Reference and Grammar: Reasserting Wittgenstein’s Picture by Andrew Tweedie A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario © 2015 Andrew Tweedie ii Abstract The aim of this essay is to present a novel line of argument in support of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy of language. It consists in three parts. First, it explores a family of referential theories of meaning belonging to the tradition of Millian semantics – a family dubbed ‘Millian externalism.’ Second, it draws on the work of both Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky to undermine the tenability of Millian externalism, all the while generating insights into the nature of an adequate semantic theory as it proceeds. And third, from the fact that Millian externalism fails insofar as it purports to be a scientific theory of meaning, the essay concludes that philosophy of language must give in to a theory of meaning which endorses Wittgensteinian quietism. If it refuses, then it must conform to the methodology of linguistics. iii Table of Contents Abstract ………………………….…..…………………….………..…………… ii Introduction ……………………………………..…………………………….. 1 Chapter 1: The Millian Externalists ……………………………… 6 Chapter 2: Relata, Grammars, and Explanations ……… 27 Chapter 3: The Quietist Picture ……………………..…………… 60 Afterword ………………………..…………………………………………..... 91 References …….…………………………………………..………….....…... 92 1 Introduction i. It would be understated, to say the least, if one were to remark that there are evident contrasts between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky.1 Whereas Wittgenstein steadfastly rejected the idea that language could be subjected to scientific analysis, Chomsky has arguably been the single most influential individual in modern science of language; and whereas Wittgenstein’s hostility for mentalist theories of meaning led him to become the father of semantic externalism, Chomsky is recognized as having been the first to lay a conceptual foundation for a cognitivist approach to linguistics. On the face of it then, there seem to be no two individuals more polarized in their ideas than Ludwig Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky. It therefore comes as a surprise to be told that followers of Wittgenstein find an unlikely ally in Chomsky in their pursuit of a quietist philosophy of language.2 1 Unless otherwise stated, references to Ludwig Wittgenstein in this paper will always be made with regards to his later work, beginning in the 1930’s with The Blue and Brown Books (1958), and culminating in his Philosophical Investigations (1953). 2 Quietism is the metaphilosophical position which states philosophy has no specialized subject matter, and no positive theses to contribute to our knowledge. It urges that philosophy is not a body of facts or theory, but rather an activity whereby intellectual discomforts are resolved by examining our use of concepts and expressions. 2 ii. In the following pages, we have but one goal: to discern the features of a satisfactory theory of meaning through a critique of referential semantics, and to thereafter propose a theory of meaning which embodies these features. In the course of this project, the ideas of both Wittgenstein and Chomsky feature prominently – not as contrasting counterparts, but rather as complimentary lines of attack against a family of referential theories of meaning which belong to the tradition of Millian semantics. This family of theories, dubbed ‘Millian externalism,’ serves as a foil to the theory of meaning which is proposed at the project’s end. It is therefore through an extensive criticism of Millian externalism that we arrive at this proposal, since an examination of Millian externalism’s faults reveals to us the many requirements which a semantic theory must satisfy if it is to be a genuine, explanatory theory of meaning. Incidentally, it turns out that such a theory of meaning must be one which is reconciled to Wittgenstein’s quietist picture of philosophy of language. To understand why this must be the case, we need to discuss the project’s overall structure. There are three chapters. In the first chapter, we begin with a detailed exploration of Millian externalism, tracing its historical roots and identifying the central characteristics of its approach to semantic content. To put it generally, a referential theory of meaning is ‘Millian externalist’ if its approach to semantic content is extensional, externalist, and anti-individualist. Upon discussing these features at length, we then turn to Millian externalism’s metasemantic foundations, where it soon becomes evident that Millian externalism aspires to be an empirical theory which is continuous with scientific investigation. 3 It is not until the second chapter that Millian externalism is subjected to scrutiny. Here, we begin with a pair of Chomskian arguments, as presented by Robert Stainton (2006), which argue against the possibility of a scientific theory of meaning constructed from word-world relations. The arguments achieve this conclusion by advancing the claim that referential theories’ objects of study are not ‘real’ in the way which is required for scientific intelligibility, and thus there can be no science which investigates the relations of reference which occur among them. This ‘Chomskian critique’ effectively opens the door for a second line of argument, one which proceeds from an entirely different direction; issuing from the perspective of common sense and ordinary discourse, the ‘Wittgensteinian critique’ explores what it is for a theory to be genuinely explanatory, and thereafter concludes that referential theories of meaning fail to explain the phenomenon of meaning. The second chapter then concludes with the observation that whatever theory of meaning we propose as an alternative to Millian externalism, it must be what Michael Dummett (1996) called a ‘theory of understanding.’ That is, it must explain what it is speakers know when they are competent with a language. The third chapter concludes the project. Proceeding from insights gleaned from the previous chapter’s attack on Millian externalism, we begin the third chapter by noting that a satisfactory theory of meaning must reverse the Millian externalist approach to semantic content all the way down. In a word, a satisfactory theory of meaning must be intensional, internalist, and individualist. Upon acknowledging this, it is proposed that a version of conceptual role semantics (i.e., a family of theories which explicate the meanings of expressions 4 in terms of expressions’ use in thought) might satisfy all these requirements. However, before we can even endorse a particular version of conceptual role semantics, a problem arises. Specifically, a more general examination of the causes for Millian externalism’s vulnerability to the Chomskian critique (as presented in the second chapter) reveals that whatever version of conceptual role semantics we elect to adopt, it must be one which is stripped of all normative concepts and objects. Simply put, it must be a theory which does not resemble a traditional philosophical theory of meaning in any way. This in turn raises the question of why we should not adopt Chomsky’s approach to semantics – a question for which we have no answer. And in lacking an answer, we cannot help but observe that the Chomskian critique we employed against Millian externalism has an unsettling conclusion: philosophy of language ought to become indistinguishable from linguistics. The third chapter ends with an alternative to this proposed sad state of affairs. Upon noting that Millian externalism was vulnerable to the Chomskian critique only because it simultaneously i) attempted to approximate to a scientific theory, and ii) invoked the normative categories and concepts of common sense, we arrive at the observation that a philosophical theory of language can evade the Chomskian critique so long as it gives up one of these two aspirations. At this point, I urge the reader to give up the former, since this would allow a philosophical theory of meaning to retain philosophy of language’s historic subject matter. This victory, however, comes at a cost: because a philosophical theory of meaning can only dodge the Chomskian critique by confining itself to the framework of common sense and ordinary discourse, it follows that 5 philosophy of language must reconcile itself to Wittgensteinian quietism. Namely, it cannot expect to produce discoveries comparable to those of science, but rather can only aspire to make contributions to our understanding. The remainder of the third chapter then ends with a general sketch of a version of conceptual role semantics which would accommodate Wittgenstein’s quietism. iii. In the upcoming pages, I take care not to forecast the conclusions of future chapters, since I wish for the reader to arrive at the project’s final conclusion by way of incremental steps. In this sense then, the project proceeds much like an investigation which gradually builds upon itself as time passes, slowly amassing insights and observations until it constructs something worthwhile. I will confess, however, that the project’s conclusion was conceived well before it was undertaken. To elaborate, at the beginning of this introduction I noted various ways in which the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky strike hard contrasts. Yet, I failed to mention one other way in which they differ: Wittgenstein was of the opinion that