius for embodying the virtuous advisor. i Dedication For my parents, Mark and Daria, with gratitude for decades of unflagging support. ii Abstract Most work in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics begins by supposing that the virtues are the traits of character that make us good people. Secondary questions, then, include whether, why, and in what ways the virtues are good for the people who have them. This essay is an argument that the neo-Aristotelian approach is upside down. If, instead, we begin by asking what collection of character traits are good for us| that is, what collection of traits are most likely to promote our own well-being|we find a collection of traits a lot like the traditional slate of virtues. This suggests an egoistic theory of the virtues: the virtues just are those traits of character that reliably promote the well-being of their possessor. In addition to making the positive case for character egoism, I defend it from some antici- pated objections. Most importantly, I argue that character egoism doesn't inherit the problems of ethical egoism. I conclude by offering self-regarding accounts of two virtues traditionally thought to be irreducibly other-regarding: honesty and justice. iii Contents Acknowledgments i Dedication ii Abstract iii 1 Introduction: Virtue and Well-Being 1 1.1 Purpose, function, and excellence of kind . 4 1.2 The connection between virtue and well-being . 8 1.3 Where from here? . 11 2 Doing Well Without a Theory of Well-Being 12 2.1 Relationships . 14 2.2 Personal projects . 17 2.3 Other candidates . 21 2.4 Projects, relationships, and theories of well-being . 27 2.5 Character egoism . 30 3 Ethical Egoism and Character Egoism 34 3.1 Egoism as category mistake . 36 3.2 Egoism and beneficence . 38 iv 3.3 Egoism and moral schizophrenia . 43 3.4 Conclusion . 54 4 Clearing Ground for Egoistic Virtues 56 4.1 \But, Hitler!" and the threat of endorsing vices . 57 4.2 Bad projects and the threat of circularity . 62 4.3 Context-sensitivity and the threat of instability . 70 4.4 The situationist challenge to virtue ethics . 76 5 A Catalog Grounded in Well-Being 83 5.1 Getting a catalog out of the definition . 83 5.2 A fragment of a catalog of virtues . 86 5.3 Conclusion . 107 6 Egoistic Honesty: Responding to the Sensible Knave 108 6.1 Hume's problem . 110 6.2 Trust, friendship, and knavery . 116 6.3 Conclusion . 124 7 Character Egoism and Social Justice 125 7.1 Oppressed groups and the pressure to adapt . 126 7.2 Social justice as a self-regarding virtue . 135 8 Conclusion 157 References 160 v Chapter 1 Introduction: Virtue and Well-Being But where is the reward of virtue? And what recompence has nature provided for such important sacrifices, as those of life and fortune, which we must often make to it? \The Stoic" David Hume Consider the two morally best people you know. They aren't, presumably, clones. They differ in superficial ways: maybe one is tall and the other short. They have different personalities, too: one might have a sharp sense of humor while the other is outgoing. They also differ from one another in ways that are clearly morally relevant. Perhaps one is kinder while the other is more steadfast. We can account for the morally relevant differences between these people in two ways. We could insist that every morally relevant difference between them represents an aspect of their character in which at least one of them is morally deficient. Alternatively, we 1 2 might suppose that these two people are comparably good in different ways. In fact, the wide variety of human life-roles yields a ready supply of examples in which we judge different moral characters as comparably good in different ways. A good poet should cultivate a degree of emotional sensitivity that would be crippling (and lamentable) for a military commander. A diplomat should cultivate dispositions that allow her to move comfortably between cultures, while a farmer with no interest in travel need not. The poet and the commander, the diplomat and the farmer, are good in different ways. While it is easiest to see different people being good in different ways when those people have different life-roles, the differences in their characters can't be chalked up (at least entirely) to their different life-roles. Consider, for example, the wide range of characters that could rightly be described as excellent (or virtu- ous) teachers. Some excellent teachers are stern and demanding. Some excellent teachers are nurturing and emotionally connected with their students. Some are passionate and funny. They are good teachers, in different ways. And when a situation with clear moral stakes arises in the classroom|say, a student says something patently bigoted during a discussion|excellent teachers will deal with it in different ways. They will be virtuous in different ways. There is variety among the virtuous. At the same time, the degree of overlap in the characteristics of virtuous people is striking. When you think of the two best people you know, it may be the case that one is kinder than the other, but it will never be the case that either of the best people you know is cruel. The traits of character that make a person virtuous are broadly shared. Neo-Aristotelian virtue theories, which ground the virtues in human nature or excellence of kind, are well-positioned to account for the similarities between 3 virtuous people. Human nature, after all, is shared between poets, generals, teach- ers, and everyone else. The slate of virtues derived from human nature will be common to us all. For the very same reason, though, theories in the Aristotelian tradition are less well-positioned to account for individual variation in the characters of virtuous people. There are many kinds of variation neo-Aristotelians can capture, but given that human nature is shared between us all, different virtues for different people appears to be incompatible with neo-Aristotelian theory. We have available to us another concept that can ground an account of the virtues: well-being. Well-being is a feature of individuals, not species, so an account of virtue grounded in well-being will naturally accommodate variety in the characters of the virtuous. However, it is a psychological fact that the sorts of engagement that foster well-being are broadly shared across the kind. For all human beings, close friendships are good; for all human beings, a sense of achievement is good. The fact that the psychology of well-being is broadly shared accounts for the fact that well-being derived virtues, too, are broadly shared. I believe this is the better way to approach theorizing about the virtues. The virtues are best understood as the traits of character that reliably promote our own well-being; that is, the virtues are best understood egoistically. Though the poet, the general, the farmer, the diplomat, and the teacher are all instances of the human kind, they have reason to cultivate varying slates of virtues: their lives will go better for them if they do. Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and its thirty years of off-shoots have together developed a framework that includes much more than a definition of virtue. Most centrally, the various virtue theories together make a compelling case that char- acter is (or should be) prior to action in moral evaluation; indeed, they all derive 4 an account of right action from an account of good character. This understanding of the relationship between character and action is an inversion of the approach of modern moral theories like utilitarianism and Kantianism, and I believe it is right.1 My disagreement, then, is not with the general framework of virtue ethics. My concern is specifically with the neo-Aristotelian theory of the virtues as the traits of character that make us excellent instances of our kind.2 This dissertation is not a direct argument against the Aristotelian theory of the virtues; it is, instead, an alternative theory. By way of introduction, however, I'd like to run through some well-trod criticisms of neo-Aristotelian virtue theory. In reviewing these issues, I'm not offering anything new|let alone a knockdown argument against neo-Aristotelians. I want only to draw attention to the difficulty (and openness) of some questions in the neo-Aristotelian tradition, and to the ways in which these questions invite us to reconceive the connection between virtue and well-being. 1.1 Purpose, function, and excellence of kind Virtue theories in the Aristotelian tradition take the virtues to be the charac- teristics that make a thing an excellent instance of its kind.