View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Springer - Publisher Connector Ethics Inf Technol (2012) 14:53–60 DOI 10.1007/s10676-011-9279-1 ORIGINAL PAPER Can we trust robots? Mark Coeckelbergh Published online: 3 September 2011 Ó The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract Can we trust robots? Responding to the litera- they rise up against us? But there is a broader and certainly ture on trust and e-trust, this paper asks if the question of more urgent issue about trust in intelligent autonomous trust is applicable to robots, discusses different approaches technologies that are already available today or will be to trust, and analyses some preconditions for trust. In the available soon. Robotics for entertainment, sex, health course of the paper a phenomenological-social approach to care, and military applications are fast developing fields of trust is articulated, which provides a way of thinking about research, autonomous cars are being developed, remote trust that puts less emphasis on individual choice and controlled robots are used in medicine and in the military, control than the contractarian-individualist approach. In and we already heavily rely on semi-robots such as auto- addition, the argument is made that while robots are neither pilot-airplanes. And of course we (often heavily) rely on human nor mere tools, we have sufficient functional, computers and other information technology in our daily agency-based, appearance-based, social-relational, and lives. The more we rely on these technologies, the more existential criteria left to evaluate trust in robots. It is also urgent becomes the issue of trust. As Taddeo writes in her argued that such evaluations must be sensitive to cultural introduction to a special issue devoted to trust in differences, which impact on how we interpret the criteria technology: and how we think of trust in robots. Finally, it is suggested As the outsourcing to (informational) artefacts that when it comes to shaping conditions under which becomes more pervasive, the trust and the depen- humans can trust robots, fine-tuning human expectations dence of the users on such artefacts also grow, and robotic appearances is advisable. bringing to the fore [issues] like the nature of trust, the necessary requirements for its occurrence, whe- Keywords Trust Á Ethics Á Robots Á Social relations Á ther trust can be developed toward an artefact or can Phenomenology Á Culture only concern human beings (…). (Taddeo 2010b, p. 283) Introduction In other words, we already delegate tasks to machines and apparently we already trust them (I will return to this point To frame the ethical question concerning robotics in terms below). This seems also the case with robots. But do we of trust may easily suggest science-fiction scenarios like have good reasons to trust robots?1 Do we need to develop the story in the film ‘I, robot’ in which robots become what Wallach and Allen call ‘moral machines’ (Wallach artificially intelligent to such an extent that humans wonder and Allen 2008) in order to make robots trustworthy and if they can be trusted—which is usually interpreted as: Will avoid misuse of our trust? Does that mean we have to develop rational artificial agents? Is it appropriate at all to talk about trust here? M. Coeckelbergh (&) Department of Philosophy, University of Twente, Postbus 217, 7500 AE Enschede, Netherlands 1 We should also ask: Do they have reasons to trust us? I will discuss e-mail: [email protected] this question elsewhere. 123 54 M. Coeckelbergh In this paper, I postpone a direct analysis of the conditions But does this mean that trusting artefacts is only about under which we can trust robots. Rather, I discuss what reliance? Or does it mean that, as Pitt argues (Pitt 2010), trust means in relation to robots. First I provide a more the question about trust in technology comes down to general, brief analysis of trust: I discuss different approa- trusting people (to do this or that)?2 ches to analysing the conditions of trust (worthiness) in relation to artefacts and to people in general. This gives me some preconditions for trust. In the process I also comment Trusting people on (other) discussions of trust in the literature on trust and e-trust. Then I explore if we can apply these preconditions In relation to people, the question of trust is different and to robots and how different approaches shed light on this more complicated than reliance. Trust is generally regarded question. I argue that in so far as robots appear human, as something that develops within (or establishes) a rela- trusting them requires that they fulfil demanding criteria tion between humans (usually called a trustor and a trus- concerning the appearance of language use, freedom, and tee) that has ethical aspects (or creates an ethical social relations. This kind of virtual trust develops in sci- dimension). ence-fiction scenarios and can even become a question of ‘mutual’ trust. However, I also show that even if robots do Trust not appear human and/or do not fulfil these criteria, as is the case today, we have sufficient functional, agency- Before I discuss the relation between trust and ethics, let based, social-relational, and existential criteria left to talk me first say something about trust and how it is usually about, and evaluate, trust in robots. Finally, I argue that all approached, which influences the interpretation of the criteria depend to some degree on the culture in which one definition just given. lives and that therefore to evaluate trust in robots we have I propose that we distinguish between a contractarian- to attend to, and understand, differences in cultural attitude individualist and a phenomenological-social approach to towards technology (and robots in particular) and, more trust and its relation to ethics. In the former approach, there generally, cultural differences in ways of seeing and ways are ‘first’ individuals who ‘then’ create a social relation (in of doing. particular social expectations) and hence trust between By proceeding in this way, I hope not only to contribute them. In the latter approach, the social or the community is to the normative-ethical discussion about trust in robots, prior to the individual, which means that when we talk but also to discussions about how to approach information about trust in the context of a given relation between ethics and ethics of robotics. humans, it is presupposed rather than created. Here trust cannot be captured in a formula and is something given, not entirely within anyone’s control. Trusting artefacts I take most standard accounts of trust to belong to the contractarian-individualist category. For example, in phi- Although the notion of trust is usually applied to human– losophy of information technology Taddeo’s overview of human relations, we sometimes say of an artefact that we the debate on trust and e-trust, and indeed her own work on (do not) trust it. What we mean then is that we expect the e-trust, is formulated within a contractarian-individualist artefact to function, that is, to do what it is meant to do as framework (Taddeo 2009, 2010a, b). an instrument to attain goals set by humans. Although we In her overview (Taddeo 2009) she discusses Luhmann do not have full epistemic certainty that the instrument will (1979) and Gambetta (1988). Luhmann’s analysis starts actually function, we expect it do so. For example, one may from the problem of co-ordination. Trust is seen as a trust a cleaning robot to do what it’s supposed to do— response to that problem: it is needed to reduce complexity cleaning. This kind of trust is what sometimes is called and uncertainty. Thus, the analysis starts from individuals ‘trust as reliance’. and then it is questioned how the social can come into Related to this type of direct trust in artefacts is indirect existence (if at all). Similarly, when Gambetta defines trust trust in the humans related to the technology: we trust that the as ‘a particular level of the subjective probability with designer has done a good job to avoid bad outcomes and—if which an agent assesses that another agent or group of we are not ourselves the users—we trust that the users will agents will perform a particular action’ (Gambetta 1988, make good use of it, that is, that they will use the artefact for p. 216), we find ourselves in a kind of game-theoretical morally justifiable purposes. For example, military use of robots and artificially intelligent systems may be controversial 2 In a later section of this paper, I will question these instrumentalist because the (human) aims may be controversial (military and one-sided views of trust in technology (and trust in robots in action in general or particular uses, actions and targets). particular). 123 Can we trust robots? 55 setting typical of contractarian views of the social. Whether social human condition. But is this still about ethics? Is this or not to trust someone else is a matter of decision and still about trust? choice. The agent calculates (at least in Gambetta’s view) This leads me to the question: How do the different and cooperative relations are the result of these choices and approaches conceptualize the relation between trust and calculations. ethics? Taddeo’s account of e-trust differs from these views but does not question the contractarian-individualist paradigm Trust and ethics itself. E-trust may arise between agents under certain conditions (Taddeo 2009; see also Turili et al.