Meeting Summary Brazil in the World: Brazil's New Role in Global Institutions and the British Response 6 November 2012 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document’s author(s). The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. Brazil in the World: Brazil's New Role in Global Institutions and the British Response KEY POINTS • In 2012, Brazil became the seventh largest economy in the world. In 2013, it may drop a few positions because of the currency situation, but it will stay among the 10 largest. In 11 years, Brazil’s economy has grown by 209 per cent. • Despite these impressive figures, the tax rate (36 per cent) is a major problem for Brazil. Although there is no fiscal deficit, there is a deficit of investments (below 20 per cent of GDP in the last six to seven years) because of the heavy tax burden. • Investment in infrastructure is also below two per cent of GDP, which is catastrophic for Brazil (for example it is eight per cent of GDP in China and six per cent of GDP in Colombia). The government and the private sector are not investing. Protectionism is also a problem. Productivity is another worry for the Brazilian economy; it has been growing very slowly. • As a global trader, Brazil has no other option but to focus on multilateralism. It has played a leading role in the Doha round, challenging the advanced economies to deliver their promised development agenda and has actively contributed to the core negotiating groups and to the debates on WTO reforms. • Brazil has an emphatic realist approach in its foreign policy but implemented with a twist, which is the focus on soft power and the consistent defence of autonomy and non-intervention. • Brazil seeks UN Security Council reform, supporting greater representation, including a permanent seat for itself. Brazil has been vague on how the Security Council should work. Instead, it prefers to draw attention to specific problems such as the need for sanctions reform. • On climate change, Brazil was well positioned to wield influence both given its historic role being the spokesperson for the G-77 and also its emerging role as one of the key countries in the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit (along China, South Africa and India). However, in the last few years the coalitions of the G-77 have been shifting and it is unclear whether Brazil will proactively act to shape its role by moving forward from its previous alliances or whether it will have its role shaped by others. • In Africa, Brazil’s engagement has changed dramatically since 2007–08, when the biggest oil discovery in 20 years was made in the country. In coming years, Brazil will become a major oil exporter and its demand for oil from Africa will diminish. Today Africa is becoming a growing consumer market and Brazil looks at it as a promising market to export its goods and services. However, Brazil’s interests in Africa go beyond the economic sphere. Its engagement has been shaped by its commitment to Africa’s development challenges and seeking support for Security Council reform. www.chathamhouse.org 2 Brazil in the World: Brazil's New Role in Global Institutions and the British Response PROGRAMME Session 1: Brazil and the UN Prof Maria Regina Soares de Lima | Institute for Social Research and Policy (IESP/UERJ) Ambassador Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves | President, CEBRI Chair: Prof Victor Bulmer- Thomas CMG OBE | Associate Fellow, Chatham House Session 2: Brazil and the G20, Brazil and the WTO Dr José Pio Borges | Partner Manager, RJX Investimento Ltd; former Chairman, Brazilian Development Bank Dr Mahrukh Doctor | University of Hull Chair: Dr Timothy Power | Associate Fellow, Chatham House Session 3: Brazil and the Climate Change Negotiation Adilson de Oliveira | Professor, Instituto de Economia, UFRJ and Director, Colégio Brasileiro de Altos Estudos Shane Tomlinson | Director of Development, E3G, Third Generation Environmentalism Chair: Robert Bailey | Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources, Chatham House Session 4: Brazil and Africa Christina Stolte | German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg Dr Marco Vieira | Lecturer in International Relations, University of Birmingham Chair: Alex Vines OBE | Head, Africa Programme and Research Director, Area Studies and International Law, Chatham House www.chathamhouse.org 3 Brazil in the World: Brazil's New Role in Global Institutions and the British Response SESSION 1: BRAZIL AND THE UN Topics: This session included discussion of Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council but also its existing role in UN missions such as MINUSTAH Maria Regina Soares de Lima Soft balancing and soft power as major strategies of Brazil in the UN Brazil has used soft balancing behaviour and soft power instruments in the United Nations to push for reform of the collective security system. This strategy combines a concern with the legalization of rules to control the use of force and to further institutionalize the collective security system, combining soft balancing behaviour with a constructive engagement to reach those objectives. Brazil and the other IBSA countries (i.e. India and South Africa) are not revisionist powers; they want to reform the UN framework rather than to contest the structure of world power. The reform of the UN Security Council and Brazil Brazilian participation in multilateral forums has been a recurring theme of the country’s foreign policy since the late nineteenth century. Brazil participated in all conferences leading to the structure of the post-1945 world order. During the 1960s and 1970s its multilateral activism focused on development with an emphasis on North-South issues and a lower profile in East-West issues. Nonetheless, Brazil has been a consistent critic of the global collective security system in dealing with international conflicts through the prism of the balance of power. Among developing countries, Brazil and India have occupied more regularly a non-permanent seat in the Security Council. Between 1946 and 1967, Brazil occupied a non-permanent member seat five times and since 1988 it has occupied a seat another five times. The Brazilian position in the reform agenda of the UN focuses on three points: a) the defence of multilateral principles and norms, especially in cases involving the authorization for the use of force pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter; b) innovative solutions capable of establishing conceptual boundaries between mechanisms for the maintenance of peace and those for peace imposition; and c) changes in the decision-making framework of the Security Council, with the objective of allowing it more representativeness and legitimacy in the post-Cold War order. (a) The emphasis on multilateralism reflects Brazil’s classical national identity as a mediator in multilateral diplomacy. Traditionally, the role of mediator has been played out in the realm of North- South negotiations. More recently, its role as mediator has been expanded to encompass issues of global security and reflects, from a Brazilian perspective, its capacity to forge consensus between extreme positions within the world order. (b) The conceptual distinction between ‘peacekeeping’ operations and ‘peace enforcement’ missions, which imply the use of force, adds three basic components to Brazilian foreign policy: the defence of the principle of non-intervention; adherence to peaceful settlement of disputes; and the notion that security threats stem first and foremost from economic causes. The Brazilian concern is focused on the multiplication of sanctioning regimes and the need to regulate them in such a way as to neutralize their arbitrary use by the permanent members, and on the need to add ‘preventive diplomacy’ measures to international cooperation for development. The creation of a Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, as suggested by the High Level Panel and endorsed by the report by Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2005 gave Brazil the opportunity to play a prominent role in the 2004–05 biennium during its mandate in the Security Council and to reaffirm its desire to include development-related issues in the mandates of peace operations. (c) Regarding Security Council reform, the Brazilian position is to support greater representation and particularly the increase of the number of permanent seats. Brazil’s aspiration to occupy a seat was officially announced in 1994 by then chancellor Celso Amorim, and since then this policy has been adopted by all succeeding governments. Brazil believes that the expansion of the Security www.chathamhouse.org 4 Brazil in the World: Brazil's New Role in Global Institutions and the British Response Council is justified by the need to respond to the changes that unfolded in the post-Cold War period and to the considerable increase in the number of UN members since the last round of expansion in the 1960s. A greater representation would confer a greater legitimacy and effectiveness to the decisions of the Council. In 2004, Germany, Japan, India and Brazil constituted the G-4 with the aim of coordinating common position for the expansion of the Security Council.