REASON, EMOTION, AND CONSEQUENCE: MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND KANTIAN IDEALS Kiran Bhardwaj A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy. Chapel Hill 2017 Approved by: Thomas E. Hill, Jr. Douglas MacLean Ryan Preston-Roedder Simon Blackburn Bernard Boxill © 2017 Kiran Bhardwaj ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Kiran Bhardwaj: Reason, Emotion, and Consequence: Moral Psychology and Kantian Ideals (Under the direction of Thomas E. Hill, Jr.) My project is a study of moral ideals, and particularly moral ideals as they play a role in Kantian ethics. It takes Kant’s discussions of what he identified as ideals (the virtuous person, the ethical community, the highest good, and friendship) and uses those discussions to argue that Kantian ideals help Kantians respond to various features of our moral lives: as a concrete representation of the consequences of following the moral law (elicited through the imagination) that engages the emotions in a morally appropriate way. The chapters of this dissertation provide: first, a general account of what ideals are and how they function, thanks to their employment of the imagination—explaining precisely how ideals orient and inspire us. Then within the domain of Kantian ethics, it reviews the Kantian debate about the supererogatory and provides a new account using Kantian ideals as a way to explore beyond the traditional explanation of actions that are good to do but not required. Chapters 3 through 5 each explore three of the Kantian ethical ideals: the ideal of self-perfection, the ideal of the kingdom of ends, and the ideal of friendship. These important themes in ethics— what it is to be a good individual, relationship, and community—are interestingly understood in the role of ideals, rather than solely in terms of duty. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I was able to complete this dissertation, which was completed in fits and starts, thanks to my philosophical mentors. Tom Hill has been a generous, thoughtful advisor who has been an inspiration to me as a person and as a philosopher. Doug MacLean pushed me to be a better writer and a better thinker; I now hear his voice as I edit. I thank them both for reading more drafts of this dissertation than anyone ought to. The rest of my committee —Ryan Preston- Roedder, Simon Blackburn, and Bernie Boxill—gave me generous comments and steadfast encouragement. Roger Crisp was kind enough to read and thoughtfully comment on my dissertation—I continue to learn many things from him. I have also been helped by discussions with my peers: in particular, I am indebted to Jen Kling, whose advice was always on point, and Jordan MacKenzie, whose philosophical judgment is infallible, so far as I have evidence. While I may have finished this project thanks to excellent philosophers, it wouldn’t have been enjoyable without the partnership and love of Michael Boyle. My family and friends have also been incredibly important to me while finishing this dissertation. In particular, Mary and Vas Bhardwaj continue their perfect record of supporting my education; Meera Bhardwaj has been the ideal sister in every way; Raghu and Latha Ballal and Mariel Woods kept me grounded and loved (and fed!). To them and everyone else—thank you. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………... 1 1. Criticisms of Kantian moral psychology……………………………………………... 2 1.1 On Consequences……………………………………………………………... 3 1.2 On Emotions………………………………………………………………….. 4 2. Kantian Appeals to Ideals…………………………………………………………….. 5 3. A Review of Kantian Ideals…………………………………………………………... 7 4. Preview of Structure………………………………………………………………….. 8 Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………... 11 CHAPTER 1: A CONCEPTION OF IDEALS…………………………………………….......... 13 1. The Standard Account of Ideals……………………………………………………... 14 1.1 Coady’s goal-like ideals……………………………………………………... 14 1.2 Brownlee’s variation on Coady’s account…………………………………... 15 1.3 Held v. Recognizable Ideals……………………………………………........ 17 2. How the Standard Account Fails……………………………………………………. 19 2.1. Stipulative v. Imaginative Ideals……………………………………………. 19 2.2 Failures of the Standard Account……………………………………………. 22 3. A Conception of Ideals………………………………………………………….......... 24 3.1 The Psychology of Imaginative Ideals……………………………………… 24 3.2 Our Relationship to Imaginable Ideals……………………………………… 31 v 4. The Imagination and its Pathological Uses…………………………………………… 36 4.1 Kinds of Pathology………………………………………………………….. 37 4.2 Guidance for Ideals………………………………………………………….. 40 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………. 41 Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………... 42 CHAPTER 2: THE SUPEREROGATORY, IMPERFECT DUTIES, AND IDEALS…………. 45 1. The charge: Urmson’s “Saints and Heroes”………………………………………… 48 1.1 “Saints and Heroes”…………………………………………………………. 