Atlantic Council RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE BRIEF Islamic State Networks in Turkey Recruitment for the Caliphate OCTOBER 2016 AARON STEIN The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the concurrent war in Syria present serious challenges to European and Middle Eastern security. For many in the West, the direct appeal by ISIS for scores of men and women to travel to Syria and Iraq in order to live in a self- declared caliphate has overwhelmed intelligence organizations. In Tunisia, Iraq, Libya, France, and Belgium, people who had spent time in Syria or Iraq returned home to carry out terror attacks. Turkey has faced a similar spate of large-scale attacks since the start of the Syrian conflict. In a series of attacks since 2015, 276 people have been killed in Turkey, with another 961 injured, in a mixture of suicide, bomb, small arms, and rocket attacks.1 Research indicates that a large group of Turkish ISIS members are behind the bulk of the suicide bombings, designed to foment ethnic tensions between Turkey’s Kurdish and Turkish citizens. The failed July coup attempt in Turkey—and subsequent purges of the Turkish military and bureaucracy—have raised concerns about the US- led air war against ISIS with its operations out of Incirlik Air Force base. To date, the instability in Turkey has had no discernible effect on the air war, and the Turkish security apparatus has also managed to continue its cooperation with European intelligence officials to help stem the flow of foreign fighters.2 However, in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, Turkish security officials are now being asked to fight three different sub-state groups: followers of Fetullah Gulen; the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK); and ISIS. The variety of sub-state threats could The Atlantic Council’s Rafik undermine efforts to clamp down on the local ISIS danger to Turkey. Hariri Center for the Middle East studies political and economic dynamics in the Middle East and recommends US, European, and 1 The author calculated the death and injury figures from the following attacks: The regional policies to encourage ISIS-linked suicide attacks in Sultanahmet, Suruc, Ankara, Istiklal, Gaziantep (twice), effective governance, political and Ataturk airport, along with the bombing of political offices and rallies in Adana, legitimacy, and stability. Mersin, and Diyarbakir. Additionally, the author added the death and injury numbers from ongoing rocket attacks on Turkish border town and cities. 2 Author Interview, European Official, Washington, DC, July 20, 2016. ISSUE BRIEF Islamic State Networks in Turkey ISIS’s rise in Turkey closely followed on the group’s This paper uses a series of case studies to examine the successes in Syria and Iraq. However, the group’s ISIS recruitment network, including the role of Turkey- cross-border infrastructure, which is used to ferry based recruiters, and how these individuals took recruits and supplies to the caliphate from Turkey, is advantage of the relatively permissive environment built on decades-old al-Qaeda and like-minded jihadist inside the country to give support to the jihadist networks based in numerous Turkish cities, and was campaign against Bashar al-Assad and his allies, Russia previously used as a secondary route for jihadists to and Iran. The data suggest that the age range of the join the Iraq jihad during the US occupation between Turkey-based recruiters varies, but key individuals have 2003 and 2011. From the outset of the conflict in Syria, links to the Afghan Jihads (1979 to 1989 and 2001 to Turkish citizens travelled back and forth, oftentimes present). These recruiters were well-known to people joining with Turkish-speaking sub-groups in larger, anti- living in their communities and, often times, had links regime opposition groups, the two most prominent of to informal cemaats, or small religious groups that which are Syria’s al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat Fateh al- gather like-minded individuals for religious training. Sham (Syria’s rebranded al-Qaeda affiliate, previously named Jabhat al-Nusra, or the Nusra Front) and the This article is based on open-source—and Salafi Ahrar al-Sham. With the rise of ISIS in 2013, Turks fragmentary—information about ISIS recruitment in began to travel to the caliphate, where they joined with Turkey, and uses a series of case studies to examine Turkish-speaking units, complete the group’s methods of recruitment with Turkish imams and military in different Turkish cities. The trainers. The available open- [T]he group’s sources reveal similar recruitment source evidence points to a slight efforts in numerous different cities difference in Turkish ISIS and al- cross-border and an interconnected network of Qaeda members. In the case of the infrastructure . is Salafis, committed to the idea of latter, the fighters tend to be older, an Islamic State. The conclusions whereas Turkish ISIS members