In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2012, Baden-Baden 2013, pp. 77-94. Elena Kropatcheva Elections in Russia in 2011-2012: Will the Wind of Change Keep Blowing? Introduction Russians have long had the reputation of being passive about, uninterested in, and disengaged from politics, and Western observers, in particular, have been puzzled by this passivity. Protests that started in December 2011 as a re- sponse to election fraud during the Russian parliamentary elections, labelled in the mass media as the “new Decembrists” movement, “the Russian winter/ spring”, the “mink-coat” or “white revolution” and described using other col- ourful epithets, too, took many observers abroad and in Russia by surprise. These were the biggest protests since the 1990s. These events raised many questions: Who are these people who have started to protest? What are the reasons for these protests and why did they begin at that specific moment? How stable is Vladimir Putin’s system over- all? Will some liberalization of the system as a result of these protests be pos- sible? And many others. Even now, at the time of writing – August 2012 – it is difficult to give clear and definite answers to these questions, and some of them still have to be studied more closely by sociologists.1 This contribution starts with an overview of the parliamentary and presidential elections (election campaigns, their results and aftermath) that took place in Russia on 4 December 2011 and 4 March 2012, respectively. It then focuses on the protest movement and tries to give some answers to the aforementioned questions. Finally, it presents a survey of developments in Russian domestic policy after the elections in order to find indicators as to whether this wind of change will keep blowing. A great deal of attention is paid throughout the article to opinions from Russia on these developments. The Parliamentary Elections of 4 December 2011 This section describes the parliamentary election on 4 December 2011: the campaign process, the course of the election per se, and its results. In terms of the form they took and their extent, the violations that occurred in the parlia- mentary election campaign, the voting process, and the vote count did not differ much from those committed during previous elections, but their out- 1 See Olga Kryshtanovskaya’s contribution to the Ekho Moskvy radio broadcast Ishchem vykhod…: Skol’ko prozhivet vlast’? [Looking for a way out: How long will the authorities stay in power?], 25 July 2012, at: http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/exit/912297-echo. 77 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2012, Baden-Baden 2013, pp. 77-94. come – the mass protests that started in large cities – is an indicator that something was different during the electoral process this time. As in previous years, the 2011 parliamentary election campaign was ridden with scandals. All of the parties committed violations, but the leader in committing such misdeeds was the ruling pro-presidential United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya, EdRo) party.2 Governors in many regions openly or indir- ectly campaigned for EdRo, promising modernization of infrastructure and an increase in social benefits in exchange for votes. Rallies for representatives of political parties, especially EdRo, took place at schools, during concerts, and at other public events that originally had nothing to do with elections.3 The leading parties that fielded candidates in this election, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, KPRF), the nationalist Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (Liberal’no-Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii, LDPR), and A Just Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossiya, SR), all have their traditional electorates. From the beginning it was clear that the “non-system opposition” liberal Yabloko party would not be given a chance to receive a decisive number of votes. To be fair, it should be also said that its leader, Grigory Yavlinsky, had been politically invisible for various reasons for a long period, so it would have been naive to hope for much support from the liberal electorate. As a result, voters who could not identify strongly with any of the parties or can- didates, or who were sceptical about their preferred party’s chances of at- tracting a significant number of votes, could only cast a negative “protest” vote – against EdRo – by voting for some other party, rather than supporting any party out of conviction. In general, there were no significant differences between the slogans used by all the contesting parties. Neither the ruling EdRo party nor the op- position parties offered real alternative paths for development. All parties fo- cused on cheap populism: For instance, the KPRF promised the nationaliza- tion of resources, the LDPR promised great-power politics, EdRo listed their achievements and focused on maintaining the status quo and stability (rather than modernization),4 and the SR promised to take care of pensioners.5 EdRo used many methods drawn from Soviet propaganda, including images of workers from factories and agriculture, producers of bread and the like, with Putin and Medvedev themselves shown bringing in the harvest. In short, it would have been difficult to discern differences between the parties from 2 See, for example, the Nedelya s Mariannoi Maksimovskoi television broadcast of 19 No- vember 2011, at: http://www.nedelya.ren-tv.com/index.php?option=com_content&view =article&id=1291:-qq--191111-&catid=4:nedelya-s-mariannoy-maksimovskoy&Itemid= 9. 