Bibliography on Modality and Possible Worlds Karen Bennett and Ted Sider (Most abstracts taken from the Philosophers Index and PhilPapers) Spring, 2014 Adams, Robert Merrihew (1974). “Theories of Actuality.” Noûs 8: 211–31. Reprinted in Loux 1979: 190–209. — (1981). “Actualism and Thisness.” Synthese 49: 3–41. The thesis of this essay is that all possibilities are purely qualitative ex- cept insofar as they involve individuals that actually exist. This thesis is expounded and defended, and some of its implications for modality are developed; the chief implication is that what modal facts “de re” there are depends on what individuals actually exist. Armstrong, David M. (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ayer, Alfred Jules (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1946. 2nd edition. Bacon, Andrew (2013). “Quanti cational Logic and Empty Names.” Philoso- phers’ Imprint 13(24). The result of combining classical quanti cational logic with modal logic proves necessitism – the claim that necessarily everything is necessarily identical to something. This problem is reected in the purely quanti - cational theory by theorems such as $ exists xt = x$; it is a theorem, for example, that something is identical 1 to Timothy Williamson. The standard way to avoid these consequences is to weaken the theory of quanti cation to a certain kind of free logic. However, it has often been noted that in order to specify the truth con- ditions of certain sentences involving constants or variables that don’t denote, one has to apparently quantify over things that are not identi- cal to anything. In this paper I defend a contingentist, non-Meinongian metaphysics within a positive free logic. I argue that although certain names and free variables do not actually refer to anything, in each case there might have been something they actually refer to, allowing one to interpret the contingentist claims without quantifying over mere possi- bilia Bealer, George (1987). “The Philosophical Limits of Scienti c Essentialism.” Philosophical Perspectives 1: 289–365. Scienti c essentialism is the view that some necessities (e.g., water = H2O) can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scienti c essentialism does not extend to the cen- tral questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scienti c essentialism (e.g., twin earth intuitions) is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central questions is also reliable. Included is an outline of a modal reliabilist theory of basic evi- dence and a concept-possession account of the reliability of a priori in- tuition. — (2006). “A De nition of Necessity.” Philosophical Perspectives 20(1): 17–39. In the history of philosophy, especially its recent history, a number of de nitions of necessity have been ventured. Most people, however, nd these de nitions either circular or subject to counterexamples. I will show that, given a broadly Fregean conception of properties, necessity does indeed have a noncircular counterexample-free de nition. Bennett, Karen (2005). “Two Axes of Actualism.” Philosophical Review 114: 297–326. — (2006). “Proxy ‘Actualism’.” Philosophical Studies 129. Bigelow, John (1988). “Real Possibilites.” Philosophical Studies 53: 37–64. 2 Blackburn, Simon (1987). “Morals and Modals.” In Fact, Science and Value, Essays in Honour of A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. Oxford: Blackwell. Reprinted in Blackburn 1993. This paper displays a “quasi-realist” theory of necessary truths, in which our propensity to attach modal values to propositions is compared with our propensity to moral attitudes. The theory offers an alternative to Quinean scepticism to “as if” theories, and to modal realism. — (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bricker, Phillip (1987). “Reducing Possible Worlds to Language.” Philosophical Studies 52: 331–55. — (1991). “Plenitude of Possible Structures.” Journal of Philosophy 88: 607–19. Which mathematical structures are possible, that is, instantiated by the concrete inhabitants of some possible world? Are there worlds with four- dimensional space? With in nite-dimensional space? Whence comes our knowledge of the possibility of structures? In this paper, I develop and defend a principle of plenitude according to which any mathemati- cally natural generalization of possible structure is itself possible. I moti- vate the principle pragmatically by way of the role that logical possibility plays in our inquiry into the world. — (1996). “Isolation and Uni cation: The Realist Analysis of Possible Worlds.” Philosophical Studies 84: 225–38. If realism about possible worlds is to succeed in eliminating primitive modality, it must provide an “analysis” of possible world: nonmodal cri- teria for demarcating one world from another. This