TO DEFEND, OR NOT TO DEFEND: UNDERSTANDING HOW STATES VIEW STRONG AND WEAK REPUTATIONS A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By DongJoon Park, M.A. Washington DC July 14, 2020 Copyright 2020 by DongJoon Park All Rights Reserved ii TO DEFEND, OR NOT TO DEFEND: UNDERSTANDING HOW STATES VIEW STRONG AND WEAK REPUTATIONS DongJoon Park, M.A. Dissertation Adviser: David M. Edelstein, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Why do states back down during crises despite the risk of harming their reputation for resolve? The existing literature contends that leaders believe, perhaps more than they should, that cultivating a strong reputation for resolve is vital for their states’ national security as it enhances both their credibility and ability to deter threats. Based on this logic, the existing literature stipulates that states back down when actors care less about their reputation for resolve because these strategic advantages are absent or perceived to be irrelevant. In contrast, this dissertation contends that states and leaders may still decide to acquiesce during crises because of the long- term costs of saving face and the benefits of cultivating a ‘weaker’ reputation for resolve. Specifically, I propose the theory of moderate reputation for resolve and argue that two factors, fears of reputation races and greater emphasis on the process of negotiations rather than its outcomes, cause states to prefer moderate rather than strong reputation for resolve. States and leaders that reach this conclusion will be more likely to back down during crises as a way of managing their reputation. I verify these claims through qualitative analysis of four case studies; US-China relations during the 1950s in the context of the first and second Taiwan Strait crises; South Korea’s response to the Blue House Raid in 1968; South Korea’s foreign policy during the 1980s after the Rangoon Bombing incident in 1983; and Britain’s policy of appeasement during the 1930s. This dissertation contributes to our understanding of how reputations matter in international relations by illustrating that decisions to back down can also be caused by iii reputational concerns, not despite it. By demonstrating how states and leaders may intentionally choose to not only defend but also concede their reputation for resolve due to the respective costs and benefits of maintaining either strong and moderate reputations, I highlight how a state’s reputation is an asset that needs to be not uniformly strengthened but rather adroitly maintained through the use of force regardless of the circumstances and their foreign policy objectives. iv I have been helped and guided by a great number of mentors, friends, and colleagues at the Department of Government at Georgetown University. This dissertation wouldn’t have been possible without the support and encouragement of my dissertation chair and mentor, Dr. David Edelstein, and my committee members, Dr. Andrew Bennett and Dr. Daniel Byman. My cohort, Alex, Andrew, Caitlin, Erum, Inu, Jeff, Kristen, Nikhil, and Shubha, were the best intellectual companions that one could have ever wished for. My sister, Hyelim Park, quietly backed me and allowed me to concentrate on my work in more ways than I can count. My wife, Hyeji Kim, and our son, Theo, who was born as I was rushing towards completion were sources of inspiration and immense joy as I labored through this long process. I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Sanghyuk Park and Hyunsoon Han, who have always been there for me and have unwaveringly believed in me throughout my life and continue to do so as I embark on the next chapter of my career in which I will be building on my own reputation. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................1 Chapter 2. The Role of Reputation for Resolve in Crisis Decision-Making ................................13 Chapter 3. Managing US Reputation for Resolve in the Taiwan Straits in the 1950s ..................61 Chapter 4. Park’s Logic for a Strong Reputation for Resolve ....................................................106 Chapter 5. Chun’s Logic for a Moderate Reputation for Resolve ..............................................143 Chapter 6. Revisiting British Appeasement ................................................................................176 Chapter 7. Conclusion .................................................................................................................213 Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................235 vi CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION Why do states back down despite the risk of harming their reputation for resolve? Why do some states choose to bolster their reputations through the threat or actual use of force while others refrain from doing so? In this dissertation, I will demonstrate that the decision to either stand firm or back down during crises to either defend or concede one’s reputation for resolve can be explained by how actors evaluate the costs and benefits of cultivating a strong reputation for resolve. Specifically, I argue that states and leaders choose to back down when they believe that a strong reputation for resolve may actually harm their national interests rather than promote it. Under such circumstances, these actors conclude that weakening or, more accurately, fostering a moderate reputation for resolve better aligns with its foreign policy objectives as it avoids escalatory cycles and makes negotiations possible. This, in turn, causes states and leaders to back down during crises despite the risk of their actions being perceived as a sign of weakness by its intended audience. Based on my theory of moderate reputation for resolve, I illustrate how reputational concerns that are conventionally understood to only incentivize states to act forcefully can also motivate them to acquiesce. Countless studies in the field of international relations have discussed how reputations influence interstate affairs. Particularly since the onset of the Cold War, building a strong reputation for resolve was considered a crucial part of a state’s national security posture. Schelling famously asserted that ‘face’ is “one of the few things worth fighting for”, and that losing 30,000 soldiers during the Korean War was necessary to bolster America’s reputation for resolve in the eyes of the Soviet Union.1 The underlying logic of his claim was that the 1 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 124-25. 1 short-term costs of strengthening one’s reputation were worth bearing given the long-term benefits of preventing future threats by enhancing states’ ability to deter their adversaries. In recent years, some scholars have claimed that the importance of the concept has been exaggerated and that actors’ reputations are not as potent in international relations as it might be in domestic or societal settings.2 These rejoinders notwithstanding, the predominant view remains that a state’s reputation is an important political asset that needs to be properly managed. The pervasiveness of this belief is more palpable in the policy realm as the need to demonstrate resolve is frequently cited to justify military actions. But the renewed scholarly interest in the topic as a result of this debate on whether reputations matter in international relations has undeniably expanded our understanding of why states choose to defend their reputations and when they are most likely to do so. However, whether and how reputational considerations affect decisions to acquiesce during crises remains under-theorized. In general, we tend to interpret such cases as instances where reputations mattered less or were not part of the deliberative process. This can occur in multiple ways. States and leaders may choose to disregard the concept in certain cases due to various reasons or fail to recognize the strategic importance of maintaining a strong reputation for resolve. But there also exists a subset of cases where such explanations are insufficient. Moreover, these arguments are predicated on the belief that actors uniformly believe that cultivating a robust reputation for resolve is beneficial. If not, considering one’s reputation should not necessarily automatically result in its defense. When might states consider a strong reputation for resolve as potentially harmful? What are some unidentified risks and costs that cause states and leaders to reach this rather counter-intuitive conclusion? By addressing these research questions, this dissertation proposes a novel theory that suggests that decisions to concede during a crisis are directly caused by the realization that 2 Max Fisher, “Do U.S. Strikes Send a ‘Message’ to Rivals? There’s No Evidence,” The New York Times, April 21, 2017. 2 moderating one’s reputation is preferable to defending it. The central argument of this dissertation is based on a simple premise. Conventional wisdom stipulates that states are expected to stand firm and defend their reputation because they believe that a strong reputation for resolve is in their best interests. Following the same logic, I hypothesize that states are most likely to back down when they assume that a ‘weaker’ reputation for resolve best achieves their