ISLAMIC PARTIES IN PAKISTAN Asia Report N°216 – 12 December 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. ENCROACHING INFLUENCE ...................................................................................... 3 A. POST-INDEPENDENCE ................................................................................................................... 3 B. ZIA AND POST-ZIA ....................................................................................................................... 4 C. THE MMA ................................................................................................................................... 5 III. THE ISLAMIST AGENDA: HOW UNIFIED? ............................................................. 6 A. JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI ....................................................................................................................... 7 1. Party mandate ............................................................................................................................... 7 2. Internal structure .......................................................................................................................... 9 B. JAMIAT ULEMA-E-ISLAM (FAZLUR REHMAN) ............................................................................ 10 1. Party mandate ............................................................................................................................. 10 2. Internal organisation .................................................................................................................. 12 C. JAMIAT ULEMA-E- ISLAM (SAMIUL HAQ) .................................................................................. 13 D. MARKAZ-E-JAMIAT AHLE HADITH ............................................................................................ 14 E. JAMIAT ULEMA-E-PAKISTAN ..................................................................................................... 15 F. SUNNI TEHREEK ........................................................................................................................ 16 G. SHIA PARTIES ............................................................................................................................ 17 1. Islami Tehreek-e-Pakistan (ITP), formerly TNFJ-Husseini ....................................................... 18 2. Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria – Moosavi Group ................................................................. 19 3. Majlis-e-Wahdutul Muslimeen .................................................................................................. 19 IV. POLITICAL IMPACT AND INFLUENCE ................................................................. 20 A. THE LEGACY OF MILITARY RULE .............................................................................................. 20 1. Legal reforms ............................................................................................................................. 20 2. Militant wings ............................................................................................................................ 21 B. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLITICS ............................................................................................ 24 1. Parliament and the political mainstream .................................................................................... 24 2. Mass mobilisation ...................................................................................................................... 25 C. STUDENT POLITICS .................................................................................................................... 27 1. The JI and the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT) .............................................................................. 28 2. Imamia Student Organisation (ISO) .......................................................................................... 29 3. Anjuman Talaba Islam (ATI) ..................................................................................................... 30 D. THE MADRASA SECTOR ............................................................................................................. 31 E. ISLAMIC PARTIES AND THE MEDIA ............................................................................................. 32 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 34 APPENDICES A. MAP OF PAKISTAN ........................................................................................................................... 35 B. GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................................... 36 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 38 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2008 ......................................................... 39 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 42 Asia Report N°216 12 December 2011 ISLAMIC PARTIES IN PAKISTAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The ability of Pakistan’s radical Islamic parties to mount that entailed, the parties have still been able to defend ear- limited but potentially violent opposition to the govern- lier gains through intimidation and violent agitation on the ment has made democratic reform, and by extension the streets. In response, faced with their opposition, the main- reduction of religious extremism and development of a more stream moderate parties have often abandoned promised peaceful and stable society, more challenging. This is a re- reforms while in government, or even made further conces- flection of those parties’ well-organised activist base, which sions, such as the National Assembly’s constitutional amend- is committed to a narrow partisan agenda and willing to ment in 1974 declaring the Ahmadi sect non-Muslim.Such defend it through violence. While their electoral support compromises have not offset the pressure of the ulama remains limited, earlier Islamisation programs have given (religious scholars), as intended, but only emboldened re- them a strong legal and political apparatus that enables them ligious hardliners. to influence policy far beyond their numerical strength. An analysis of party agendas and organisation, as well as other The success of the six-party Islamic coalition, Muttahida sources of influence in judicial, political and civil society Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), in the 2002 elections in North- institutions, is therefore vital to assessing how Pakistan’s west Frontier Province and Balochistan was initially per- main religious parties apply pressure on government, as well ceived to be testament to the Islamic parties’ power if they as the ability and willingness of the mainstream parties were unified in a single bloc. This result, however, was in that are moderate on religious issues to resist that pressure. fact due to massively rigged polls by the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, which sought to sideline its These parties’ ability to demonstrate support for their var- main opposition, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pa- ious agendas is an expression of coherent internal struc- kistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). Furthermore, the tures, policymaking processes and relations between the alliance, as reflected in its subsequent breakup, arguably leadership and the rank-and-file. These aspects of party revealed more about internal differences between the par- functioning are, therefore, as critical to understanding their ties – particularly between the two largest and most influ- role in the polity and prospects of influencing policy in the ential, the revivalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the orthodox future as in understanding their relationship to the state. Deobandi Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) – than about their unity. Deprived of the military’s support in the 2008 polls, The Islamic parties that are the subject of this report might the MMA was routed by the PPP, PML-N and Pashtun operate within the current political order, but their ultimate nationalist Awami National Party (ANP). aim is to replace it with one that is based on narrow, dis- criminatory interpretations of Islam. They have also taken Although the Islamic parties support the enforcement of equivocal positions on militant jihad: on the one hand, they Sharia, they represent different schools of thought, and insist on their distinction from militant outfits by virtue of their resulting acrimonious relations have resulted in intra- working peacefully and within the democratic system; on religious violence and created splinter factions that have the other, they admit to sharing the ideological goal of en- weakened the original party or, in some cases, made it de- forcing Sharia (Islamic law), while maintaining sizeable funct. This has also diminished the likelihood of a restored madrasa and mosque networks that are breeding grounds alliance in the next general election. Nevertheless, the for many extremist groups. Fazlur Rehman-led faction of the JUI (JUI-F), the JI and smaller Islamic parties remain relevant due to their relative Moreover, belying their claims of working