February 2011 STRATEGIC FORUM National Defense University About the Author Conventional Prompt M. Elaine Bunn is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Global Strike: Strategic Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at Asset or Unusable Liability? the National Defense University. Vincent A. Manzo is a Research Analyst in CSR. by M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo Key Points ◆◆ A Conventional Prompt Global he Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) concept calls for a Strike (CPGS) capability would U.S. capability to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the world be a valuable strategic asset for some fleeting, denied, and in approximately an hour. The logic of the CPGS concept is straight- difficult-to-reach targets. It would forward. The United States has global security commitments to deter and re- fill a gap in U.S. conventional T strike capability in some plausible spond to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from terrorist organizations to high-risk scenarios, contribute to near-peer competitors. The United States might need to strike a time-sensitive a more versatile and credible U.S. target protected by formidable air defenses or located deep inside enemy ter- strategic posture, and potentially enhance deterrence across a di- ritory. Small, high-value targets might pop up without warning in remote or verse spectrum of threats. sensitive areas, potentially precluding the United States from responding to the ◆◆ A small number of CPGS systems situation by employing other conventional weapons systems, deploying Special would not significantly affect the size of the U.S. deployed nuclear Operations Forces (SOF), or relying on the host country. arsenal or substitute for the abil- A long-range nuclear-armed ballistic missile has the speed and global ity of nuclear weapons to hold large sets of hard, deeply buried, reach to overcome these obstacles. But a President would probably prefer a or mobile targets at risk. conventional strike option as an alternative to nuclear weapons in most con- ◆◆ A key concern is the risk that tingencies. In fact, many advocates of the CPGS concept argue that it would either Russia or China might provide a new capability for scenarios in which existing conventional systems launch its nuclear forces due to uncertainty about the target of an would be insufficient but the use of nuclear weapons would be inappropriate. ambiguous U.S. CPGS strike. As- Additionally, in many potential crises, a nuclear threat might lack credibility suming functioning early warning systems, the Conventional Trident in the eyes of U.S. allies and adversaries regardless of a U.S. President’s will- Modification (CTM) mitigates this ingness to employ nuclear force. At the same time, U.S. allies and potential risk better than the conventional strike missile because Russian and adversaries might question whether existing U.S. conventional weapons would Chinese officials would be better be effective against some emerging threats. A long-range conventional strike able to assess quickly whether a capability might enhance deterrence and assurance by providing an effective CTM would land on their territory. and usable (and thus more credible) strike option. For these reasons, a con- C RESEARCH CENTER FOR STRATEGI ventional weapon that is faster, travels farther, and is more effective against www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 263 1 antiaccess capabilities than existing conventional forces intelligence, they reason, other conventional assets will would be a valuable strategic asset. be within range of the target. The most commonly discussed CPGS systems As a result, there is no clear consensus within Con- envision mating a conventional warhead with either gress and the U.S. national security policy community a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) or a about whether the United States should develop and modified intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). If deploy CPGS capabilities. This Strategic Forum exam- successful, this would provide a conventional weapon ines the conceptual and policy issues surrounding CPGS with the same rapid speed, global reach, and ability to missiles. It concludes that, on balance, a CPGS capability penetrate air defenses as U.S. nuclear-armed SLBMs would be a valuable strategic asset for some fleeting and and ICBMs. difficult-to-reach targets. It would fill a gap in the U.S. conventional strike capability in some circumstances, contribute to a more versatile and credible U.S. strategic there is no clear consensus within posture, and potentially enhance deterrence across a di- Congress and the U.S. national verse spectrum of threats. security policy community about Continuity amid Change whether the United States should develop and deploy Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. na- CPGS capabilities tional security strategy and enhancing nonnuclear capa- bilities have been U.S. objectives since the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review.1 This section examines the previous Because the United States has thus far only de- and current administrations’ interest