built on decades- in this article are based primarily are younger.3 However, there are old al-Qaeda on Turkish-language sources exceptions, underscoring the need and like-minded citing various police reports. One for more data to draw definitive potential drawback is that little is conclusions about “typical” Turkish jihadist networks actually known about the content of ISIS members. discussions between ISIS recruiters based in numerous and their recruits. As such, the In both cases, fighters from ISIS Turkish cities. findings are based on the available and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham/Nusra evidence and must be updated as Front used similar networks to new information about the group enter the Syrian conflict, often after being exposed to and its activities in Turkey becomes available. The elements of conflict via social media, active Islamist lessons learned from this study can be of benefit to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in other countries, where ISIS will remain—in some way, speaking out against the Syrian regime, or through shape, or form—long after it loses territory in Iraq and the large number of Islamist aid groups active along Syria and where like-minded jihadists could continue the border. In certain instances, these NGOs provided to recruit at-risk youth, either to support a continued the means to enter the Syrian conflict, where a small insurgency, or for a different jihad in another part of number of Turks then opted to stay with the groups the world. that received the aid. In other instances, returning ISIS recruiters sought out those that had returned from Al-Qaeda in Iraq: The Turkish Connection Syria, whom were then sent for indoctrination and to the War in Syria religious training inside Turkey. Another ISIS member The history of ISIS is well-documented. The group is the would arrange for their transit to the border and on to latest incarnation of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jamaat al- Raqqa, the caliphate’s Syrian capital city. Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, which later morphed into al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). After Zarqawi’s death in 2006, the group 3 The average birth year of ISIS members previously based in Adi- moved ahead with its plans to establish an Islamic State, yaman is 1990, according to birth years of known members this first under the direction of self-declared Caliph Abu author has collected. 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL ISSUE BRIEF Islamic State Networks in Turkey Map 1. Primary path of ISIS foreign fighters through Turkey into Syria Omar al-Baghdadi. The group subsequently rebranded Syria through six different border towns: Yayladagi, itself as Islamic State Iraq, or ISI, and began to focus Atmea, Azaz, al-Rai, Jarablus, and Tel Abyad.4 For on taking and holding territory in Anbar to establish its many foreign fighters, Istanbul was the first point of desired caliphate. Abu Omar was subsequently killed entry, before ISIS facilitators arranged for travel to two in 2010, giving rise to the current Caliph, Abu Bakr al- key cities near the border, Sanliurfa and Gaziantep. Baghdadi, along with the current leadership of ISIS. In From these two cities, ISIS fighters then moved to Kilis, 2011, al-Qaeda dispatched Abu Muhammad al-Jolani Elbeyli, Karkamis, or Akcakale. At least three of these to Syria, where he was tasked with establishing the areas—Yayladagi, Atmea, Azaz—are no longer under Nusra Front, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Baghdadi ISIS control, with the Nusra Front or Ahrar now taking remained the overarching leader of the Nusra Front, their place as the most dominant group in these areas. but ultimately the two groups split. The available data suggest that ISIS was able to A key group of Turkish recruiters for ISIS first provided embed itself within a larger sub-set of the Turkish support for the Nusra Front, recruiting for the group and Salafi community. A sub-set of the Salafi community using well-established networks in Turkey to smuggle has lent support to the jihad in Iraq against the United men and materiel to Nusra Front-held territory. This States, as well as other jihadist conflicts like those in Turkey-based network pledged allegiance to ISIS and Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Ogedan,5 and Iraq. The Iraqi has since been providing the same type of support/ logistical help to the caliphate. This is reflected in 4 Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, “The Caliphate’s documents captured about the movement of foreign Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign fighters through Turkey to Syria. Fighter Paper Trail,” Combatting Terrorism Center, West Point, April 2016, p. 25, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caliphates- According to West Point’s analysis of over 4,600 ISIS global-workforce-an-inside-look-at-the-islamic-states-foreign- fighter-paper-trail.