CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by DCU Online Research Access Service 1 Chapter 6 France: Stacking the Deck Robert Elgie This chapter examines the two-ballot electoral system in France. The main focus is on the system used for elections to the lower house of the French parliament, the National Assembly. These elections are contested on the basis of a specific type of two-ballot system, namely a single-member, semi-closed, majority- plurality system. At the same time, France has a rather unusual political system in which the President of the Republic is a major political actor. Therefore, this chapter also refers in passing to the system used for presidential elections. This is a variant of the above system. There are four parts to the chapter. The first part identifies the origins of the two electoral systems. The second part outlines the mechanics of the French two-ballot system. The third part discusses the political consequences of the system. The fourth part addresses the seemingly perennial issue of electoral reform. There is a brief conclusion. The origins of the current electoral systems In June 1958, the French political system collapsed. To save the regime from the imminent prospect of martial law, General Charles de Gaulle was called upon to form a government. He agreed on condition that there would be a new Constitution. In October 1958, after being approved in a referendum, the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic came into force. In December 1958 de Gaulle was elected as the first President of the Fifth Republic, winning a landslide victory in the electoral college. In January 1959 he appointed Michel Debré as Prime Minister. The origins of the electoral system for the National Assembly date back to the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. A two-ballot system was used for much of the period 1870-1940 during the Third Republic. However, during the Fourth Republic (1946-58) a proportional representation highest-average list- based system was used. The collapse of the Fourth Republic undermined the credibility of virtually all the institutions associated with it. As a result, when de Gaulle returned to power in 1958 electoral reform was inevitable. At this time, 2 Michel Debré was the gaullists’ main spokesperson on institutional reform. He had long been in favour of a majority system. He believed that such systems were based on the conception of the state as an independent actor in its own right and one that could shape the party system. By contrast, he believed that proportional systems were based on a political philosophy that viewed the state as merely the sum total of the interests and groups that existed in society as a whole (Harmsen, 1988: 283). The former was entirely consistent with gaullist political philosophy. The latter was totally repugnant to it. As a result, even though Debré failed to gain support for the inclusion of either the details or the principles of the new electoral system in the Constitution (Wahl, 1959: 366-67), a shift to a majority system was inevitable. Indeed, the communists were the only major force that objected. That said, there was little support among either the public or the political class for a UK-style single-member plurality system. By contrast, there was more general support for the reintroduction of a two-ballot system. Here, though, a choice had to be made between a single-member constituency-based system and a department-based majority-list system. In the end, the General himself arbitrated in favour of the former (Duverger, 1960: 226). This decision meant that in the first election the gains made by the gaullists were likely to be considerably less than they would otherwise have been. However, it also meant that the General would not have the ‘problem’ of dealing with a very large right-wing majority in the National Assembly that would most likely have been in favour of Algeria remaining French (ibid.). The new system was passed by decree as a piece of emergency legislation on 13 October 1958 and the first elections were held a month later. That said, the current system has only operated uninterruptedly since 1988. The failure to constitutionalise the electoral system in 1958, or subsequently, has meant that electoral reform is almost permanently on the political agenda in France. (See below). Article 34 of the Constitution simply states that the system of election to the National Assembly is determined by law. Thus, the system can be reformed simply by the passage of a new law. From 1958-81 inclusive, National Assembly elections were contested on the basis of the two-ballot system. However, in 1985 a department-based list system of proportional representation was introduced (Knapp, 1987). This was an extremely controversial reform (Favier and Martin-Roland, 1991: 306-15). It was one of François Mitterrand’s election promises at the 1981 presidential election. However, the reform was introduced, at Mitterrand’s behest, just prior to the 3 1986 National Assembly, at which the left was predicted to lose very badly. In the end, the left still lost, but the size of the defeat was greatly reduced. What is more, the extreme-right National Front party won 35 seats, whereas most likely it would not have won any under the old system. Immediately following the 1986 election, the right-wing majority reverted back to the two-ballot system. This reform was itself controversial because the right seemed to stand to gain the most from a return to the previous system. It was also controversial because the Minister of the Interior was accused of wanting to gerrymander the constituency boundaries to favour the right even more. In fact, the Constitutional Council limited the Minister’s right to redraw the constituency boundaries and as public opinion changed the socialists won the 1988 election. As we shall see later in the chapter, the issue of electoral reform has remained politically salient. All the same, since this time, there have been no further reforms to the system of election for the National Assembly. The situation with regard to presidential elections is more straightforward. In 1958, the situation was not considered to be right for the direct election of the President. At least in part, this was because citizens in Algeria would have been able to vote. As a result, the President was indirectly elected by an electoral college, mainly comprising local notables. However, in September 1962, once the Algerian issue had been resolved, a decision was taken to amend the Constitution and to introduce the direct election of the President. At this time, there appears to have been little or no discussion about whether or not to adopt a two-ballot system for presidential elections. Instead, the main element of the discussion centred on the number of sponsors required to contest the election and the rules determining participation at the second ballot (Rudelle, 1984: 705). Even then, these issues were resolved quite quickly. Moreover, since 1962, with the exception of an increase in the required number of sponsors, the system has remained largely unaltered. In part, this is because the basic details of the system were constitutionalised at the time of the 1962 reform, including the rules for participation at the second ballot. Thus, a constitutional reform is needed to change the details of the system. More generally, the system has enjoyed widespread popular and political support. Indeed, the 1993 Vedel (1993) committee on constitutional reform made no mention of reforming the basic mechanics of the system of election for the President, even though it did address a wide range of other issues. 4 How the electoral systems work Elections to the National Assembly are contested on the basis of single-member constituencies. At the 2002 election, there were 577 constituencies, 555 of which were situated in metropolitan France and the remainder in France’s overseas departments and territories. In metropolitan France, the department (the equivalent of UK or US counties) is the basic territorial area within which constituency boundaries are drawn. The number of constituencies per department varies according to the population of the department, but there must be a minimum of two constituencies in a department. Moreover, in any one constituency the size of the electorate should not vary by more than 20 per cent from the average size of the electorate in all the constituencies in the department. In other words, there are rules to guarantee some equality of representation, but discrepancies still remain. So, at the 2002 election, 15 departments contained just two constituencies each. By contrast, one department, Nord, contained 24 constituencies and the Paris department had 21. The number of inhabitants per constituency in metropolitan France ranged from a high of 188,200 in the second constituency of the Val d’Oise department in the Paris suburbs to a low of 34,374 in the second constituency of the Lozère department which is in a highly rural and sparsely populated area. The 1986 electoral law specified that constituency boundaries should be redrawn after every other census, in practice meaning every 20 years or so. The boundaries are proposed by the government, specifically by Minister of the Interior, and submitted to the highest administrative courts in the land for their advice (Council of State, Court of Accounts, Court of Cassation). The changes are then voted by the National Assembly. In each constituency, elections, which are always held on a Sunday, take place according to what can be called a two-ballot majority-plurality system (Elgie, 1997). In basic terms, a candidate is elected by virtue of winning either a majority of votes at the first ballot, or, failing that, a plurality of votes at the second ballot, hence majority-plurality.