BorislavChernev The Habsburg Mobilisation of Ethnicity and the Ukrainian Question during the Great War* The HabsburgEmpireacquired most of its Ukrainian populated territories as a result of the first partition of Poland in 1772, organising them within the newly establishedKingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria. Ukrainians also resided in Bukovina, annexedfromthe Ottoman Empire in 1775, as well as in aregionof North-eastern Hungaryknown as Transcarpathian or UgricRus’. The majority of Ukrainians nevertheless lived in the Russian Empire, some twenty-two and a half millionaccording to the census of 1897 and perhaps as manyasthirty million by 1914. The Ukrainian Question gradually emerged as an issue in Habsburg politics as the challenge of nationalism came to East-Central Europe in the wakeofthe French Revolution. Over the course of the long nineteenth cen- tury, the partitioningpowers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia-Germanylargely refrained from playing the nationalist card in order to maintain stabilityinthe region. This began to change as the Great Powers aligned in two hostile camps, with Austria-Hungaryand Russia on opposite sides. In ageopolitical atmosphere of growing antagonism, especially manifest in East-Central Europeinthe wakeof the Bosnian Annexation Crisis of 1908–1909, East Galicia or RedRuthenia (Chervonnaia Rus’) became something of an obsessionfor Russian nationalists and also caught the eye of the Romanov establishment. In 1913 alone, the Russian ForeignMinistry funnelled 200,000 rubles to the Russophile faction in Galicia.1 Prior to the outbreak of the Great War, however,these Imperial and nationalist challenges to Austria-Hungarybore little fruit. This was to change dramatically once Ukrainian populated territories became one of the main combat zones on the EasternFront.With Ukrainians fighting on both sides, the empires had to introduce innovativewaysofsecuring the political loyaltiesof‘their’ Ukrainians while simultaneously undermining their rival’s home front. Furthermore, the war introduced the travails of foreign occupation *This article is dedicated to Mark vonHagen, whose work inspired my research. 1AleksandraIur’evna Bakhturina,Okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii. Gosudarstvennoeupravleniei natsional’naia politika vgody Pervoi mirovoivoiny (1914–1917 gg.),Moscow2004, p. 122. © 2020, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783847110606 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737010603 140 Borislav Chernev as well as escalating levels of violence to what had previously been primarily peaceful cultural activities on both sides of the Zbruch River,while challenging the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungaryand Russia. Ultimately,itfacilitated a process of accelerated nation- and state-building which culminated in the emergence of two independent Ukrainian states by January1919. This essayaims to examine this process by applyingthe concept of mobi- lisation of ethnicity, first developed by Mark vonHagen in apath-breaking article, to Austria-Hungary’s Ukrainian policyduring the Great War.2 This view shifts the main focus away fromthe actions of ØmigrØ nationalist leaders to state and Imperialpolicies, suggesting that Imperialestablishments became actively involved in nationalising processes which contributed, inadvertently,totheir owndemise. Such an approach mayseemcounterintuitivetothe study of Aus- tria-Hungary’s involvementinthe Great War, giventhe Habsburg aversionto nationalist politics and distrust of nationalism in general. However,the Great Warwitnessed aradical rethinking of nationality policyinall four dynastic empires along the entangled EasternFront, and Austria-Hungarywas no ex- ception. By looking at howthe Habsburg mobilisation of ethnicityimpacted the nationality questioninthe multi-ethnic, multi-confessional borderlands of East- Central Europe in relation to similarpolicies enacted by the Hohenzollernand Romanov Empires, we can improve our understandingnot just of the creation of nation-states but also,asvon Hagen points out, of the reasons behind the pro- liferation of interethnic conflict and violence during the second half the decade long East-Central European continuum of violence between 1914 and 1923. In applyingthe concept of mobilisation of ethnicitytothe Habsburg Empire, it is importanttotakeintoaccountthe more decentralised structure of the Dual Monarchyincomparison with the Russian and, to asomewhat lesser extent, German Empire. This essaywill focus on policies initiated or actively supported by the jointAustro-Hungarian Foreign Office and the Austrian Governmentin Vienna as well as regional elites and individual actors. The Ukrainian policyof the Hungarian GovernmentinBudapest was distinctive anddoesnot fit easily within this framework, which is whyitdeserves separatetreatment. The Habsburg mobilisationofethnicitywas