DISSERTATION / DOCTORAL THESIS Titel der Dissertation /Title of the Doctoral Thesis „The Challenges of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Statehood in Post-Dayton Constitutional Order“ verfasst von / submitted by Mag. Bogdan Živaljević angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doktor der Philosophie (Dr. Phil.) Wien, 2015 / Vienna 2015 Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt / A 092 300 degree program code as it appears on the student record sheet: Dissertationsgebiet lt. Studienblatt / Politikwissenschaft / Political Science field of study as it appears on the student record sheet: Betreut von / Supervisor: Doz. Dr. Johann Wimmer Table of Contents CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 Introductory Words 1 Problem Statement 3 Research Methods 10 Research Framework 12 CHAPTER 2: WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 18 Introduction 18 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 19 Political and Economic Crisis of Federal Yugoslavia during the 1980s 19 Ethnic and Religious Cleavages in Bosnia and Herzegovina 26 THE ROAD TO WAR 30 The November 1990 Elections 30 Government Formation 32 The War in Croatia and its Spillover to Bosnia and Herzegovina 34 The February/March 1992 Independence Referendum 35 WAR BREAKS OUT 37 The Establishment of the Republic of Srpska 37 The Establishment of the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia 40 The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Alija Izetbegović 42 Croat-Bosniak War 44 Enclaves and Sieges 46 Washington Agreement 49 FROM STALEMATE OVER CEASEFIRE TO PEACE 51 Operation Storm, NATO, Operation Mistral 51 Dayton Agreement 53 War in a Nutshell: An Outlook 56 CHAPTER 3: THEORY 58 Introduction 58 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 59 History Sets a Framework for Political Actors 59 Past Choice of Institutions Determines the Present Political Maneuvering Space 63 Path Dependency 65 Creation of Institutions and Institutional Change 67 Institutional Design 70 STATE-BUILDING 76 Theories of State 76 Constitutional Design 82 Building of Public Administration 89 Building of Judiciary 92 Building of the Security Sector 96 NATION-BUILDING 99 Theories of Nation 99 Building National Symbols 109 Shaping National Civic Culture 114 Civic vs. National Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina 118 CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES 120 Introduction 120 DEFENSE REFORM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 122 The Challenges of Demilitarization and Future Defense Reform 122 Balancing Strengths of Armed Forces 127 Downsizing Armed Forces 129 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 131 Major Reform Activities and Establishment of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces: A Brief Overview 136 Organizational structure of AFBiH and MoD after 1 January 2006 144 Defense Reform: A Summary 148 The Incomplete Security Reform: The Collapse of the Police Reform 150 Security Reform: Lessons Learned 155 JUDICIARY REFORM 159 Introduction 159 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 161 Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina 164 High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council 167 Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina 172 War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina 174 ECONOMIC REFORMS 176 Introduction 176 Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina 178 Indirect Taxation Authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina 181 Economic indicators of Bosnia and Herzegovina 186 CHAPTER 5: POLICIES 190 Introduction 190 Party of Democratic Action (SDA) 195 Social Democratic Party (SDP) 196 Serb Democratic Party (SDS) 197 Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) 198 Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) 199 Present Political Stalemate: Path Dependencies in Practice 201 CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 203 Summary of Research Hypotheses Confirmation 203 Conclusion 205 SOURCES 206 ANNEX: INTERVIEW WITH BORISLAV PARAVAC 215 Table of Figures Table 1. Members of the Rotating Presidency of Yugoslavia, 1980-1991 21 Table 2. Unemployment Rate in Yugoslavia and its Federal Units, 1980-1990 23 Table 3. Strength of Ethnic Armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-2004 126 Table 4. Stand-by Arrangements with the IMF 188 Figure 1: Political Map of Socialist Yugoslavia 20 Figure 2: Flag of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 27 Figure 3: Ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991 38 Figure 4: Political Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina 56 Figure 5. Command Structure of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina 146 Figure 6. Structure of the Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina 147 Figure 7. Judicial structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina 159 Figure 8. Organizational Chart of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 162 Figure 9. Organizational Chart of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina 180 Figure 10. Customs Offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina 184 Figure 11. Annual GDP Growth 186 Figure 12. Parliamentary Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2014 201 Chapter 1: Introduction Introductory Words Multiethnic socialist states, like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, faced serious challenges of nationalism, which prevented certain republics from peaceful dissolution and successful state- building (e.g. Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Georgia, etc.). This resulted in a number of violent ethnic conflicts, among which the Bosnian-Herzegovinian was the most intense one. Its constitutional order, which came as a result of the Dayton Peace Process, is an experiment of the International Community1 but, at the same time, the only realistic and legitimate solution, despite all of its deficiencies. Among other objectives, this doctoral research represents an attempt to plausibly demonstrate why the current constitutional order in Bosnia and Herzegovina hinders its European integration and successful completion of the state-building process. The demise of communism resulted in a turbulent transformation process in Eastern Europe, thereby enabling a healthy democratization process with effective left-right polarization. This was not the case in some multiethnic states. The political elites of Bosnia and Herzegovina are primarily nationalist, ethnic and have opposing views on Bosnian-Herzegovinian history, language(s) and statehood. The question which one may ask is whether, in absence of these prerequisites, it is possible to further pursue state-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Former Croatian Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader (2003-2009), once used the term constitutional patriotism2 while discussing the challenges of its immediate neighbor. If three main ethnic groups fail in defining a common view on Bosnian-Herzegovinian statehood, how can the International Community keep encouraging state-building? Is it just a utopian project or can it end up being a success story which enshrines European values of compromise-finding and consensus-building? Bosnia and Herzegovina has a complex, multi-level political system and it is an absolute necessity to provide a detailed analysis of its constitutional order to be able to comment on the challenges of its statehood. If you try to simplify things and argue that all 1 The capitalized expression International Community, used throughout the text, refers to the bulk of sovereign states that, primarily through the framework of the United Nations and its Security Council, exercise influence on the international order and have been heavily involved in both the attempts to solve the Yugoslav Crisis, the Yugoslav Wars and the problems arising from post-conflict state-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2 This is a term (Verfassungspartriotismus) that he borrowed from German political tradition after the Second World War. 1 ethnic groups are politically represented and its people vote for political parties, you can already optimistically argue that they identify with the state. Although the political parties they elect have different political programs, different mid and long-term aspirations, the supremacy of the ethnic factor is what prevents the country from functioning. Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a state government but the Council of Ministers. All posts are rotated among ethnic groups and there is absolutely no possibility for the Chairman (Prime Minister) to set clear goals and long term economic and political strategy because he/she knows that someone else will take up these duties after four years. Any change favoring centralization and transfer of powers from strong entities is vehemently opposed by Serbs, who, at the very beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, boycotted the Referendum on Independence. 3 On the contrary, the Bosniak side is eager to strengthen the state by transferring powers from entities and establishing new government departments and agencies on the state level. Croats, as the third main ethnic group, pursue their own interests by demanding their own entity which they had until 19944 and the founding of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of two present-day entities, the second being the Republic of Srpska. Because of opposing views on statehood, there is no cross-ethnic programmatic cooperation between political parties. Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a product of a diplomatic stalemate, which has since the end of the four-year civil war been in the state of negative peace (Kaldor, 2003). It is a challenge to determine which political system would be simultaneously the most functional, legitimate and realistic one, given the complex decision- making process at the state level. This doctoral research is also an attempt to elaborate on the pros and cons of federal, confederal and other relevant models which come into question when discussing a long-term constitutional solution for this