South Carolina Law Review Volume 17 Issue 4 Article 9 1964 Comments Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation (1964) "Comments," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 17 : Iss. 4 , Article 9. Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss4/9 This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. et al.: Comments COMMENTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUPREME COURT SCOPE OF REVIEW-STATE SOVEREIGNTY V. COURT PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS* I. INTRODUCTION The validity of a state felony arrest without a warrant is an issue that has been much litigated, and its resolution is of in- creasing importance. Because of the many instances where an arrest must be made without a warrant and because of the danger of tainting the evidence seized if the arrest is adjudged illegal,' it is imperative that the standards used to determine the validity of such an arrest be clearly stated. Despite this need for clear and definite rules, a cloud of doubt and speculation hovers over this area. Rules have been promulgated, but they lack certainty and are difficult to apply to specific factual situations. Like most questions of individual rights and freedoms, the problem of a valid arrest arises from the interpretations given to the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. The Su- preme Court has held that the fourth amendment applies alike to questions of arrest as well as search and seizure. 2 They have further held that the freedoms guaranteed by the fourth amend- ment are an essential element in the concept of ordered liberty, and, as such, are entitled to the protection of the fourteenth amendment against illegal state action.3 In order to insure this protection, the Court has indicated its intent to make an inde- pendent examination of the facts in each case that alleges a vio- lation of constitutional freedoms.4 Before discussing the specific problems of felony arrests with- out a warrant, it may be beneficial to trace the general develop- * Beck v. Ohio (Sup. Ct 1964). 1. Both federal and state courts must exclude from a trial all evidence that was illegally obtained. When incident to a valid arrest even without a warrant, seized evidence is admissible. However, where the arrest is invalid, the subse- quent search and seizure is also invalid, and any evidence acquired thereby must be excluded as "fruits of the poisonous tree." The federal exclusionary rule was established by Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). It was not until 1961 that the states were subjected to the same requirement by Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 2. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). 3. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 4. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963). 553 Published by Scholar Commons, 1964 1 SouTH CARoLINA LAW REYV EW [Vol. 17 South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1964], Art. 9 ment of constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court as they affect state actions in the criminal field. II. Is STAT SovEREiN~TY BEING SACRIFICED? By holding in Tolf v. Colorado5 that the fourth amendment was applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend- ment, the Supreme Court initiated an inquiry into two separate, but related, areas. First, in determining whether a case met the fundamental constitutional criteria required by the fourteenth amendment, how close would the Court come to making a de novo review? Second, to what extent did the Court intend to interfere with state rules and decisions? A. Enlargement of the Supreme Court's Socope of Review The Court has frequently stated the rules of review to which it adheres. While it is within their province to determine whether a state court's finding is supported by sufficient evidence, such an inquiry is generally limited to the undisputed sections of the record." Any conflict is presumed to come to the Supreme Court authoritatively resolved by the state's adjudication.' This rule of noninterference applies to cases where the conflict is in the evidence and to cases where the conflict is in the factual infer- ences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. That is, where the conclusions depend on an appreciation of facts and circumstances which admit of different interpretations, the con- clusions of the lower court will be accepted.8 Further, where the evidence is not in the record, or where only part of the evidence is present, the presumption is that it was sufficient to sustain the judgment. 9 While it appears that these rules of appellate review are well established, where a violation of constitutional rights is alleged, there is a tendency in the Supreme Court to approach each case de novo. In dealing with a question of constitutionality the court must determine if the action, whether state or federal, was rea- 5. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 6. See Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 402 (1958) ; Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Johnson Oil & Ref. Co. v. State ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933) ; Berdler v. South Carolina Tax Comn'n, 282 U.S. 1 (1930). 7. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949). 8. See General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1940); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Lowell, 151 U.S. 209 (1894). 9. International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934). https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss4/9 2 1965] CoXMTset al.: Comments sonable in light of constitutional guarantees. As early as 1931 the Court stated that there was no formula for the determination of reasonableness and that each case was to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. 10 The Court reasoned that the only way they could determine whether the constitutional requirements had been met was to look at the particular facts of each case. It would be impossible for the Court to accept the state court's findings of fact in toto because of the restrictions it would place on the Court's duty to uphold the Constitution.11 Thus, the only feasible approach was for the Court to review the state court's determination of the issues, and obviously this could not be accomplished without an independent examination of the facts and circumstances of each case. Such an examination borders closely on de novo review. How close the Court's review is to de novo review depends on the extent to which they intend to carry on their independent determinations. Recently, in Ker v. California12 the Court has attempted to define the limits of their review. Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for eight members of the Court, stated that it would be impossible to lay down a fixed formula to apply in specific cases; rather, the Court will be met with the recurring questions of reasonableness. 13 In attempting to strike a balance between def- erence to lower court findings and independent review by the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Clark stated that the question of reasonableness is to be determined first by the trial court, and their findings will be accorded the usual weight.-4 However, he then indicated that while the findings of reasonableness are in the first instance for the trial court, they will be respected by the Supreme Court only insofar as they are consistent with federal constitutional guarantees. Mr. Justice Clark indicated that when it was necessary to the determination of constitutional rights, the Court would make a thorough and independent exam- ination of the facts to determine whether the trial court had re- spected the "fundamental" or "constitutional" criteria. 5 10. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). 11. [T]his Court cannot allow itself to be completely bound by a state court determination of any issue essential to the decision of a claim of federal right, in view of the fact that the federal law could then be frustrated by distorted fact finding... Stein v. People, 346 U.S. 156, 181 (1953). 12. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 13. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963). 14. Id. at 31-32, quoting excerpts from Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961). 15. Id. at 34. Published by Scholar Commons, 1964 3 South SOUTrCarolina CAROLINA Law Review, LAW Vol. REvw[ 17, Iss. 4 [1964], Art.[Vol. 9 17 B. Supreme Court Criteria-FromWhat Source? In addition to the Court's general power of review over state court cases, it has a supervisory authority over proceedings orig- inating in federal courts, 16 and as a necessary adjunct to this supervisory authority, the Court has formulated specific require- ments that a federal arrest must meet when its constitutionality is questioned in a federal jurisdiction. The Court has frequently indicated that these requirements are more stringent than those used when state jurisdictions are involved.17 The Supreme Court has stated that in order for a state arrest to be adjudged valid, it must meet the fundamental criteria established by the fourteenth amendment. This fundamental criteria was not considered to arise from the same sources as the supervisory requirements ap- plied to federal actions. However, while the supervisory require- ments were set out in specific written rules, fundamental criteria was merely a concept devoid of tangibility.