David Lewis has done. Lewis holds, roughly, that worlds are maximal uni ed regions of logical space. So far, so good. But what Lewis means by uni cation’ is too narrow, I think, in two different ways. First, for Lewis, all worlds are (almost) “globally” uni ed: at any world, (almost) every part is directly linked to (almost) every other part. I hold instead that some worlds are “locally” uni ed: at some worlds, parts are directly linked only to “neigh- boring” parts. Second, for Lewis, each world is (analogically) “spatiotem- porally” uni ed; every world is “spatiotemporally” isolated from every other. I hold instead: a world may be uni ed by nonspatiotemporal rela- tions; every world is “absolutely” isolated from every other. If I am right, Lewis’s conception of logical space is impoverished: perfectly respectable worlds are missing. 3 — (2001). “Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality.” In Gerhard Preyer and Frank Siebelt (eds.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Phi- losophy of David Lewis, 27–55. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little eld. — (2006). “Absolute Actuality and the Plurality of Worlds.” Philosophical Per- spectives 20: 41–76. Brock, Stuart (1993). “Modal Fictionalism: A Response to Rosen.” Mind 102: 147–50. Gideon Rosen, in his paper Modal Fictionalism (Mind, 1990) puts for- ward and defends what is intended to be an ontologically neutral alter- native to modal realism. I argue that Rosen does not achieve this goal. His ctionalism entails realism about possible worlds. Moreover, any at- tempts to modify the analysis results in an undesirable multiplication of the modal primitives, a problem faced by those who take the standard modal operators as primitive. Burgess, John P. (1997). “Quinus ab Omni Naevo Vindicatus.” Canadian Jour- nal of Philosophy Supplementary volume 23: 25–65. Useful paper clarifying Quine’s attack on quanti ed modal logic. Carnap, Rudolf (1947). Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chalmers, David J. (2002). “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” In Gendler and Hawthorne (2002), 145–200. Coffa, Alberto J. (1991). The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Landmark book describing the history of thought about a prioricity and necessity and analyticity, from Kant to the twentieth-century linguistic philosophers (like logical positivists and the ordinary language philoso- phers). Correia, Fabrice (2007). “(Finean) Essence and (Priorean) Modality.” Dialec- tica 61(1): 63–84. — (2012). “On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence.” Philosophy and Phe- nomenological Research 84(3): 639–653. 4 In his inuential paper “Essence and Modality”, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual and logical necessity in the same vein: a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and a logical necessity a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. I argue that the plausibility of Fine’s view crucially requires that certain apparent explanatory links between essentialist facts be admitted and ac- counted for, and I make a suggestion about how this can be done. I then argue against the reductions of conceptual and logical necessity proposed by Fine and suggest alternative reductions, which remain nevertheless Finean in spirit Craig, E. J. (1975). “The Problem of Necessary Truth.” In Simon Blackburn (ed.), Meaning, Reference and Necessity: New Studies in Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cresswell, M.J. (1972). “The World Is Everything That Is The Case.” Aus- tralasian Journal of Philosophy 50: 1–13. Reprinted in Loux 1979: 129–45. Davies, Martin and Lloyd Humberstone (1980). “TwoNotions of Necessity.” Philosophical Studies 38: 1–30. deRosset, Louis (2009a). “Possible Worlds I: Modal Realism.” Philosophy Com- pass 4(6): 998–1008. It is dif cult to wander far in contemporary metaphysics without bump- ing into talk of possible worlds. And reference to possible worlds is not con ned to metaphysics. It can be found in contemporary epistemology and ethics, and has even made its way into linguistics and decision the- ory. What are those possible worlds, the entities to which theorists in these disciplines all appeal? This paper sets out and evaluates a leading contemporary theory of possible worlds, David Lewis’s Modal Realism. I note two competing ambitions for a theory of possible worlds: that it be reductive and user-friendly. I then outline Modal Realism and consider objections to the effect that it cannot satisfy these ambitions. I conclude that there is some reason to believe that Modal Realism is not reductive and overwhelming reason to believe that it is not user-friendly. 5 — (2009b). “Possible Worlds II: Non-Reductive Theories of Possible Worlds.” Philosophy Compass 4(6): 1009–1021.