IPCS Forecasts Pakistan in 2015 Civil-Military Equations & Increased Space for the Army I Intra-Political Relations amongst Political Parties I Threat from the Islamic State I Strategy towards J&K I Sushant Sareen IPCS Special Report # 170 January 2015 IPCS Forecasts 2015 I Special Report #170, January 2015 About the Author Sushant Sareen Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow at Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), New Delhi. He writes a column for the IPCS titled Industan. See http://www.ipcs.org/columnist/sushant- sareen/ This report is an updated and compiled version of his earlier commentaries for his column during 2014. CONTENTS Section-I Pakistan in 2015: A Forecast Civil-Military Relations Political Interplay Pakistan’s Likely Strategy Towards Jammu and Kashmir © IPCS, 2015 Rise of the Islamic State? B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor Safdarjung Enclave New Delhi 110029 Tel: 91-11-4100 1900, 4100 1901 Fax: (91-11) 41001902 Section-II Pakistan in 2014: A Review Cover Photo Credit: 2 Pakistan in 2015 IPCS Forecasts Pakistan in 2015 Sushant Sareen Senior Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation & IPCS Columnist on Pakistan Pakistan in 2015: A Forecast Making a forecast is always fraught with risk, more so when it is about a country like Pakistan where something is happening all the time, and worse, a single incident or event, whether or not within the country, can change the dynamics and trajectory of how things are likely to play out. In 2014, there were some clear trends that manifest themselves: the civil-military tussle tilted heavily in favour of the military; politically, the Nawaz Sharif government weakened considerably, partly as a result of the military becoming more assertive and partly because of the potent challenge mounted by Imran Khan; relations with India went through the usual roller-coaster but the trend is significantly negative, more so with the issue of Jammu and Kashmir once again acquiring salience; and finally, the unabated march of radicalism what with the Islamic State registering its presence in the region and attracting elements from the Taliban. Most, if not all, of these trends are likely to gather force in 2015. Civil-Military Relations: Will the Civilians Remain a Rubber Stamp? The Nawaz Sharif government has, at least for the time being, reconciled to playing a subservient role to the military. While underlying tensions are likely to dog this relationship in 2015, it is unlikely that there will be any overt or hostile takeover of the government by the army. The army will continue to burnish its image in the public eye the public relations exercise by the Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Raheel Sharif, at the Peshawar Army Public school reopening is an example and will use this to keep the civilian– government under pressure. – Civilians will be used to rubber-stamp decisions that the army takes on issues like counter- terrorism, Afghanistan, India, the US and other security and foreign policy issues. The space of the army has increased immensely, and that of the civilian government has constricted in the same measure after the creation of the military courts under the 21st Constitutional Amendment. While the government is likely to avoid any step that causes friction with the army, it will not be averse to taking advantage of any blowback of policies that the army forces on the country to claw back some of the space it had had to cede to the military. This will however deepen the disconnect between the civilians and the military establishment. The problem will ngs right. be that if the armys policies start unravelling, there isnt much the civilians can do to set thi What is more, the army would have gamed how the government is likely to play its cards in the event of things going awry. It would therefore keep its leverages to keep any possible civilian IPCS Forecasts 2015 I Special Report #170, January 2015 pushback in check. For its part, the Nawaz Sharif government has understood that it needs to balance a rampaging opposition against an assertive army and prevent any linking-up between the two that can sound the death knell of the sitting government. But this balancing act will come under strain if the military makes demands that the government is loath to concede. For instance, if the military wants to act against religio-political parties or wants to continue playing favourites with jihadists or wants to undertake massive operations against ethnic separatists and dissidents, it could become unpalatable for the civilian government. While Nawaz Sharif has checked his proclivity to enter into a head-on collision for now, how long he will be able to do this remains a crucial question which will decide how the civil-military cookie crumbles. Political Interplay: PTI-PML-PPP-MQM Equations In 2015, at the national level, among the civilian political parties, the two main contenders will remain the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI). The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) is likely to diminish further and will only serve as a handmaiden of the PMLN while keeping up the appearance of being in the opposition. Even if Bilawal Bhutto Zardari starts playing a more active role in PPP affairs, it is highly unlikely that the party will be able to re-emerge as one of the poles of Pakistani politics. The PPP has virtually no presence or resonance anywhere in Pakistan except for Sindh, where it could see some crystallisation of forces opposed to it. In Sindh, the PPP-Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) relations will remain fraught. The MQM is facing erosion in both its firepower and its political base and could face major crisis even if the criminal cases against Altaf Hussein i disruptions and disturbances. n UK dont lead to his arrest. Nevertheless, if the MQM retaliates, Karachi could see large scale In Balochistan, despite the growing dissent from a section of the PMLN leadership, the coalition government is likely to continue under the current Chief Minister. The anti-establishment Baloch nationalists like the Balochistan National Party Mengal (BNP-M) have lost political ground because of their participation in the 2013 General Elections and are likely to get squeezed between those the insurgents on one side and the collaborators on the other side. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, there could be a political vacuum in 2015 if the anger, disillusionment and disenchantment with the PTI- y broken any new ground in terms of administration and good governance and partly because of its soft led coalition grows, partly because it hasnt reall managed to really regroup after its loss in the 2013 polls and is in no position to re-emerge as a potentattitude forcetowards in thethe province.Taliban. TheThe troublePMLN appearsis that theto Awamibe in disarrayNational withParty senior ANP leaders hasnt disgruntled and the central leadership averse to doing anything to destabilise the PTI-led government. The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam- Fazal-ur-Rehman (JUI-F) has its pockets of support but its links with the Taliban are going to go against it. The real battleground will remain the Punjab where the fight will be between PTI and PMLN. Unless the PMLN commits a major blunder, either with the military or in its dealings with other political parties, it is unlikely that in 2015 Imran Khan will be able to mount the sort of pressure he did in 2014. His anti-government campaign appears to have lost steam. Partly because of the urgency that the anti-terror campaign has acquired and partly because of the papering over of differences between the PMLN government and the military, Imran Khan is unlikely to get much 4 Pakistan in 2015 traction in his quest to force the ouster of the government. The challenge for Imran Khan will be to keep his flock together and even expand his political base. There is a good chance that many anti-PMLN elements in Punjab, including those in the PPP, will make a bee-line for PTI. Therefore, while Imran Khan will remain a force to reckon with, he will not be able to force a mid-term election. In any case, if a situation develops where the elected government is ousted by hook or by crook, then instead of an election, there could be another extra-constitutional dispensation taking over. Pakistan’s Likely Strategy Towards Jammu and Kashmir Kashmir is likely to once again become the big sticking point between India and Pakistan, more so because positions in both New Delhi and Islamabad have hardened over the issue. Even if Pakistan cracks down against all shades of jihadists, including groups focussed on India like the Jamaat-ud-Dawah/ Lashkar-e- balance this action by raising the diplomatic and political temperature over Kashmir. Taiba, it wont be of much help because Pakistan will try and Efforts will be made to internationalise Kashmir, which in turn will be a red rag for the Indian government and tie its hands on re-engaging with Pakistan. On the other hand, if Pakistan continues with the policy of using jihadist proxies in India and tries to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir by exporting violence, then in addition to the normal political and diplomatic stand-off, chances are that the Line of Control (LoC) will also heat up. Violence levels in Kashmir could also spike if Pakistan re-starts the export of jihad. Pakistan could get an opportunity to muddy the waters in Kashmir if the internal politics in the state remains in disarray. Rise of the Islamic State? The rising attraction of the Islamic State (IS) is among the most worrying trends that could unfold in 2015.