Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 3, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za THE MILITARY GLIDER REVISITED Helmoed-Romer Heitman* The military glider has, arguably, enjoyed the low cost and simplicity, the latter also allowing briefest life span of any major military equipment local development and production. type - spanning not much more than a decade • Little or no requirement for specialised train- and a half from the entry into production of the ing on the part of the troops to be landed, first, to the demise of the concept as such. Dur- allowing normal infantry to be so employed ing its heyday, however, the glider was instru- after basic orientation and thereby freeing mental in not a few spectacular operations. paratroops for more specialised tasks. Thus, it is not really surprising that some of the • A degree of immunity to current air defences, more iconoclastic military thinkers have, albeit having no infrared and only - depending on infrequently, wondered whether there is not still construction - a low radar signature; a place for up to date gliders in modern warfare. • The ability to deliver a measure of suppres- sive fire during the landing phase by means Just over one year ago, Lieutenant McGill Alex- of fixed or flexibly mounted machine guns 1 or ander addressed this question in an article in possibly even underwing rocket pools2. Militaria, reviewing the glider's primary charac- • The possibility of co-inciding the landing teristics and suggesting that these might merit phase with a preparatory air strike, and serious consideration of the glider as a comple- • The related ability to land its passengers on ment to paratroops. Interestingly, he also the objective to be assaulted without incurring touched on the possibility of employing gliders unacceptable risks. in the resupply of fast moving mechanised forces. This article will outline several other Applying these characteristics in the southern possible applications of the military glider in the African situation, we can find applications both Southern African context, addressing both low in the external element of COIN operations and intensity and conventional war. in more conventional warfare. Before setting out to do this, it is perhaps as well In the former case, one result of our successful to briefly review the glider's salient characteris- raids against PLAN bases in southern Angola tics. In essence, it has many of the capabilities has been to force their relocation deeper into of the helicopter which, in fact, largely sup- that country. The disadvantages of this to PLAN planted it. Its disadvantage relative to the heli- are readily apparant, but there are also disad- copter is that it allows only for delivery, a differ- vantages to ourselves which are less so. ent means of extraction being required. On the other hand, the glider can project power to much Then, too, we face the situation that distance will greater ranges than even the latest helicopters. increasingly hamper the employment of heli- Setting out its salient characteristics in point borne assault until the stage is reached where form, we have: usefully laden helicopters might well be able to reach the objective, but would be unable to re- • Long range, limited only by the range of avail- turn without refuelling. This will then leave us with able transport aircraft and air support; rather restricted options: • Extreme accuracy of placement; • The ability to deliver a concentrated group of • An entirely overland raid; men ready to go into action; • A paradrop near the objective; • The ability to deliver heavy equipment; • A heliborne raid relying on refuelling on the • The ability to deliver concentrated supply objective or loads; • A combination of any of the above . • The ability to land on quite rough and very short unprepared pieces of more or less level None of these will be without serious disadvan- ground; tages. • Relative imperviousness to local weather con- ditions; Thus, an overland raid would inevitably be so • Relative expendability resulting from relatively well advertised that, far from achieving any 42 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 3, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za / •....' ..". German Tank carrying a glider WW II worthwhile measure of surprise, the raiding force could very well find itself ambushed and/or cut off by a superior force. Such a force could not only be superior in terms of size, but also in terms of the type of equipment deployed as it would, in effect, be operating on interior lines. Also, the further such a raiding force penetrates, the greater will be its vulnerability to air attack as the SAAF's ability to provide a continuous CAP at long range would be limited. At the very best, such a raid would encounter fully prepared and alerted defences. Instead of a short, sharp - almost surgical - strike, we could thus find our- selves faced with a very messy and potentially costly imbroglio that would serve only to provide the enemy with a welcome source of propa- ganda material. A paradropped raiding force could well- by dint of low flying during the approach - achieve a measure of surprise but would face several other serious problems. Thus a very low level drop would go some way towards delaying discovery but would require extremely accurate navigation and also carry with it a not inconsiderable risk of serious injury problems. A more conventional Example of a Horsa Glider 43 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 3, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za drop, on the other hand, would almost certainly A glider-borne deep-penetration raid might, result in the transport aircraft being acquired by thus, take the following form: the local air defences, which could prove unac- ceptably costly. Then, too, the sound of the air- • An extremely low level approach by the towed craft would in either case serve to alert the garri- gliders to the release point, thereby seeking to son unless the DZ is some distance from the underfly the opposing surveillance system, a objective - which would in itself create addi- fighter and/or flak suppression escort being tional problems. provided if deemed necessary; • An equally low approach by seperate and Once on the ground, such a raiding force would later starting successive strike and ground be highly vulnerable to any interference at all support forces; until it has successfully consolidated. Even then, • Gliders released some ten minutes from the it will remain painfully vulnerable to any mecha- objective, using JATO type rocket assistance nised force until and unless at least some heavy to 'pop up' to an altitude from which they can equipment can be dropped. Unless the terrain acquire and reach the objective3, then diving and the enemy situation allow low-level extrac- towards it, the towing aircraft returning to tion techniques to be employed, this will how- base at low altitude; ever, only be possible after the local air de- • A preparatory strike on the objective timed to fences have been neutralised. A paradropped co-incide with the assault force coming within raiding force might well also experience diffi- earshot of the objective, thereby distracting culty in overcoming the alerted defences, lack- the defenders' attention from the sound and ing as it would, any integral heavy support. sight of the JATO 'pop up' and, if necessary, the sound of the towing aircraft.4 This strike Finally, there remains the question of extraction, would employ exclusively cluster, fragmenta- although this could probably be quite readily tion (free-fall or rockets), fuel-air or napalm handled by helicopter - if a sufficiently secure weapons and cannon fire in order to minimise LZ can be established. This would be of particu- the danger of significant terrain-deformation lar importance if the raid was carried out at which could endanger the landing gliders: extreme range, as the helicopters might then • The gliders land on the objective immediately have to be refuelled on the ground. In turn, this after the preparatory strike and under cover of presents another set of problems - that of accu- ground support aircraft which, being relatively rate (ie within the LZ) fuel delivery and its hand- manoeuverable at low speeds could continue ling on the ground - should the helicopters not to engage the ground defences during the be able to carry sufficient fuel as cargo on the landing phase. They would use drogue way to the objective. chutes and/or retro-rockets to reduce their landing run to a minimum.5 The vulnerability of a heliborne raid relying on • The assault force disembarks and goes into refuelling on the objective for its extraction, is action under the continued cover of ground sufficiently apparant not to warrant further dis- support aircraft and using whatever heavy cussion here. Suffice it to say that one major equipment has been brought in in assault or problem would be the delivery of the fuel in the cargo gliders. This could well include heavy absence - which must be assumed in the case mortars, light guns and Eland-90s. of a large raid - of sufficient helicopters to trans- • Relieving ground support aircraft stand off, port both the raiding force and the necessary coming in to deal with indicated targets as the fuel. assault force proceeds to clear the objective of the enemy. While a combination of these approaches would • Once the assault force has accomplished its go a little way towards ameliorating some of mission, helicopters are brought in to extract these problems, none would be entirely satisfac- it, refuelling if necessary from fuel carried as tory as the essential weaknesses would remain: cargo on the run in to the objective or landed the obviousness of a ground force on a long in cargo gliders.