3 For video reports and analysis of the election campaign see, in particular, ibid. 4 Modernization was the slogan, coined by Dmitry Medvedev, to accentuate the specific goals of his presidency (2008-2012). 5 For videos of election campaign propaganda, see the Nedelya s Mariannoi Maksimovskoi television broadcast of 17 November 2011, at: http://www.nedelya.ren-tv.com/index.php? Itemid=9&id=4&layout=blog&option=com_content&view=category& limitstart=20. 78 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2012, Baden-Baden 2013, pp. 77-94. their election campaigns in terms of posters, promises made, and TV election broadcasts. While there was no monitoring of the Russian parliamentary and presi- dential elections in 2007 and 2008 by the OSCE Office for Democratic In- stitutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) because of disagreements be- tween Russia and the OSCE/ODIHR about the role and number of monitors, this time OSCE/ODIHR election monitoring did take place. A total of some 325 observers from the OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) monitored the election.6 The OSCE/ODIHR characterized the elec- tion campaign, the voting, and the count as follows: The preparations […] were technically well-administered […] but the elections were marked by the convergence of the state and the govern- ing party [author’s note: for instance, the posters of the Moscow State Election Committee were almost identical with the posters of EdRo]. […] The contest was also slanted in favour of the ruling party. This was evidenced by the lack of independence of the election administration, the partiality of most media, and the undue interference of state author- ities at different levels. […] Despite the lack of a level playing field, voters took advantage of their right to express their choice. […] The quality of the process deteriorated considerably during the count, which was characterized by frequent procedural violations and instances of apparent manipulation, including several serious indications of ballot box stuffing. Result protocols were not publicly displayed in more than one-third of polling stations observed.7 I allowed myself this long citation because it aptly summarizes the course of the elections and the vote-counting. As a consequence, it is not surprising that the largest number of votes was received by EdRo with 49 per cent. EdRo was followed by the KPRF with 19 per cent, the SR with 13 per cent, and the LDPR with twelve per cent. These parties made it into the Duma. Liberal-democratic Yabloko re- ceived only around three per cent of the vote.8 However, estimates given by independent experts on the basis of exit polls differed significantly from the official results: For example, EdRo would have received just 24 to 30 per cent without manipulation, while Yabloko would probably have made it into 6 Cf. OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Russian Federation, Elections to the State Duma, 4 December 2011, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mis- sion Final Report, Warsaw, 12 January 2012, p. 3. 7 Ibid., p.1. 8 For the election results, see the website of the Central Election Commission (CEC) at: http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom. 79 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2012, Baden-Baden 2013, pp. 77-94. the Duma with five to twelve per cent.9 Thus, even though EdRo would have still received the largest number of votes in a fair election, its real support is much lower than official numbers indicate. While it was no surprise that manipulation would be used to help im- prove EdRo’s standing and that – with or without manipulation – it would have received the largest number of votes and won the election, nonetheless, there was something special about this election. First of all, even before elec- tion day, several opinion polls were predicting that EdRo would receive a far lower share of votes than in previous years.10 Indeed, EdRo received 15 per cent fewer votes than it did in the 2007 Duma elections. As a result, EdRo lost its two-thirds constitutional majority in parliament: Out of 450 seats, EdRo received 238 and the other parties 212.These results were symptomatic. They showed the fatigue and dissatisfaction of the population with the results of government by a party of “thieves and crooks”, a slogan that was coined and popularized by Alexey Navalny, one of the opposition leaders, in his anti-corruption campaign.