in developing non- ployed nuclear-armed ICBMs and SLBMs, some ar- nuclear capabilities, especially CPGS. This discussion is gue that U.S. conventional SLBMs or ICBMs would intended neither as a comprehensive analysis compar- be destabilizing weapons. For instance, Congress ing the Barack Obama administration’s nuclear policies withheld the funding necessary for the George W. to those of the Bush administration nor as a complete Bush administration to develop and deploy conven- assessment of U.S. strategic forces policy since the end tional Trident D–5 missiles on Ohio-class submarines of the Cold War. However, this brief review highlights due to concerns that Russian officials might misin- continued U.S. interest in the CPGS concept as an im- terpret a U.S. CPGS launch as a nuclear attack. Ad- portant continuity between the Bush and Obama ad- ditionally, since long-range ballistic missiles possess ministrations. unparalleled speed and reach, some analysts worry Nonnuclear Capabilities and Tailored Deter- that U.S. leaders will be tempted to launch CPGS rence. President Obama set two objectives for the 2010 missiles quickly without fully assessing the poten- Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). He instructed his ad- tial risks of using military force. Finally, Russian and ministration to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. Chinese officials have suggested that they perceive national security strategy while simultaneously strength- the CPGS concept as part of a U.S. effort to achieve ening deterrence of potential adversaries and assurance a first strike capability. of U.S. allies and friends.2 These objectives also guided Skeptics also argue that CPGS weapons would the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the likely be unusable because the United States would lack 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). the necessary intelligence to employ them against fleet- A core conclusion of these three strategy and policy ing targets. If the United States does possess actionable reviews is that strengthening U.S. reliance on nonnuclear 2 SF No. 263 www.ndu.edu/inss strategic capabilities to deter adversaries and reassure allies reduced by increasing the role of missile defense and will advance the President’s dual objectives. In particular, other capabilities.”7 the 2010 NPR states that improved conventional Developing nonnuclear strategic capabilities to re- capabilities have reduced the role of nuclear weapons in duce the role of nuclear weapons is an important con- deterring and responding to nonnuclear—conventional, tinuity between the Obama and Bush administrations. biological, and chemical—attacks. Enhancing deterrence The Bush administration’s 2001 NPR conceptualized of nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and strategic capabilities as a New Triad of nuclear and conventional attacks via further improvements in U.S. nonnuclear offensive strike forces, defenses (including conventional capabilities is an important policy goal of the missile defenses), and a robust industrial base.8 “The 2010 NPR.3 The NPR states that “reinforcing” regional goal of the new triad is to reduce our emphasis on nu- security architectures with nonnuclear capabilities will clear weapons for deterrence and provide the president contribute to the assurance of allies about U.S. security more non-nuclear deterrence options and responses commitments. It further notes that “U.S. nuclear weapons to potential crises,” said Secretary of Defense Robert will play a role in the deterrence of regional states so long as Gates in 2006.9 Similarly, Keith Payne, the Deputy those states have nuclear weapons, but the decisions taken Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy dur- in the NPR, BMDR, and QDR reflect the U.S. desire to ing the 2001 NPR, explained that the policy guidance increase reliance on non-nuclear means to accomplish our flowing from the review “seeks to reduce reliance on objectives of deterring such states and reassuring our allies nuclear weapons, and place greater weight on non-nu- and partners.”4 clear threat options.”10 Brian Green, the former Deputy Administration statements suggest that regional Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabili- ballistic missile defense architectures and an enhanced ties, said that “the New Triad is intended to reduce our mix of nonnuclear strike forces are critical components dependence on nuclear weapons.”11 of its plan to accomplish these objectives. In February This continuity between the Bush and Obama ad- 2010, Vice President Joseph Biden said, “Capabilities ministrations stems from a shared assessment of the like an adaptive missile defense shield, conventional contemporary strategic environment. The Bush admin- warheads with worldwide reach, and others that we istration’s 2001 NPR and 2006 QDR concluded that the are developing enable us to reduce the role of nuclear world was more complicated and unpredictable than it weapons.”5 Similarly, the NPR Report states that the had been during the Cold War and that the United States administration’s near-term goal is to “increase reli- had to deter a more diverse range of actors and threats.