KANT’S KNOWLEDGE OF UNKNOWABLE THINGS IN THEMSELVES: An Examination of the Doctrine of Ignorance and the Non-spatiotemporality Thesis By Copyright 2015 Micah Joel Bailey Submitted to the graduate degree program in the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ________________________________ Chairperson, Scott Jenkins ________________________________ John Bricke ________________________________ Thomas Tuozzo ________________________________ Donald Marquis ________________________________ Charlene L. Muehlenhard Date Defended: May 5th, 2015 The Dissertation Committee for Micah Bailey certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: KANT’S KNOWLEDGE OF UNKNOWABLE THINGS IN THEMSELVES: An Examination of the Doctrine of Ignorance and the Non-spatiotemporality Thesis ________________________________ Chairperson, Scott Jenkins Date approved: May 5th, 2015 ii Abstract This dissertation is an examination of things in themselves as they are presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. Chapter 1 deals with Kant’s notion of a thing in itself generally. I argue that Kant uses ‘things in themselves’ in two ways: (1) to refer to logically possible entities that, if they exist, are ontologically distinct from appearances; (2) to signify the thought of empirical objects apart from sensibility. This follows from the fact that the notion of a thing in itself is a function of the understanding, but that our intellectual representations cannot relate to things in themselves. Chapters 2 and 3 attend to two theses of things in themselves: (1) they are unknowable; (2) they are non-spatiotemporal. Thesis (1) seems to render any judgment of things in themselves epistemically unjustifiable, thereby undermining Kant’s right to maintain either thesis (1) or (2). Thesis (2) seems to rest on an invalid argument and, consequently, fails to rule out the possibility that things in themselves are spatiotemporal (the traditional neglected alternative). Chapter 2 focuses on establishing that Kant is entitled to the Identity Thesis (i.e. if x is intuited a priori, then x is reducible to the representational content of that a priori intuition). I argue that the Identity Thesis secures a valid argument for thesis (2). Chapter 3 demonstrates that Kant’s argument for the transcendental ideality of space (and time) entails that our sensible representations cannot relate to things in themselves. Since neither our sensible, nor our intellectual, representations can relate to things in themselves, thesis (1) actually expresses a subtler claim: we cannot cognize things in themselves through our representations. I argue that this is neither self-undermining, nor does it undermine thesis (2); however, it does restrict us to a weak reading of thesis (2), such that it cannot rule out the possibility of a strong structural isomorphism obtaining between things in themselves iii and space and time (a new neglected alternative). I conclude by arguing that this new neglected alternative does not present Kant’s cognitive theory with any serious difficulties. Acknowledgments I am indebted to the faculty of the University of Kansas for my intellectual cultivation. This work would have suffered greatly if I had not been exposed to this community. In this regard, I should mention Teresa Robertson and Scott Jenkins specifically; Teresa, for her strict demand for clarity, and Scott, for his Socratic pedagogy, which, above all, has taught me to teach myself. I also owe a great deal to several of my fellow students, most notably, Sean Meseroll and Andrew McFarland, whose philosophical acumen has been as valuable to me as their friendships. I owe Scott Jenkins doubly for his role as adviser. The encouragement, patience, and advice he has offered me in the course of this project has aided me as much as his philosophical insight. The foundation for my intellectual pursuits has been my emotional support. In this regard, I owe much to many. In particular, I should mention Skyla McCollum for her steadfast faith in me and for loving me despite my many flaws. I should also mention Asa Bailey, who insists on giving me more than I can hope to return. But I owe no greater debt than I do to my parents – Colleen Riley and Lane Bailey – to whom I dedicate this dissertation; know that in my pursuit to understand wisdom, your example of it has not gone unnoticed. iv Table of Contents Abstract......................................................................................................................................... iii Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................ iv Chapter 0: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 §0.1 Kant’s General Project, a Problem, and a Possible Solution ........................................... 1 §0.1.1 Kant’s Project.................................................................................................................. 1 §0.1.2 The Problem .................................................................................................................... 4 §0.1.3 A Possible Solution .......................................................................................................... 5 §0.2 My General Project and Some Specifics............................................................................ 6 §0.2.1 My Project....................................................................................................................... 6 §0.2.2 Some Specifics ................................................................................................................. 7 §0.2.2.1 Chapter 1: An Outline .................................................................................................9 §0.2.2.2 Chapter 2: An Outline ............................................................................................... 11 §0.2.2.3 Chapter 3: An Outline ............................................................................................... 13 Chapter 1: The Problematic Thing in Itself, the Objective Validity Problem, and the Noumenal Causation Thesis ............................................................................. 18 §1.1 Chapter 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 18 §1.1.1 My Interpretation of Kant’s Things in Themselves and My Argumentative Strategy ....................................................................................................................... 19 §1.2 The Applicability of ‘Noumena’ to Things in Themselves ............................................. 24 §1.3 The Dissertation’s Noumena, The Modification of Kant’s Cognitive Theory, and The Appearing Argument........................................................................ 25 §1.3.1 The Dissertation’s Cognitive Theory and Its Noumena ..................................................... 26 §1.3.1.1 Kant’s Cognitive Theory in the Dissertation ............................................................... 27 §1.3.1.2 Two Characterizations of the DistinctionID ................................................................. 28 v §1.3.1.3 The Argument for the Ontological DistinctionID .......................................................... 32 §1.3.2 The Objective Validity Problem, Kant’s Modification of his Cognitive Theory, and the Appearing Argument ........................................................................................ 35 §1.3.2.1 The “Recounting” and the Modification of Kant’s Cognitive Theory............................ 37 §1.3.2.2 The Objective Validity Problem................................................................................. 40 §1.3.2.3 The Appearing Argument as an Objection .................................................................. 45 §1.3.2.3.1 The Appearing Argument and the Objective Validity Problem ...................................................... 46 §1.3.2.3.2 Confirmation in the B-edition of “The Ground of Phenomena and Noumena” ........................... 49 §1.4 Kant’s Considered View of Things in Themselves in the Critique ................................. 51 §1.4.1 The Argument from the Consequences of the Objective Validity Problem ........................... 52 §1.4.1.1 The Modification of Kant’s Cognitive Theory and Noumena in the Negative Sense .......................................................................................................... 53 §1.4.1.2 Logical Possible Entities and Noumena in the Negative Sense ..................................... 53 §1.4.1.3 Thinking Empirical Objects Apart from Sensibility and Noumena in the Negative Sense .......................................................................................................... 55 §1.4.2 The Argument from Textual Evidence .............................................................................. 55 §1.4.3 The Argument from the Possibility of Kant’s Practical Project.......................................... 58 §1.5 The Objective Validity Problem, the Doctrine of Ignorance, and the Noumenal Causation Thesis ........................................................................................ 60 §1.5.1 The Objective Validity Problem and the Doctrine of Ignorance ........................................