CHAPTER THIRTEEN OLD HABITS IN NEW CLOTHES, OR CLIENTELISM, PATRONAGE AND THE UNIÓN DEMÓCRATA INDEPENDIENTE Marcus Klein* One of the more unexpected developments in Chilean politics in recent years has been the ‘impressive rise’ to prominence of the Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union, UDI), the de facto ‘governmental party’ (partido ofi cialista)—if not in name then in spirit—of the military regime headed by General Augusto Pinochet between 1973 and 1990 (Stanley 1983; Angell 2005).1 From being a group that received slightly less than 10 per cent in the foundational elections of 1989 and with basically the same number of votes just clear of this mark in the fi rst municipal elections three years later, the UDI turned into the strongest party in the country at the beginning of the new millennium. In the congressional elections of 2001, it obtained a little over 25 per cent of the popular vote and elected thirty-one depu- ties to the 120-seat lower house of parliament, overtaking the Christian Democrats (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC)—the dominant party of the centre-left Concertación that has been ruling the country in the post-authoritarian era—in terms of number of votes and deputies. Th e Independent Democrats defended their leading position in the congressional elections four years later, even though in comparison with the previous polls they lost about three per cent (or 71,000 votes) while the PDC also narrowed the gap by regaining some of its popular * Th e author would like to thank Patricio Silva and especially Juan Pablo Luna for their thoughtful and stimulating comments. Th e usual caveats apply. An earlier version of this article originally appeared under the title ‘Th e Unión Demócrata Independiente and the Poor (1983–1992): Th e Survival of Clientelistic Traditions in Chilean Politics’ in volume 41 (2001), pp. 301–324, of the Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas. 1 In a preliminary note, Angell also points out that this development was not fore- seeable when the original version of the article, jointly authored with Benny Pollack, was published in 1990. 296 marcus klein support (but not its number of deputies, which the UDI, by contrast, increased by two).2 Various explanations have been put forward to account for the rise of the UDI, and many diff erent factors come into play. Suffi ce it to say, one reason is its growing appeal to the sectores populares (Joignant and Navia 2003; San Francisco 2003; Barozet 2003; Klein 2004; Luna 2007). Following its success in 2001, the UDI therefore self-assuredly described itself as the new and truly ‘partido popular’. Patricio Melero Abaroa, the party’s secretary-general at the time, justifi ed this slogan with the strong following the UDI enjoyed amongst the poorer sectors of the Chilean population. In accounting for this ‘fact’, Melero Abaroa emphasized his party’s allegedly selfl ess and devoted work at the local level since its foundation in late September 1983. With its ‘idealism’, emphasis on solidarity, ‘special sense of public service’, defence of ‘Western Christian Humanism’, and ‘fi rm adherence to the social market economy’, the deputy representing one of the less developed electoral districts of Greater Santiago since 1989 declared the UDI ‘had provided the only real alternative to the Left , which for years had only contami- nated the poor with its destructive message of class struggle. Because of its creed his party also had overcome the initial reluctance of the pobladores, who had been disappointed with traditional party politics and politicians only interested in them as voters immediately before the elections. Not even the violent resistance of the ‘most radicalized Left ’ against the attempts on the part of UDI militants to gain a foothold in the slum area had prevented its progress (Melero Abaroa 2002).3 Melero Abaroa’s description of events is not without its merits but, unsurprisingly, it only tells one part of the story. Th e signifi cant sup- port that the UDI gets from the poorer sectors of Chilean society is undeniable. However, it is diffi cult to accept that the party’s work at grassroots level would have shown any lasting impact if it had just relied on what Melero Abaroa described as its idealism and struggle against the extreme Left . Although opposition to the latter, and particularly to the militant Communist activists working in the shantytowns, for instance, may help to explain the initial support of some sectors that seem to have shared the UDI worldview and thus, by implication, would have rejected the extreme Left ’s strategy of violently confronting 2 For results, cf. www.elecciones.gov.cl. 3 Melero Abaroa is a deputy for the 16th electoral district, comprising the munici- palities of Colina, Lampa, Pudahuel, Quilicura, and Tiltil..