atwo-stage process. During the first phase, between August 1914 and the February1917 revolutioninRussia, Austria-Hungarysupported actively,ifsomewhat ambiguously,both domestic and ØmigrØ-Ukrainian organisations committed to the revolutionising of Dnieper Ukraine and its eventual separation from the RomanovEmpire. Even though Germanyquickly became the champion of this policy, Habsburg expe- 2Mark vonHagen, The Great Warand the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire, in: Barnett R. Rubin/Jack Snyder (ed.), Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflictand State Building, London 1998, p. 34–57. © 2020, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783847110606 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737010603 The Habsburg Mobilisation of Ethnicity 141 rience in Ukrainian affairs meant thatthe Dual Monarchyplayedaleading part, especially early on. This involved positiveaswell as negative mobilisation of ethnicityinthe empire’s Ukrainian populated territories, the latter manifesting itself in the suppression of ‘undesirable’, especially Russophile, forms of national identity.Incontrast, during the second phase, between February1917 and No- vember 1918, the Habsburg establishmentbecame increasinglyreluctantto mobilise Ukrainian nationalism, as it realised thatImperial collapse in the east might have graverepercussions at home. Nonetheless, this phase witnessed unprecedented Habsburg involvementinall-Ukrainian affairs, as the quarter- million strong Austro-Hungarian Ostarmee swept throughSouthernUkraine and ArchdukeWilhelmvon Habsburg initiated apolicyofUkrainisationwhich made the popular young prince aclaimanttothe throne of what was by then a Ukrainian monarchy(Hetmanate). By the time of the late autumncollapse of the Central Powers, the Ukrainian Legion formerly under the archduke’s command became actively involved in the creation of aWest-Ukrainian People’s Republic fighting bitterly with Polish forces over Lemberg. Phase I: Mobilisation through Militarisation and Propaganda, August 1914–February 1917 The Ukrainian Legion The one indispensable factor affecting war nationalism, Eric Lohr suggests, is the role of the army.3 Traditionally,the Habsburg army had eschewed the formation of militaryunits on apurely national basis, relying instead on amulti-lingual Habsburgtreu officer corps which aimedtotranscend the verynotion of na- tionality.4 In areversal of this policy, the Habsburg authorities established a precedentbyallowing the creation of aPolish Legion under Józef Piłsudski in August 1914. Having conferred with Ukrainian political leaders in Lemberg, CountEmanuel Urbas, the local representative of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, raised the possibilityofaUkrainian Legion as early as 6August in con- junction with the potential future establishmentofaUkrainian state on terri- tories conquered fromRussia. While some of his sources suggested that the initiativewould attractperhaps as manyas15,000 volunteers, Urbas reckoned a 3EricLohr, WarNationalism,in: id./Vera Tolz/AlexanderSemyonov/Mark vonHagen (ed.), The Empire andNationalismat War(Russia’s GreatWarandRevolution,1914–1922, 2),Bloomington 2014,p.91–108, here p. 93–96. 4IstvµnDeµk, Beyond Nationalism.ASocial and Political Historyofthe Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918, NewYork 1990. © 2020, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783847110606 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737010603 142 Borislav Chernev figure of 5,000 more accurate. The proposed banner of the new national unit would combine the Ukrainian national colours (blue and yellow) with the Aus- trian double-eagle alongside the Ukrainian lion and ablack-gold campaign streamer hoisted on ablack-gold flagpole.5 After the Army High Command approved the measure, aUkrainian military detachment, which subsequently incorporatedthe so-called ‘UkrainianSich Sharpshooters’(Ukrainski SichoviStriltsi, USS) was duly created in early Sep- tember 1914. The legionserved in the Austrian Landwehr (territorials), attached to the 55th InfantryDivisionand the 129th and 130th Brigades. The USS also formed partofthe 131st Brigade of the 8th CavalryDivision.6 In 1915 it came under the command of Wilhelm vonHabsburg,aself-fashioned Ukrainophile whose penchantfor wearing ablue-yellowembroidered shirtwon him the alias Vasyl Vyshyvanyi and the heartfelt affection of his Ukrainiantroops. The Ukrainian Legion engaged in heavy fightingthroughout1915 and 1916, suffering casualties of over 1,500 men during this period. By 30 September 1916, with only nine officersand 444 infantrymen remaining,the depleted USS was senttothe rear in order to reform.7 Farfrom sliding into obscurity, however,the legion would recover and playaleading role in the Habsburg involvementinDnieper Ukraine in 1918. The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine The creation of the