Bolton, Matthew GOLDMINE? A Critical Look at the Commercialization of Afghan Demining Centre for the Study of Global Governance (LSE) Research Paper 01/2008 Centre for the Study of Global Governance London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global 1 GOLDMINE ? A Critical Look at the Commercialization of Afghan Demining Matthew Bolton Centre for the Study of Global Governance London School of Economics and Political Science This research is funded in part by the Economic and Social Research Council All text, graphics and photos © Matthew Bolton, 2008. 2 Contents Acronyms........................................................................................................................ 4 Executive Summary........................................................................................................ 5 1. Introduction................................................................................................................. 8 2. A Brief History of Afghan Demining ....................................................................... 10 2.1 The Three Roots of Afghan Demining, 1987-1994............................................ 10 2.2. UN Hegemony, 1994-2001................................................................................ 19 2.3. The 9/11 Sea Change ......................................................................................... 23 2.4. Summary............................................................................................................ 25 3. The Commercialization Process ............................................................................... 26 3.1. RONCO Returns ................................................................................................ 26 3.2. The Commercial Influx...................................................................................... 27 3.3. Market Profile .................................................................................................... 29 3.4. Summary............................................................................................................ 30 4. Price and Productivity............................................................................................... 30 4.4. Summary............................................................................................................ 34 5. Specialization and Innovation................................................................................... 35 5.1 Summary............................................................................................................. 35 6. Quality and Safety..................................................................................................... 35 6.1. Accident Records............................................................................................... 38 6.2. Quality Assurance Reports ................................................................................ 39 6.3. An Example of Commercial Corner-Cutting..................................................... 41 6.4. Summary............................................................................................................ 43 7. The Commodification of Demining.......................................................................... 43 7.1. Summary............................................................................................................ 45 8. The Securitization of Aid.......................................................................................... 46 8.1 Summary............................................................................................................. 49 9. Conclusions and Recommendations ......................................................................... 49 10. Annex: Profiles of Commercial Demining Companies Operating in Afghanistan. 53 10.1. International Companies .................................................................................. 53 10.2. Afghan-Owned Companies.............................................................................. 55 11. Sources.................................................................................................................... 56 11.1 Interviews Conducted ....................................................................................... 56 11.2 Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 58 3 Acronyms ADG Afghan Demining Group AMAC Area Mine Action Center ATC Afghan Technical Consultants BAC Battle Area Clearance CBHA USAID Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance Program for Afghanistan CIA US Central Intelligence Agency DAFA Demining Agency for Afghanistan DSL Defense Systems Limited EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal EODT EOD Technology, Inc. GICHD Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining HALO Trust Hazardous Area Life-support Organisation Trust HID Hemayatbrothers International Demining IED Improvised Explosive Device IMAS International Mine Action Standards IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action ISI Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence MAG Mines Advisory Group MANPADS Man-portable air defense systems MAPA Mine Action Program for Afghanistan MCPA Clearance and Planning Agency MDC Mine Dog Center META Monitoring Evaluation and Training Agency NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization OMA Organization for Mine Awareness OMAR Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation PPE Personal Protective Equipment RONCO RONCO Consulting Corporation SOP Standing Operating Procedures SWAAD South West Afghan Agency for Demining UNDP UN Development Programme UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF UN Children’s Fund UNMACA UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan UNMAS UN Mine Action Service UNOPS UN Office for Project Services UNOCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs USAID US Agency for International Development USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UXB UXB International UXO Unexploded ordnance WRA US State Department Office for Weapons Removal and Abatement WWII World War II 4 Executive Summary Afghan demining is in a period of momentous change. After 16 years of UN-led and NGO-implemented mine action, the last two years have seen the influx of commercial demining companies. This has the potential to enhance the capacity of Afghan demining, through greater profit-driven efficiency, innovation and specialization. Moreover, it is unlikely that many NGOs would be able, or willing, to do mine and UXO clearance tasks for the Coalition and Afghan militaries. Thus some involvement of commercial companies in Afghan demining should be welcomed. However, there are also possible disadvantages to commercialization: 1) Without tight controls and a clear regulatory framework, using commercial companies risks lowering the quality and safety of the demining process, 2) Turning demining into a purchasable commodity risks drawing demining resources away from those who need mine clearance the most, as those who can pay get demining first, 3) Commercialization, which has seen the growing role of private security contractors in demining, has occurred in tandem with the merging of US aid and security policy in Afghanistan. As a result, there is a danger that neutral ‘humanitarian space’ for demining may be reduced. Acknowledging that to a large degree commercialization is a fait accompli , the author has the following recommendations: To UNMACA: 1. Build confidence in the UN-led system by addressing weaknesses in transparency and perceptions of unnecessary bureaucratic inertia. 2. Continue with organizational reform to improve donor reporting, transparency, better data collection and operational efficiency. 3. Commission a study into the economic, political and social impacts of the commercialization of demining in Afghanistan, and ways to make best use of the commercial potential. 4. Rapidly expand the capacity of the quality management structure of UNMACA and centralize the reporting from these teams in a headquarters database. 5. Improve the demining accident database and integrate this into IMSMA (Information Management System for Mine Action) properly. 6. Collate and analyze the quality management and accident data regularly and take accreditation away from organization that have consistently poor safety records. 7. Fundraise aggressively to maintain the humanitarian demining capacity at its current level. 8. Strengthen the NGO sector by encouraging transparency, building technical capacity and introducing elements of moderate competition for grants, so they are able to stem the hemorrhaging of talent to commercial companies. 5 To the agencies of the US government: 1. Maintain some funding for the UN-led system, conditional on improvements in transparency, efficiency and data reporting. 2. Support a UN-commissioned study into the economic, political and social impacts of the commercialization of demining in Afghanistan. 3. Ensure that reconstruction demining contractors are penalized for poor safety practices. 4. Strengthen the NGO sector by encouraging transparency, building technical capacity and introducing elements of moderate competition for grants, so they are able to stem the hemorrhaging of talent to commercial companies. 5. Give security clearance to more UNMACA quality management inspectors to observe the work of commercial contractors in Coalition secure areas. 6. Include tight caveat in