48 1.2 Urmson’s criticisms of utilitarianism and Kantian ethics…………………… 50 2. The Kantian debate………………………………………………………………….. 52 2.1 Perfect and imperfect duties…………………………………………………. 53 2.2 Hill’s account…………………………………………………………........... 55 2.3 Baron’s criticisms…………………………………………………………… 59 3. Kantian Supererogation and Ideals…………………………………………………… 65 3.1 Kant’s conception of ideals…………………………………………………. 66 3.2 Our duties in the direction of ideals…………………………………………. 74 3.3 Supererogation, imperfect duty, and ideals…………………………………. 76 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………. 81 Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………... 83 CHAPTER 3: SELF-PERFECTION, SELF-IMPROVEMENT, AND THE KANTIAN VIRTUOUS AGENT………………………………………………………… 86 1. The Problem as it Arises in Kant’s Moral Philosophy……………………………… 87 2. Kant’s Solution……………………………………………………………………….. 91 3. Alternative Kantian Solutions………………………………………………………… 93 vi 3.1 Self-Improvement View…………………………………………………….. 94 3.2 Response to the Self-Improvement View…………………………………… 96 3.3 Faith in Humanity View…………………………………………………….. 98 3.4 Response to the Faith in Humanity View…………………………………… 99 4. My View…………………………………………………………………………….. 100 4.1 The Lie of the Imagination………………………………………………… 103 4.2 The Truth of the Imagination………………………………………………. 108 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………... 110 Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………. 112 CHAPTER 4: THE KINGDOM OF ENDS AS AN IDEAL…………………………………... 115 1. Kant on the Ethical Community…………………………………………………… 117 1.1 The kingdom of ends: as a community and as a legislative strategy………. 117 1.2 The kingdom of ends as an ideal…………………………………………… 119 2. Interpretations of the Kingdom of Ends……………………………………………. 123 2.1 A substantive ideal…………………………………………………………. 124 2.2 A deliberative ideal………………………………………………………… 129 3. The Uses of an Ideal……………………………………………………………….. 131 4. The Imagination and Ideals………………………………………………………… 135 4.1 Mirroring and contagion…………………………………………………… 136 4.2 Testing the interpretations………………………………………………….. 138 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………... 144 Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………. 145 CHAPTER 5: FRIENDSHIP AS A BRIDGE TO THE HIGHEST GOOD…………………... 147 1. Kant on Friendship…………………………………………………………………. 149 vii 1.1 Kinds of Friendships……………………………………………………….. 154 2. Moran on the Duty of Friendship…………………………………………………... 156 3. Moral Friendship and the Imperfect Duties………………………………………... 160 3.1 An Objection……………………………………………………………….. 164 4. The Ideal of Moral Friendship as a Bridge to the Highest Good………………….. 166 4.1 The Relationship between the Kingdom of Ends and the Highest Good….. 168 4.2 The Imaginative Ideal of Friendship and the Kingdom of Ends…………… 169 4.3 Is the Ideal of Friendship Realizable? ……………………………………... 171 4.4 An Objection……………………………………………………………….. 174 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………... 175 Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………. 177 viii INTRODUCTION My research project comes from a recurring theme in Kant’s ethical writings: the ethical ideals regularly mentioned from the Critique of Pure Reason until the late ethical works. Other moral philosophers have meant something of great importance in their theory when they use the term; Kant’s usage of the term is, comparatively, not taken to be central to Kantian ethics. Yet the subjects he identifies as ‘ideals’ are the heavy-hitters: the virtuous person, the kingdom of ends (or ethical community), the highest good, friendship. Each of these are important concepts in Kantian ethics. What significance might they bear, thought of as ideals? In reviewing Kant’s ethical writings and the work of other Kantians, I came to the conclusion that ideals can do a robust kind of work for us. In particular, they allow us to think in a very sophisticated way about moral psychology. Kantians agree on the importance of reason in the moral life. Yet there are other parts of our psychologies that provide us with incentives to act, including our concern for consequences and our emotions. Critics of Kantian ethics have suggested that Kant handles these features of our moral psychology badly (as I will discuss in the next section of this preface)—and think that he asks us to suppress the otherwise-potent influence of emotions and our concern for consequences when we are morally deliberating and acting. Against these critics, I think we have a great deal of evidence to suggest that Kant acknowledged the significance of ideals in bridging to these other parts of our moral psychology. Ethical ideals channel those parts of our moral psychology—they get our emotions and our 1 representations of the consequences of our actions to fall in line with what reason requires. Emotion